medical rule in California

2014(See Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123 [“‘“[w]hen a defendant [in a medical malpractice case] moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence”’”]; Selden v. Dinner (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 [“a medical standard of care can only be established by way of expert medical testimony”]; Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984 [because plaintiffs “failed t

1993(Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) Significantly, a medical standard of care can only be established by way of expert medical testimony.

2015(People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 471, 474-475, 477-479 .) Here, there is no dispute that defendant had a “facially valid” physician’s recommendation to use medical marijuana, defendant presented evidence he possessed the concentrated cannabis to treat his medical conditions, and no evidence was presented to the contrary.

2014(People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 471, 474-475, 477-479 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) Here, there is no dispute that defendant had a “facially valid” physician’s recommendation to use medical marijuana, defendant presented evidence he possessed the concentrated cannabis to treat his medical conditions, and no evidence was presented to the contrary.

2025(See Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 189 ; Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601 , 607–608.) Rather, Hanson addresses whether an expert declaration contained causation and standard of care opinions that were sufficiently specific and definite to avoid summary judgment. ( Hanson, supra, at pp. 607–608.) The court concluded that “[a]lthough the style of the [expert] declaration is at times a bit obtuse, [the plaintiff] [was] entitled to all favorable inferences that may reasonably be derived from that declaration,” and that the declaration was sufficiently sp

2014VI MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Whiting contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his medical malpractice cause of action based on Whiting not providing any expert testimony 16 refuting Dr. Brown’s expert testimony that Dr. Himelman’s conduct fell within the medical standard of care. “[I]n any medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish: ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduc

2025(Id. at p. 369.) In a medical malpractice case, “fault is measured by the medical standard of care.” (Ibid.) Although Wilson is helpful in understanding that fault requires more than just causation, courts have limited its holding to the rule “that a nonparty medical doctor cannot be found comparatively at fault in a personal injury action unless the defendant proves with expert testimony the doctor failed to meet the applicable standard of care.” (Chakalis v. Elevator 12 Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1561 ; see also Vollaro v. Lispi (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 93, 102 [same].) Inste

2014(Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1570 [ 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 362 ].) The record supports such a finding.

2018"A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applications." ( Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195 , 1206, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) The medical exception (quoted in fn. 2, ante ) on its face is "sufficiently clear to give fair warning of the ... required conduct." ( Schweitzer, at p. 1206, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) v. Section 24175, subdivision (a) Finally, plaintiffs alleged a violation of section 24175, subdivision (a).

2018"A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applications." ( Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195 , 1206, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) The medical exception (quoted in fn. 2, ante ) on its face is "sufficiently clear to give fair warning of the ... required conduct." ( Schweitzer, at p. 1206, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) v. Section 24175, subdivision (a) Finally, plaintiffs alleged a violation of section 24175, subdivision (a).

2025(Id. at p. 369.) In a medical malpractice case, “fault is measured by the medical standard of care.” (Ibid.) Although Wilson is helpful in understanding that fault requires more than just causation, courts have limited its holding to the rule “that a nonparty medical doctor cannot be found comparatively at fault in a personal injury action unless the defendant proves with expert testimony the doctor failed to meet the applicable standard of care.” (Chakalis v. Elevator 12 Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1561 ; see also Vollaro v. Lispi (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 93, 102 [same].) Inste

2024SFFCU relies on Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 7 (Lund), to assert that legally incorrect jury instruction errors cannot be waived.

2024Bard, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 763, 787 [where the appellants acquiesced in an inadequate jury instruction on the medical standard of care, they were estopped from asserting the instructional error on appeal; otherwise, they could employ the “ ‘win-win’ ” gamesmanship of “wait and see what the jury did,” and if the result was not to their liking, argue on appeal the jury was not properly instructed].) Here, as in Transport, SFFCU expressly approved the instructions, including CACI 325, and directed the jury to utilize it in their deliberations.

2014(See Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123 [“‘“[w]hen a defendant [in a medical malpractice case] moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence”’”]; Selden v. Dinner (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 [“a medical standard of care can only be established by way of expert medical testimony”]; Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984 [because plaintiffs “failed t

2014(See Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 123 [“‘“[w]hen a defendant [in a medical malpractice case] moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence”’”]; Selden v. Dinner (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 [“a medical standard of care can only be established by way of expert medical testimony”]; Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984 [because plaintiffs “failed t

2014“The standard of care in a medical malpractice case requires that medical service providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances.” (Alef v. Alta Bates Hospital (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 208, 215 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) This standard of care is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts and therefore expert testimony is required to “prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the prevailing standard of care.” (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519,

2014“The standard of care in a medical malpractice case requires that medical service providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances.” (Alef v. Alta Bates Hospital (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 208, 215 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) This standard of care is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts and therefore expert testimony is required to “prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the prevailing standard of care.” (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519,

2014“The standard of care in a medical malpractice case requires that medical service providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances.” (Alef v. Alta Bates Hospital (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 208, 215 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) This standard of care is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts and therefore expert testimony is required to “prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the prevailing standard of care.” (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519,

2014“The standard of care in a medical malpractice case requires that medical service providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances.” (Alef v. Alta Bates Hospital (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 208, 215 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) This standard of care is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts and therefore expert testimony is required to “prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the prevailing standard of care.” (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519,

2003Whereas “[t]he purpose of [Proposition 215] was to provide a narrow medical exception under medical supervision for use of marijuana as an approved therapeutic agent” (People v. Rigo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 409, 415 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ]), the right to use marijuana based merely upon a physician’s “favorable opinion” toward such a treatment suggests neither the deliberation nor the formal sanction associated with a physician’s recommendation or approval of a particular treatment for a particular patient.

2003Whereas “[t]he purpose of [Proposition 215] was to provide a narrow medical exception under medical supervision for use of marijuana as an approved therapeutic agent” (People v. Rigo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 409, 415 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ]), the right to use marijuana based merely upon a physician’s “favorable opinion” toward such a treatment suggests neither the deliberation nor the formal sanction associated with a physician’s recommendation or approval of a particular treatment for a particular patient.

2002In doing so, the Court of Appeal followed People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1543-1551 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ], People ex rel.

2002In doing so, the Court of Appeal followed People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1543-1551 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ], People ex rel.

2000See generally Roth, Meisel & Ledz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J.Psychiatry 279 (1977).” Courts have recognized that a defendant may make rational choices despite a mental disorder. “ ‘[E]ven though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 ].) Riese recognized that “mental illness ‘often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired, and

2000See generally Roth, Meisel & Ledz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J.Psychiatry 279 (1977).” Courts have recognized that a defendant may make rational choices despite a mental disorder. “ ‘[E]ven though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 ].) Riese recognized that “mental illness ‘often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired, and

2000See generally Roth, Meisel & Ledz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J.Psychiatry 279 (1977).” Courts have recognized that a defendant may make rational choices despite a mental disorder. “ ‘[E]ven though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 ].) Riese recognized that “mental illness ‘often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired, and

2000See generally Roth, Meisel & Ledz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J.Psychiatry 279 (1977).” Courts have recognized that a defendant may make rational choices despite a mental disorder. “ ‘[E]ven though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 ].) Riese recognized that “mental illness ‘often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired, and

2000See generally Roth, Meisel & Ledz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J.Psychiatry 279 (1977).” Courts have recognized that a defendant may make rational choices despite a mental disorder. “ ‘[E]ven though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 ].) Riese recognized that “mental illness ‘often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other areas unimpaired, and

1996The section from which that proposition is derived is entitled: “Psychiatric Examination Not Required [when a defendant seeks to represent himself].” Witkin and Epstein then note: “Mental competency to stand trial ... is not equated with competency to waive the assistance of counsel; even though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.” (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2818, p. 3429.) Witkin and Epstein cite three cases in support of the noted pro

1996The section from which that proposition is derived is entitled: “Psychiatric Examination Not Required [when a defendant seeks to represent himself].” Witkin and Epstein then note: “Mental competency to stand trial ... is not equated with competency to waive the assistance of counsel; even though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.” (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2818, p. 3429.) Witkin and Epstein cite three cases in support of the noted pro

1996The section from which that proposition is derived is entitled: “Psychiatric Examination Not Required [when a defendant seeks to represent himself].” Witkin and Epstein then note: “Mental competency to stand trial ... is not equated with competency to waive the assistance of counsel; even though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.” (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2818, p. 3429.) Witkin and Epstein cite three cases in support of the noted pro

1996The section from which that proposition is derived is entitled: “Psychiatric Examination Not Required [when a defendant seeks to represent himself].” Witkin and Epstein then note: “Mental competency to stand trial ... is not equated with competency to waive the assistance of counsel; even though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.” (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2818, p. 3429.) Witkin and Epstein cite three cases in support of the noted pro

1996The section from which that proposition is derived is entitled: “Psychiatric Examination Not Required [when a defendant seeks to represent himself].” Witkin and Epstein then note: “Mental competency to stand trial ... is not equated with competency to waive the assistance of counsel; even though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.” (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2818, p. 3429.) Witkin and Epstein cite three cases in support of the noted pro

1996The section from which that proposition is derived is entitled: “Psychiatric Examination Not Required [when a defendant seeks to represent himself].” Witkin and Epstein then note: “Mental competency to stand trial ... is not equated with competency to waive the assistance of counsel; even though a defendant has a history of mental disorder, a medical inquiry is not required if it appears that his election to represent himself is knowing and intelligent.” (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2818, p. 3429.) Witkin and Epstein cite three cases in support of the noted pro

1993(Rogoff v. Grabowski (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 624, 633 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 185 ].) What, in the final analysis, separates these cases from Dinner’s broken promise to perform surgery on Selden is Dinner’s independent obligation to meet a medical standard of care in treating Selden.

1993(Rogoff v. Grabowski (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 624, 633 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 185 ].) What, in the final analysis, separates these cases from Dinner’s broken promise to perform surgery on Selden is Dinner’s independent obligation to meet a medical standard of care in treating Selden.