policy behind rule in California

2024An “appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been, but was not raised below. [Citation.] The policy behind the rule is fairness. ‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.’ ” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 826 .) Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to raise extrinsic fraud below, especially since this was the Garrards’ second motion to vacate.

2019By failing to object to the trial court's judgment on this basis, Husband forfeited these arguments on appeal. "[A]n appellate court will ordinarily not *134 consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been, but was not raised below. [Citation.] The policy behind the rule is fairness. 'Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.' [Citations.]" ( In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814 , 826, 79 Cal.Rptr.

2025“It is well established that appellate courts will ordinarily not consider errors that ‘could have been, but were not raised below.’ [Citations.] The rule applies to defenses as well as theories of liability, and to a ‘new theory for or against recovery’ of attorney fees. [Citation.] ‘The policy behind the rule is fairness.’ [Citation.] ‘Appellate 6 courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider. [Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party has the obligation to rais

2024“It is well established that appellate courts will ordinarily not consider errors that ‘could have been, but [were] not raised below.’ [Citations.] The rule applies to defenses as well as 15 theories of liability, and to a ‘new theory for or against recovery’ of attorney fees. [Citations.] ‘The policy behind the rule is fairness.’ [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider. [Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party has the obligation to

2022On the issue of mootness, “[g]enerally, courts decide only ‘actual controversies’ which will result in a judgment that offers relief to the parties. [Citations.] Thus, appellate courts as a 4 rule will not render opinions on moot questions: ‘[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without fault of the [respondent], an event occurs which renders it impossible for [the reviewing court] if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant [appellant] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. [Ci

2020We decline to address these arguments because they are moot. “[A]ppellate courts as a rule will not render opinions on moot questions.” (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178 .) “The policy behind this rule is that courts decide justiciable controversies and will normally not render advisory opinions.” (Id. at p. 1179.) “If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.” (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2

2018Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168 , 178, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 840 .) These rules are no less applicable to Native American tribes than to other parties.

2018Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168 , 178, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 840 .) These rules are no less applicable to Native American tribes than to other parties.

2023A. Bagley-Keene Act “The Bagley-Keene Act requires that, with certain exceptions, ‘[all meetings of a state body shall be open and public . . . .’ (§ 11123, subd. (a).) The policy behind this rule is set forth in section 11120, which states that public agencies and public servants exist to help conduct the public’s business, that they may not decide what the public should know, and that the proceedings of public agencies must be conducted openly.” (Travis v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 335, 341 (Travis).) Two exceptions to the open meeting requiremen

2023(In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 (Nassimi).) The policy behind this rule is fairness. “ ‘ “[I]t would be unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.” ’ ” (Ibid.) C.

2021(See AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021 [only narrow exceptions permit consideration of extra-record evidence].) Second, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. “ ‘The policy behind the rule is fairness.’ [Citation.] ‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an made disallowing certain compounding default interest features and other late charges.

2015II DISCUSSION A. The Appeal Must Be Dismissed Because It is Moot “Generally, courts decide only ‘actual controversies’ which will result in a judgment that offers relief to the parties. [Citations.] Thus, appellate courts as a rule will 4 not render opinions on moot questions: ‘[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without fault of the [respondent], an event occurs which renders it impossible for [the reviewing court] if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant [appellant] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgm

2012The policy behind this rule is that courts decide justiciable controversies and will normally not render advisory opinions.’ ” (Larner v. Los Angeles Doctors Hospital Associates, LP (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1296 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ].)

2012The policy behind this rule is that courts decide justiciable controversies and will normally not render advisory opinions.’ ” (Larner v. Los Angeles Doctors Hospital Associates, LP (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1296 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ].)

2008“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 840 ]; see also In re Marriage of Harris (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 430, 440 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] (dis. opn. of Ramirez, P. J.).) Kathey had ample opportunity to raise the objection below.

2008“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 840 ]; see also In re Marriage of Harris (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 430, 440 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] (dis. opn. of Ramirez, P. J.).) Kathey had ample opportunity to raise the objection below.

2008If the language of a statute is clear, we should not add to or alter it to accomplish a purpose which does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” Statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other.’ [Citation].” (Pasadena Metro Blue Line Construction Authority v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 658, 663-664 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 556 ].) DISCUSSION The Bagley-Keene Act requires that, with certain exceptions, “[a]ll meetings of a state body shall be open and public . . . .” (§ 11123, subd. (a).) The policy behind this rule is set forth

2008If the language of a statute is clear, we should not add to or alter it to accomplish a purpose which does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” Statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other.’ [Citation].” (Pasadena Metro Blue Line Construction Authority v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 658, 663-664 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 556 ].) DISCUSSION The Bagley-Keene Act requires that, with certain exceptions, “[a]ll meetings of a state body shall be open and public . . . .” (§ 11123, subd. (a).) The policy behind this rule is set forth

2006(Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 , 76 S.Ct. 585 ]; Britt v. North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 226, 227-230 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 400 , 92 S.Ct. 431 ] (Britt).) The policy behind this rule is to ensure that an indigent defendant receive “the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other [defendants].” (Britt, supra, at p. 227 .) In Britt, supra, 404 U.S. 226 , the United States Supreme Court articulated two factors relevant to determining the need for a transcript: “(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connecti

2006(Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 , 76 S.Ct. 585 ]; Britt v. North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 226, 227-230 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 400 , 92 S.Ct. 431 ] (Britt).) The policy behind this rule is to ensure that an indigent defendant receive “the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other [defendants].” (Britt, supra, at p. 227 .) In Britt, supra, 404 U.S. 226 , the United States Supreme Court articulated two factors relevant to determining the need for a transcript: “(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connecti

2006(Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 , 76 S.Ct. 585 ]; Britt v. North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 226, 227-230 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 400 , 92 S.Ct. 431 ] (Britt).) The policy behind this rule is to ensure that an indigent defendant receive “the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other [defendants].” (Britt, supra, at p. 227 .) In Britt, supra, 404 U.S. 226 , the United States Supreme Court articulated two factors relevant to determining the need for a transcript: “(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connecti

2006(Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 [ 100 L.Ed. 891 , 76 S.Ct. 585 ]; Britt v. North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 226, 227-230 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 400 , 92 S.Ct. 431 ] (Britt).) The policy behind this rule is to ensure that an indigent defendant receive “the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other [defendants].” (Britt, supra, at p. 227 .) In Britt, supra, 404 U.S. 226 , the United States Supreme Court articulated two factors relevant to determining the need for a transcript: “(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connecti

1994As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, damages are not available for claims under the Unfair Business Practices Act. ( Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266 [ 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ].) CONCLUSION We conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for violation of section 56 et seq. because defendants are exempted under the act by section 56.10(c)(4).

1994As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, damages are not available for claims under the Unfair Business Practices Act. ( Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266 [ 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 538 , 833 P.2d 545 ].) CONCLUSION We conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for violation of section 56 et seq. because defendants are exempted under the act by section 56.10(c)(4).

1990The rule of invited error by waiver does not apply to noncurable defects of substance *188 where the question is one of law such as lack of jurisdiction or complete failure to state a cause of action. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 315, p.326.) It “is limited to matters involving errors which could have been cured in the trial court, for instance by introduction of additional evidence or framing of correct instructions.” (Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117-1118 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 24 ].) As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider pro

1990The rule of invited error by waiver does not apply to noncurable defects of substance *188 where the question is one of law such as lack of jurisdiction or complete failure to state a cause of action. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 315, p.326.) It “is limited to matters involving errors which could have been cured in the trial court, for instance by introduction of additional evidence or framing of correct instructions.” (Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117-1118 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 24 ].) As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider pro

1990(Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 485 P.2d 1132 ]; Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 480, 495-496 [ 55 P.2d 870 ]; Crespo v. Cook (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [ 336 P.2d 31 ].) It has been held that the requirement is inflexible pursuant to “uninterrupted case authority since at least Sherwin v. Southern Pacific Co. (1914) 168 Cal. 722, 726 [ 145 P. 92 ] . . . .” (People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 598-599 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) The policy behind this requirement “is to prevent a party who, p

1990(Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 485 P.2d 1132 ]; Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 480, 495-496 [ 55 P.2d 870 ]; Crespo v. Cook (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [ 336 P.2d 31 ].) It has been held that the requirement is inflexible pursuant to “uninterrupted case authority since at least Sherwin v. Southern Pacific Co. (1914) 168 Cal. 722, 726 [ 145 P. 92 ] . . . .” (People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 598-599 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) The policy behind this requirement “is to prevent a party who, p

1990(Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 485 P.2d 1132 ]; Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 480, 495-496 [ 55 P.2d 870 ]; Crespo v. Cook (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [ 336 P.2d 31 ].) It has been held that the requirement is inflexible pursuant to “uninterrupted case authority since at least Sherwin v. Southern Pacific Co. (1914) 168 Cal. 722, 726 [ 145 P. 92 ] . . . .” (People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 598-599 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) The policy behind this requirement “is to prevent a party who, p

1990(Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 485 P.2d 1132 ]; Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 480, 495-496 [ 55 P.2d 870 ]; Crespo v. Cook (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [ 336 P.2d 31 ].) It has been held that the requirement is inflexible pursuant to “uninterrupted case authority since at least Sherwin v. Southern Pacific Co. (1914) 168 Cal. 722, 726 [ 145 P. 92 ] . . . .” (People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 598-599 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) The policy behind this requirement “is to prevent a party who, p

1990(Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 485 P.2d 1132 ]; Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 480, 495-496 [ 55 P.2d 870 ]; Crespo v. Cook (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [ 336 P.2d 31 ].) It has been held that the requirement is inflexible pursuant to “uninterrupted case authority since at least Sherwin v. Southern Pacific Co. (1914) 168 Cal. 722, 726 [ 145 P. 92 ] . . . .” (People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 598-599 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) The policy behind this requirement “is to prevent a party who, p

1990(Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 485 P.2d 1132 ]; Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 480, 495-496 [ 55 P.2d 870 ]; Crespo v. Cook (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [ 336 P.2d 31 ].) It has been held that the requirement is inflexible pursuant to “uninterrupted case authority since at least Sherwin v. Southern Pacific Co. (1914) 168 Cal. 722, 726 [ 145 P. 92 ] . . . .” (People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 593, 598-599 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 697 ].) The policy behind this requirement “is to prevent a party who, p