medical standard in West Virginia

1986Our explicit overruling of the locality rule today was presaged in the case of Thornton v. CAMC, 172 W.Va. 360 , 305 S.E.2d 316 (1983) in which the plaintiff assigned as error several defense instructions on the medical standard of care which contained the phrase “in accord with reasonable care and diligence as practiced by accredited physicians and surgeons in a locality similar to that in which defendant Pushkin’s services were rendered.” In that case, Justice Miller pointed out that we had “virtually abandoned” the locality rule in Hundley, supra, and that we had entirely abolished the loca

1986Our explicit overruling of the locality rule today was presaged in the case of Thornton v. CAMC, 172 W.Va. 360 , 305 S.E.2d 316 (1983) in which the plaintiff assigned as error several defense instructions on the medical standard of care which contained the phrase “in accord with reasonable care and diligence as practiced by accredited physicians and surgeons in a locality similar to that in which defendant Pushkin’s services were rendered.” In that case, Justice Miller pointed out that we had “virtually abandoned” the locality rule in Hundley, supra, and that we had entirely abolished the loca

2010Accordingly, the court properly admitted [the nurse’s] testimony of the victim’s statements under the medical exception to the hearsay rule.” Id.

2010In State v. Anderson, 86 Conn.App. 854 , 864 A.2d 35 (2005), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924 , 871 A.2d 1031 , the Connecticut appellate court held that testimony from a certified nurse practitioner regarding information provided by a victim of sexual assault was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule. 864 A.2d at 51 .

2010In State v. Anderson, 86 Conn.App. 854 , 864 A.2d 35 (2005), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924 , 871 A.2d 1031 , the Connecticut appellate court held that testimony from a certified nurse practitioner regarding information provided by a victim of sexual assault was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule. 864 A.2d at 51 .

2010Similarly, in State v. Williams, 137 Wash. App. 736 , 154 P.3d 322 (2007), the Washington Appellate Court found that testimony regarding a victim’s statements to a forensic nurse was admissible due to the fact that the statements were obtained for a “combination” of purposes, both medical and forensic. 154 P.3d at 328 .

2010Similarly, in State v. Williams, 137 Wash. App. 736 , 154 P.3d 322 (2007), the Washington Appellate Court found that testimony regarding a victim’s statements to a forensic nurse was admissible due to the fact that the statements were obtained for a “combination” of purposes, both medical and forensic. 154 P.3d at 328 .

2010Similarly, in State v. Williams, 137 Wash. App. 736 , 154 P.3d 322 (2007), the Washington Appellate Court found that testimony regarding a victim’s statements to a forensic nurse was admissible due to the fact that the statements were obtained for a “combination” of purposes, both medical and forensic. 154 P.3d at 328 .

1999Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 852 . [8] The Hansen court stated the following: To recover medical monitoring damages under Utah law, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) exposure (2) to a toxic substance (3) which exposure was caused by the defendant's negligence (4) resulting in an increased risk (5) of a serious disease, illness or injury (6) for which a medical test for early detection exists (7) and for which early detection is beneficial, meaning that a treatment exists that can alter the course of the illness, and (8) and which test has been prescribed by a qualified physician according to c

1992However, the appellee Ayoubi concedes that under appropriate circumstances, the medical standard of care requires that minors be consulted if they are mature and if the circumstances of the particular case do not militate against such consultation. 9 In Cross v. Trapp, 170 W.Va. 459 , 294 S.E.2d 446 (1982), we reiterated in syllabus point 1 thereto the well-established principle concerning consent to medical procedures: “Except in very extreme cases, a surgeon has no legal right to operate upon a patient without his consent, nor upon a child without the consent of its parent or guardian.” Brow

1992However, the appellee Ayoubi concedes that under appropriate circumstances, the medical standard of care requires that minors be consulted if they are mature and if the circumstances of the particular case do not militate against such consultation. 9 In Cross v. Trapp, 170 W.Va. 459 , 294 S.E.2d 446 (1982), we reiterated in syllabus point 1 thereto the well-established principle concerning consent to medical procedures: “Except in very extreme cases, a surgeon has no legal right to operate upon a patient without his consent, nor upon a child without the consent of its parent or guardian.” Brow

1986Our explicit overruling of the locality rule today was presaged in the case of Thornton v. CAMC, 172 W.Va. 360 , 305 S.E.2d 316 (1983) in which the plaintiff assigned as error several defense instructions on the medical standard of care which contained the phrase “in accord with reasonable care and diligence as practiced by accredited physicians and surgeons in a locality similar to that in which defendant Pushkin’s services were rendered.” In that case, Justice Miller pointed out that we had “virtually abandoned” the locality rule in Hundley, supra, and that we had entirely abolished the loca

1986Our explicit overruling of the locality rule today was presaged in the case of Thornton v. CAMC, 172 W.Va. 360 , 305 S.E.2d 316 (1983) in which the plaintiff assigned as error several defense instructions on the medical standard of care which contained the phrase “in accord with reasonable care and diligence as practiced by accredited physicians and surgeons in a locality similar to that in which defendant Pushkin’s services were rendered.” In that case, Justice Miller pointed out that we had “virtually abandoned” the locality rule in Hundley, supra, and that we had entirely abolished the loca

1984While the people administering these tests, evaluating the tests, and entering orders based upon the tests perform those routine functions scores of times every month, the claimant is possessed of only one set of lungs and one limited life expectancy. 162 W.Va. at 236-237 , 248 S.E.2d at 848 .

1984While the people administering these tests, evaluating the tests, and entering orders based upon the tests perform those routine functions scores of times every month, the claimant is possessed of only one set of lungs and one limited life expectancy. 248 S.E.2d at 848 .