14 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1966–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Poirier v. City of Schenectadygreen2 sentences2009The policy behind this rule is to limit a municipality’s duty of care over its streets and sidewalks “by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location” (Poirier, 85 NY2d at 314 ). 2009The policy behind this rule is to limit a municipality’s duty of care over its streets and sidewalks ‘by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specific location.’ ” (Gorman v Town of Huntington, 12 NY3d 275, 279 [2009], quoting Poirier v City of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 310, 314 [1995] [emphasis supplied]). | 1 | 2 |
Price v. Pricegreen1 sentence2010This policy, of course, differs markedly from the policy behind equitable distribution, namely, the distribution of property upon divorce in a manner that treats the marriage as an economic partnership (Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 14-15 [1986]). | 1 | 1 |
Gorman v. Town of Huntingtongreen1 sentence2009The policy behind this rule is to limit a municipality’s duty of care over its streets and sidewalks ‘by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specific location.’ ” (Gorman v Town of Huntington, 12 NY3d 275, 279 [2009], quoting Poirier v City of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 310, 314 [1995] [emphasis supplied]). | 1 | 1 |
Amabile v. City of Buffalogreen1 sentence2009To date, the Court of Appeals has recognized only two exceptions to the prior written notice rule: (1) where the municipality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence, or (2) where a “special use” confers a special benefit upon the municipality (see Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
Kircher v. City of Jamestowngreen1 sentence2005The policy behind the rule is that the duty of the municipality is owed to the public at large rather than to individuals, and that such services are “limited by the resources of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed” (see Riss v City of New York, 22 NY2d 579, 581-582 [1968]; accord Kircher, supra; Cuffy, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Riss v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2005The policy behind the rule is that the duty of the municipality is owed to the public at large rather than to individuals, and that such services are “limited by the resources of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed” (see Riss v City of New York, 22 NY2d 579, 581-582 [1968]; accord Kircher, supra; Cuffy, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002(See, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 et seq. [McNaughton rev 1961 and Supp 2002]; Upjohn Co. v United States, 449 US 383, 389 [1981].) The attorney-client privilege is waived where the client places the subject matter of the communication in issue or where the invasion of the privilege is required to determine the validity of the client’s claim or defense and application of the privilege would deprive the adversary of vital information. | 1 | 1 |
Parsa v. State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1986The town’s argument that Hartford was required to submit proposed claim settlements to the Town Board for approval comports with the policy behind this rule of protecting the public from governmental misconduct or improvidence (see, Parsa v State of New York, supra, at p 147). | 1 | 1 |
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp.green2 sentences1966Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra; see Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. 2d 567 ; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106 , 22 N. E. 2d 254 ; 123 A. L. 1966Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra; see Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. 2d 567 ; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106 , 22 N. E. 2d 254 ; 123 A. L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Curcio v. Ippolito
green
2 sentences2018The decision also vitiates the doctrine's timeliness requirement, which bars the toll as a matter of law where, as here, a gap in treatment exceeds any reasonable interpretation of timely ( see Curcio , 63 N.Y.2d at 969 , 483 N.Y.S.2d 989 , 473 N.E.2d 239 [granting summary judgment on the ground that three years passed between doctor visits] ). 2018The decision also vitiates the doctrine's timeliness requirement, which bars the toll as a matter of law where, as here, a gap in treatment exceeds any reasonable interpretation of timely ( see Curcio , 63 N.Y.2d at 969 , 483 N.Y.S.2d 989 , 473 N.E.2d 239 [granting summary judgment on the ground that three years passed between doctor visits] ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
S & S Hotel Ventures Limited Partnership v. 777 S. H. Corp.
green
1 sentence2015Corp., 69 NY2d 437 [1987] [advocate-witness rule provides guidance, not binding authority].) The policy behind the rule is that the roles of advocate and witness are inconsistent, and it is unseemly for a lawyer to argue his own credibility as a witness during a trial. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
New York State Mortgage Loan Enforcement & Administration Corp. v. Townsend Tower Associates
green
1 sentence2011Corp. v Austin Powder Co., 112 AD2d 11 , 12 [1985].) Unlike negligence, breach of contract is not necessarily a “wrongdoing” to which the policy behind the rule applies. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cuffy v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2005The policy behind the rule is that the duty of the municipality is owed to the public at large rather than to individuals, and that such services are “limited by the resources of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed” (see Riss v City of New York, 22 NY2d 579, 581-582 [1968]; accord Kircher, supra; Cuffy, supra). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ingram v. Axelrod
green
1 sentence1990The policy behind this exception for intraagency materials is to encourage the open exchange of ideas among government policymakers, while still maintaining broad public access to agency records (Ingram v Axelrod, 90 AD2d 568 [1982]). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Briggs v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence1989Hosp., 104 AD2d 626 ; Rademacher v Torbensen, 257 App Div 91 ; Andersen v Lilly & Co., Sup Ct 1988 [No. 87-775]; Wind v Lilly & Co., Sup Ct 1989 [No. 86-19699]; Clark v Lilly & Co., 725 F Supp 130.) The policy behind this rule is that a third party should not be able to "create an ex post facto liability for loss of consortium where none existed before” simply by marrying an injured person. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.
green
1 sentence1989(Walsh v Armstrong World Indus., 700 F Supp 783, 786 .) The plaintiff Kevin Murphy’s reliance on Enright v Lilly & Co. ( 141 Misc 2d 194 ) is misplaced. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Clark v. Eli Lilly & Co.
green
1 sentence1989Hosp., 104 AD2d 626 ; Rademacher v Torbensen, 257 App Div 91 ; Andersen v Lilly & Co., Sup Ct 1988 [No. 87-775]; Wind v Lilly & Co., Sup Ct 1989 [No. 86-19699]; Clark v Lilly & Co., 725 F Supp 130.) The policy behind this rule is that a third party should not be able to "create an ex post facto liability for loss of consortium where none existed before” simply by marrying an injured person. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Rademacher v. Torbensen
green
1 sentence1989Hosp., 104 AD2d 626 ; Rademacher v Torbensen, 257 App Div 91 ; Andersen v Lilly & Co., Sup Ct 1988 [No. 87-775]; Wind v Lilly & Co., Sup Ct 1989 [No. 86-19699]; Clark v Lilly & Co., 725 F Supp 130.) The policy behind this rule is that a third party should not be able to "create an ex post facto liability for loss of consortium where none existed before” simply by marrying an injured person. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Walsh v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1989(Walsh v Armstrong World Indus., 700 F Supp 783, 786 .) The plaintiff Kevin Murphy’s reliance on Enright v Lilly & Co. ( 141 Misc 2d 194 ) is misplaced. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
green
1 sentence1987(National Labor Relations Bd. v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 US 132 ; Ryan v Department of Justice, 617 F2d 781, 789-791 [DC Cir 1980]; Paisley v Central Intelligence Agency, 712 F2d 686, 697-698 [DC Cir 1983]; Stiftung v Zeiss, 40 FRD 318 [DC 1966].) Neither may he be deposed concerning his own deliberations or those with his fellow Commissioners in Stowers. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Mortimer Agency, Inc. v. Underwriters Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1983This rule, first set forth in Price v. Neal (3 Burr. 1354 [1762]), is followed in section 3-418 of the-Uniform Commercial Code and inferentially in section 3-417 (subd. [1], par. [b]) and section 4-207 (subd. [1], par. [b]) of the Uniform Commercial Code.” (Mortimer Agency v Underwriters Trust Co., 73 Misc 2d 970, 973 .) The policy behind this rule is clearly set forth in Marine Midland Bank v Umber ( 96 Misc 2d 835, 838 ): “The narrowly circumscribed rights of a payor bank to recover its payment of a check with a forged drawer’s signature are the result of a policy decision traditionally anch | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Marine Midland Bank v. Umber
green
1 sentence1983This rule, first set forth in Price v. Neal (3 Burr. 1354 [1762]), is followed in section 3-418 of the-Uniform Commercial Code and inferentially in section 3-417 (subd. [1], par. [b]) and section 4-207 (subd. [1], par. [b]) of the Uniform Commercial Code.” (Mortimer Agency v Underwriters Trust Co., 73 Misc 2d 970, 973 .) The policy behind this rule is clearly set forth in Marine Midland Bank v Umber ( 96 Misc 2d 835, 838 ): “The narrowly circumscribed rights of a payor bank to recover its payment of a check with a forged drawer’s signature are the result of a policy decision traditionally anch | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rozell v. Rozell
green
2 sentences1966Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra; see Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. 2d 567 ; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106 , 22 N. E. 2d 254 ; 123 A. L. 1966Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra; see Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. 2d 567 ; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106 , 22 N. E. 2d 254 ; 123 A. L. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.