medical standard in Michigan

2022This Court rejected a similar argument in Navarre v Navarre, 191 Mich App 395, 398 ; 479 NW2d 357 (1991), holding that the Legislature did not intend to suspend the medical privilege in custody cases, reasoning as follows: All privileges exist at the expense of suppressing valuable evidence.

2022This Court rejected a similar argument in Navarre v Navarre, 191 Mich App 395, 398 ; 479 NW2d 357 (1991), holding that the Legislature did not intend to suspend the medical privilege in custody cases, reasoning as follows: All privileges exist at the expense of suppressing valuable evidence.

2022Given this montage of issues and positions created by the language of this statute, it would be helpful for the Legislature to reexamine its goal and the policies it wishes to promote and strive to better articulate its intent in that regard. [Stone, 482 Mich at 164 .] Subsequently, in Lanigan v Huron Valley Hosp, Inc, 282 Mich App 558, 562 ; 766 NW2d 896 (2009), the plaintiff patient alleged that the “defendants failed to timely diagnose [a] heart attack, timely order thrombolytic therapy, and timely transfer [the patient] to a facility capable of emergency cardiac intervention[.]” The plaint

2022Given this montage of issues and positions created by the language of this statute, it would be helpful for the Legislature to reexamine its goal and the policies it wishes to promote and strive to better articulate its intent in that regard. [Stone, 482 Mich at 164 .] Subsequently, in Lanigan v Huron Valley Hosp, Inc, 282 Mich App 558, 562 ; 766 NW2d 896 (2009), the plaintiff patient alleged that the “defendants failed to timely diagnose [a] heart attack, timely order thrombolytic therapy, and timely transfer [the patient] to a facility capable of emergency cardiac intervention[.]” The plaint

2022Given this montage of issues and positions created by the language of this statute, it would be helpful for the Legislature to reexamine its goal and the policies it wishes to promote and strive to better articulate its intent in that regard. [Stone, 482 Mich at 164 .] Subsequently, in Lanigan v Huron Valley Hosp, Inc, 282 Mich App 558, 562 ; 766 NW2d 896 (2009), the plaintiff patient alleged that the “defendants failed to timely diagnose [a] heart attack, timely order thrombolytic therapy, and timely transfer [the patient] to a facility capable of emergency cardiac intervention[.]” The plaint

2015This is tantamount to a claim of malpractice. [] [Bryant, 471 Mich at 411 .] [] Plaintiff contends that the claims under the Mental Health Code . . . cannot be considered malpractice claims because they are based on a violation of the statutes.

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] The deletion of the limitation of duty of “ordinaiy” care in the nonstandard instruction is inconsistent with Michigan law as set forth in SJI2d 30.01 and numerous cases such as Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225, 231 ; 26 NW2d 755 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated: “ ‘The law is well settled that a patient who is treated by a physician is entitled to a thorough and careful examination, such as the con

2000Crosby v Prudence Mut Casualty Co, 252 SC 294; 166 SE2d 201 (1969).

1991In Richardson v Jackson Co, 432 Mich 377, 384 ; 443 NW2d 105 (1989), our Supreme Court explained that "[s]tatutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or *399 have the same purpose or object." Here, the purposes of the Child Custody Act and the medical privilege statute are different.

1991In Richardson v Jackson Co, 432 Mich 377, 384 ; 443 NW2d 105 (1989), our Supreme Court explained that "[s]tatutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or *399 have the same purpose or object." Here, the purposes of the Child Custody Act and the medical privilege statute are different.

1980See Wohlfeil v Bankers Life Co, 296 Mich 310 ; 296 NW 269 (1941), and Cartwright, supra. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in preventing the defendant from commenting on the plaintiffs assertion of the physician-patient privilege.

1980As the Court held in Simpson v Hubert, 35 Mich App 523, 528 ; 193 NW2d 68 (1971): "The standard of care, whether the action is against an impostor or a true member of the profession, is the same; both are required to conform to the standard of care of a member of the profession.” Testimony as to the proper medical standard was introduced into the record below through the testimony of a medical doctor, Alvin M.

1980As the Court held in Simpson v Hubert, 35 Mich App 523, 528 ; 193 NW2d 68 (1971): "The standard of care, whether the action is against an impostor or a true member of the profession, is the same; both are required to conform to the standard of care of a member of the profession.” Testimony as to the proper medical standard was introduced into the record below through the testimony of a medical doctor, Alvin M.

1980Gilchrist v Mystic Workers of the World, 188 Mich 466 ; 154 NW 575 (1915), and its progeny have held that a contractual waiver of the medical privilege contained in the application for life insurance is against public policy and void, and the testimony of the attending physicians as to all knowledge obtained by them within the privileged area is inadmissible.

1980Gilchrist v Mystic Workers of the World, 188 Mich 466 ; 154 NW 575 (1915), and its progeny have held that a contractual waiver of the medical privilege contained in the application for life insurance is against public policy and void, and the testimony of the attending physicians as to all knowledge obtained by them within the privileged area is inadmissible.

1975The thrust of defendants’ argument on appeal is that since Dr. Sachs was found by the jury to be free from negligence no liability may be imposed on the principal Detroit General, citing Lamb v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 41 Mich App 287, 290 ; 200 NW2d 88 (1972).

1975The thrust of defendants’ argument on appeal is that since Dr. Sachs was found by the jury to be free from negligence no liability may be imposed on the principal Detroit General, citing Lamb v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 41 Mich App 287, 290 ; 200 NW2d 88 (1972).