policy behind rule in Washington

2024App. 748, 759 , 172 P.3d 712 (2007) (“The policy behind this rule is to ‘prevent laymen from speculating as to what is the standard of reasonable care in a highly technical profession.’” (quoting Bussabarger, 73 Wn.2d at 479 )); Grove v. PeaceHealth St.

2014The policy behind this rule is to "prevent laymen from speculating as to what is the standard of reasonable care in a highly technical profession." Douglas v. Bussabarger. 73 Wn.2d 476, 479 , 438 P.2d 829 (1968).

1998Id.

1998Id.

1977A new claim of error brought forward for the purpose of reversing a judgment is too late if made for the *490 first time on the motion for new trial (Sherman v. Mobbs, 55 Wn.2d 202, 207 , 347 P.2d 189 (1959)), or first raised in the reply brief rather than in the appellants' brief where it belongs (ROA 1-41; CAROA 41), or on a petition for rehearing especially when raising a factual issue.

1977A new claim of error brought forward for the purpose of reversing a judgment is too late if made for the *490 first time on the motion for new trial (Sherman v. Mobbs, 55 Wn.2d 202, 207 , 347 P.2d 189 (1959)), or first raised in the reply brief rather than in the appellants' brief where it belongs (ROA 1-41; CAROA 41), or on a petition for rehearing especially when raising a factual issue.

2024Joseph Hosp., 182 Wn.2d 136, 144 , 341 P.3d 261 (2014) (“The applicable standard of care and proximate causation generally must be established by expert testimony.”); Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 89, 419 P.3d 819 (2018) (“[T]his requires ‘an expert to say what a reasonable doctor would or would not have done, that the [defendants] failed to act in that manner, and that this failure cause [the] injuries.’” - 10 - No. 86036-4-I/11 (some alterations in original) (quoting Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 371 )); Behr v. Anderson, 18 Wn.

2024App. 748, 759 , 172 P.3d 712 (2007) (“The policy behind this rule is to ‘prevent laymen from speculating as to what is the standard of reasonable care in a highly technical profession.’” (quoting Bussabarger, 73 Wn.2d at 479 )); Grove v. PeaceHealth St.

2024Joseph Hosp., 182 Wn.2d 136, 144 , 341 P.3d 261 (2014) (“The applicable standard of care and proximate causation generally must be established by expert testimony.”); Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 89, 419 P.3d 819 (2018) (“[T]his requires ‘an expert to say what a reasonable doctor would or would not have done, that the [defendants] failed to act in that manner, and that this failure cause [the] injuries.’” - 10 - No. 86036-4-I/11 (some alterations in original) (quoting Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 371 )); Behr v. Anderson, 18 Wn.

2021Indeed, we have previously explained that “ER 404(b) prohibits evidence of prior acts to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crime.” State v. Cook, 131 Wn.

2017We disagree. 1 Ch. 19.86 RCW. -3- No. 75335-5-1/ 4 Under the priority of action doctrine, the court that "first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved."2 Because the trial court's application of the priority of action doctrine presents a question of law, this court reviews the trial court's decision de novo.3 Before a court applies the priority of action rule, it decides whether the actions possess identity of subject matter, relief, and parties.4 In practice, courts do not apply these elements inflexibly.5 "Rathe

2017We disagree. 1 Ch. 19.86 RCW. -3- No. 75335-5-1/ 4 Under the priority of action doctrine, the court that "first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved."2 Because the trial court's application of the priority of action doctrine presents a question of law, this court reviews the trial court's decision de novo.3 Before a court applies the priority of action rule, it decides whether the actions possess identity of subject matter, relief, and parties.4 In practice, courts do not apply these elements inflexibly.5 "Rathe

2014Lvbbert v. Grant County. 141 Wn.2d 29, 39 , 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).

2014Lvbbert v. Grant County. 141 Wn.2d 29, 39 , 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).

2012Harrison, 148 Wn.2d at 561 .

2010Id. at 507-08, 198 P.3d 1021 .

1997State v. Reynolds, 80 Wn.

1993Weyerhaeuser, 117 Wn.2d at 138-39 ; accord, Todd, 717 F.2d at 1286 .

1991State v. Knowles, 46 Wn.

1982The rule at present under consideration has been "clear" on its face and does not "require or permit any construction." State v. McIntyre, 92 Wn.2d 620, 622 , 600 P.2d 1009 (1979).

1982The rule at present under consideration has been "clear" on its face and does not "require or permit any construction." State v. McIntyre, 92 Wn.2d 620, 622 , 600 P.2d 1009 (1979).

1978State v. Thorne, 43 Wn.2d 47 , 260 P.2d 331 (1953).

1978State v. Thorne, 43 Wn.2d 47 , 260 P.2d 331 (1953).