policy behind doctrine in Minnesota

1999The majority, citing Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403 , 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973), also turns to the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat superior when it states that an employer’s liability “stems from public policy rather than from any fault of the employer.” This policy determination should have limits, but the majority’s interpretation of orn-ease law leaves almost no barrier in Minnesota to recovery by persons injured by the criminal acts of employees when, as is the case here, there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the employer.

1999The majority, citing Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403 , 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973), also turns to the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat superior when it states that an employer’s liability “stems from public policy rather than from any fault of the employer.” This policy determination should have limits, but the majority’s interpretation of orn-ease law leaves almost no barrier in Minnesota to recovery by persons injured by the criminal acts of employees when, as is the case here, there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the employer.

1993Official Immunity The policy behind this immunity is to protect “public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn.1988); see also Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713 , 718 n. 4 (Minn.1988).

1993Thus, where public officials are “charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of [their] judgment or discretion [they are] not personally liable to an individual for damages unless [they are] guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677 (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1993Official Immunity The policy behind this immunity is to protect “public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn.1988); see also Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713 , 718 n. 4 (Minn.1988).

1993Thus, where public officials are “charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of [their] judgment or discretion [they are] not personally liable to an individual for damages unless [they are] guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677 (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1993Thus, where public officials are “charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of [their] judgment or discretion [they are] not personally liable to an individual for damages unless [they are] guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677 (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175 , 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)).

1990This court upholds notice provisions because the policy behind the requirement is to give the insurer “an opportunity for prompt investigation so as to protect itself against fraudulent or exorbitant claims and, while the matter is fresh in the minds of all, to appraise and determine a disposition by way of settlement or defense.” Sterling State Bank v. Virginia Surety Co., 285 Minn. 348, 354 , 173 N.W.2d 342, 346 (1969).

1990This court upholds notice provisions because the policy behind the requirement is to give the insurer “an opportunity for prompt investigation so as to protect itself against fraudulent or exorbitant claims and, while the matter is fresh in the minds of all, to appraise and determine a disposition by way of settlement or defense.” Sterling State Bank v. Virginia Surety Co., 285 Minn. 348, 354 , 173 N.W.2d 342, 346 (1969).

1984In Shimp v. Sederstrom, 305 Minn. 267 , 233 N.W.2d 292 (1975), also relied upon by the majority opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained the policy behind the doctrine of collateral estoppel: The policy of putting an end to litigation, in so far as it is implemented by doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel * * * is based on the principle that a party should not be twice vexed for the same cause, and that it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation.

1984In Shimp v. Sederstrom, 305 Minn. 267 , 233 N.W.2d 292 (1975), also relied upon by the majority opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained the policy behind the doctrine of collateral estoppel: The policy of putting an end to litigation, in so far as it is implemented by doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel * * * is based on the principle that a party should not be twice vexed for the same cause, and that it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation.