policy behind rule in Maryland

2009The policy behind the rule is " ‘that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.' " White v. State, 318 Md. at 744, 569 A.2d 1271 , quoting Simpson v. U.S., 435 U.S. 6, 15 , 98 S.Ct. 909, 914 , 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), which in turn quotes Ladner v. U.S., 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958).

2009The policy behind the rule is “ ‘that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ” White v. State, 318 Md. at 744, 569 A.2d 1271 , quoting Simpson v. U.S., 435 U.S. 6, 15 , 98 S.Ct. 909, 914 , 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), which in turn quotes Ladner v. U.S., 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958).

2009The policy behind the rule is “ ‘that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ” White v. State, 318 Md. at 744, 569 A.2d 1271 , quoting Simpson v. U.S., 435 U.S. 6, 15 , 98 S.Ct. 909, 914 , 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), which in turn quotes Ladner v. U.S., 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958).

2009The policy behind the rule is “ ‘that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ” White v. State, 318 Md. at 744, 569 A.2d 1271 , quoting Simpson v. U.S., 435 U.S. 6, 15 , 98 S.Ct. 909, 914 , 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), which in turn quotes Ladner v. U.S., 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958).

2013As the Court of Appeals stated in Mandel : The Supreme Court noted that official immunity apparently rests on two rationales, (1) the injustice of subjecting to liability an officer who is legally required to exercise discretion, particularly absent bad faith, and (2) the danger of deterring willingness to exercise judgment with decisiveness posed by the threat of liability. 320 Md. at 116-17 , 576 A.2d 766 (citation omitted).

2013As the Court of Appeals stated in Mandel : The Supreme Court noted that official immunity apparently rests on two rationales, (1) the injustice of subjecting to liability an officer who is legally required to exercise discretion, particularly absent bad faith, and (2) the danger of deterring willingness to exercise judgment with decisiveness posed by the threat of liability. 320 Md. at 116-17 , 576 A.2d 766 (citation omitted).

2024App. 536 (2013), counter that the litigation privilege now extends to other tort claims, including these allegations under the MDCDA and MCPA that Collectors made “false claims in a debt collection lawsuit.” In Collectors’ view, restricting the privilege “to ‘defamation-like torts’ is mistaken” because “[t]his Court has made clear that ‘the policy behind the privilege would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’” See id. at 547 (quotin

2024App. 536 (2013), counter that the litigation privilege now extends to other tort claims, including these allegations under the MDCDA and MCPA that Collectors made “false claims in a debt collection lawsuit.” In Collectors’ view, restricting the privilege “to ‘defamation-like torts’ is mistaken” because “[t]his Court has made clear that ‘the policy behind the privilege would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’” See id. at 547 (quotin

2010The policy behind the rule is “that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.” (Internal citations omitted.) Under the rule of lenity, “a court will not impose multiple punishments but will, for sentencing purposes, merge one offense into the other,” with “ ‘the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merg[ing] into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.’ ” Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 356 , 893 A.2d 10

2010The policy behind the rule is “that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.” (Internal citations omitted.) Under the rule of lenity, “a court will not impose multiple punishments but will, for sentencing purposes, merge one offense into the other,” with “ ‘the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merg[ing] into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.’ ” Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 356 , 893 A.2d 10

2001The policy behind the rule of lenity is to prohibit courts from “ ‘interpret[ing] a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ” Monoker, 321 Md. at 222 , 582 A.2d at 529 (quoting White, 318 Md. at 744 , 569 A.2d at 1273 (quoting Simpson, 435 U.S. at 15 , 98 S.Ct. at 914 , 55 L.Ed.2d at 78 (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)))).

2001The policy behind the rule of lenity is to prohibit courts from “ ‘interpret[ing] a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ” Monoker, 321 Md. at 222 , 582 A.2d at 529 (quoting White, 318 Md. at 744 , 569 A.2d at 1273 (quoting Simpson, 435 U.S. at 15 , 98 S.Ct. at 914 , 55 L.Ed.2d at 78 (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 , 79 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)))).

2023Fifth, the defendant or defense counsel must be a party to the violation, Hicks, 285 Md. at 335 , and “seeking” behavior requires some affirmative conduct bearing on 40 scheduling, see Dorsey, 349 Md. at 708–09.

2023Fifth, the defendant or defense counsel must be a party to the violation, Hicks, 285 Md. at 335 , and “seeking” behavior requires some affirmative conduct bearing on 40 scheduling, see Dorsey, 349 Md. at 708–09.

2020The policy behind this rule is that it serves to “balance any unfair prejudice one party may have suffered.” Little v. Schneider, 434 Md. 150 , 163 n.6 (2013).

2019This Court analyzed the Court of Special Appeals reversal, noting that the Court of Special Appeals "explor[ed] the policy behind the privilege statute, rather than the words of the statute." Id. at 389 , 648 A.2d at 982 .

2019This Court analyzed the Court of Special Appeals reversal, noting that the Court of Special Appeals "explor[ed] the policy behind the privilege statute, rather than the words of the statute." Id. at 389 , 648 A.2d at 982 .

2018The policy behind the rule is to "ensure fairness for the parties involved and to promote orderly judicial administration." Id. (quoting Jones v. State , 379 Md. 704 , 714, 843 A.2d 778 (2004) ).

2016Where a verdict is ambiguous, inconsistent, unresponsive, or otherwise defective, it is the duty of the trial judge to call the jury’s attention to the defect and to direct them to put the verdict in proper form either in the presence of the court or by returning to their consultation room for the purpose of further deliberation. 184 Md. at 617−18, 42 A.2d at 130 (see cases cited therein).

2016Where a verdict is ambiguous, inconsistent, unresponsive, or otherwise defective, it is the duty of the trial judge to call the jury’s attention to the defect and to direct them to put the verdict in proper form either in the presence of the court or by returning to their consultation room for the purpose of further deliberation. 184 Md. at 617−18, 42 A.2d at 130 (see cases cited therein).

2013The court in Thornton v. Rhoden agreed that the policy reasons behind the absolute privilege would be defeated if claims beyond defamation were not protected. 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 99 , 53 Cal.Rptr. 706 (1966).

2013The court in Thornton v. Rhoden agreed that the policy reasons behind the absolute privilege would be defeated if claims beyond defamation were not protected. 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 99 , 53 Cal.Rptr. 706 (1966).

2011(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) In Wooten-Bey v. State, 76 Md.App. 603 , 547 A.2d 1086 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 318 Md. 301 , 568 A.2d 16 (1990), *560 we held that when two separate criminal statutes create separate offenses based on different criminal behavior with different criminal consequences, and there is no relevant legislative history suggesting that the Legislature intended to prohibit the imposition of separate sentences for the two separate crimes, the rule of lenity does not apply.

2011(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) In Wooten-Bey v. State, 76 Md.App. 603 , 547 A.2d 1086 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 318 Md. 301 , 568 A.2d 16 (1990), *560 we held that when two separate criminal statutes create separate offenses based on different criminal behavior with different criminal consequences, and there is no relevant legislative history suggesting that the Legislature intended to prohibit the imposition of separate sentences for the two separate crimes, the rule of lenity does not apply.

2011(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) In Wooten-Bey v. State, 76 Md.App. 603 , 547 A.2d 1086 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 318 Md. 301 , 568 A.2d 16 (1990), *560 we held that when two separate criminal statutes create separate offenses based on different criminal behavior with different criminal consequences, and there is no relevant legislative history suggesting that the Legislature intended to prohibit the imposition of separate sentences for the two separate crimes, the rule of lenity does not apply.

2011(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) In Wooten-Bey v. State, 76 Md.App. 603 , 547 A.2d 1086 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 318 Md. 301 , 568 A.2d 16 (1990), *560 we held that when two separate criminal statutes create separate offenses based on different criminal behavior with different criminal consequences, and there is no relevant legislative history suggesting that the Legislature intended to prohibit the imposition of separate sentences for the two separate crimes, the rule of lenity does not apply.

2004The plaintiff in Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559 (Ky.1971), appealed from a judgment for the defendant entered on a jury verdict in an action against the tortfeasor and the plaintiffs UM/UIM carrier.

2004The policy behind such a requirement is that full disclosure of the identity of the parties protects the integrity of the jury system and prevents charades at trial.” Id.

2003Furthermore, “[t]his approach puts a child of separated parents in the same situation as a child of parents because it allows the child to maintain the same standard of living as if the parents had not separated.” Ley, 144 Md.App. at 672 , 800 A.2d 1 (quoting Drummond, 350 Md. at 521 , 714 A.2d 163 ).

2003Furthermore, “[t]his approach puts a child of separated parents in the same situation as a child of parents because it allows the child to maintain the same standard of living as if the parents had not separated.” Ley, 144 Md.App. at 672 , 800 A.2d 1 (quoting Drummond, 350 Md. at 521 , 714 A.2d 163 ).

2003In Ley , this Court stated that the policy behind this rule is that “[relieving] a parent of his or her obligation because the child receives a benefit to which he or she is entitled from some other source would not ordinarily be consistent with [the parent’s duty to provide for the maintenance of their children.]” 144 Md.App. at 671 , 800 A.2d 1 .

2003In Ley , this Court stated that the policy behind this rule is that “[relieving] a parent of his or her obligation because the child receives a benefit to which he or she is entitled from some other source would not ordinarily be consistent with [the parent’s duty to provide for the maintenance of their children.]” 144 Md.App. at 671 , 800 A.2d 1 .

1994Id.

1986Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court in Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721 , 436 A.2d 465 (1981) articulated the policy behind the requirement of UM coverage: The courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is “that each insured under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility law.” Id. at 737 , 436 A.2d at 474 (quoting Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

1986Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court in Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721 , 436 A.2d 465 (1981) articulated the policy behind the requirement of UM coverage: The courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is “that each insured under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility law.” Id. at 737 , 436 A.2d at 474 (quoting Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

1986Blumenthal v. Heron, supra, 261 Md. at 243 , 274 A.2d 636 (quoting Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T.

1986Blumenthal v. Heron, supra, 261 Md. at 243 , 274 A.2d 636 (quoting Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T.