policy behind rule in Illinois

2017The Fifth District, while recognizing the logic of the argument, nonetheless concluded: “[I]t is clear to us that to allow a substitution of judge in a section 2-1401 proceeding would defeat the policy behind the rule requiring a motion for substitution to be presented before the judge has ruled on any substantial issue in the case: to preclude litigants from ‘judge-shopping’ after having formed an opinion that the judge may be unfavorably disposed toward the litigant’s cause.” Id.

2017The Fifth District, while recognizing the logic of the argument, nonetheless concluded: “[I]t is clear to us that to allow a substitution of judge in a section 2-1401 proceeding would defeat the policy behind the rule requiring a motion for substitution to be presented before the judge has ruled on any substantial issue in the case: to preclude litigants 8 from ‘judge-shopping’ after having formed an opinion that the judge may be unfavorably disposed toward the litigant’s cause.” Id.

2020Knight, 867 F.2d at 1288 .

2020Knight, 867 F.2d at 1288 .

2019As our supreme court has noted, *654 *436 disclosure to a third party generally results in waiver because it "is inherently inconsistent with the policy behind the privilege of facilitating a confidential attorney-client relationship." (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2019As our supreme court has noted, disclosure to a third party generally results in waiver because it “is inherently inconsistent with the policy behind the privilege of facilitating a confidential attorney-client relationship.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2005Viewing this divergence of interests in light of the policy behind the requirement, we conclude that Local 148 did not have a direct interest in the outcome of the labor dispute." (Emphases in original.) 345 Ill.App.3d at 395-96 , 280 Ill.Dec. 364 , 802 N.E.2d 289 .

2005Viewing this divergence of interests in light of the policy behind the requirement, we conclude that Local 148 did not have a direct interest in the outcome of the labor dispute.” (Emphases in original.) 345 Ill.

2022The underlying policy behind the doctrine of res judicata is to “promote judicial economy and to protect defendants from the burden of having to relitigate essentially the same claim.” A & R Janitorial v. Pepper Construction Company, 2018 IL 123220, ¶16 ; see also Wilson, 2012 IL 112989 , ¶ 12 (“The rule *** is founded on the premise that litigation should have an end and that no person should unnecessarily be harassed with a multiplicity of lawsuits”).

2015The Schnepf court strongly condemned the "test the waters" doctrine, noting that it was "rendered obsolete 20 years ago by introduction of the right to a substitution of judge without cause under the new version of section 2-1001(a)(2)." Schnepf, 2013 IL App (4th) 121142, ¶ 50 . 7 substitution of judge in a section 2-1401 proceeding would defeat the policy behind the rule requiring a motion for substitution to be presented before the judge has ruled on any substantial issue in the case: to preclude litigants from 'judge-shopping.' " Id. at 465. ¶ 14 The Third District, too, has explicitly foun

2007Lawter International, Inc. v. Carroll, 116 Ill.

2001Rather, Rule 204(c), when read in conjunction with Rule 208, provides that the party at whose instance a doctor’s discovery deposition is taken bears the burden of paying the doctor’s fees. 166 111. 2d R. 204(c); Woolverton, 321 Ill.

1997In re Marriage of Talty, 252 Ill.

1995"The raison d’etre of the privilege is to secure for the client the ability to confide freely and fully in his or her attorney, without fear that confidential information will be disseminated to others.” People v. Knuckles (1995), 165 Ill. 2d 125, 130 .

1995"The raison d'etre of the privilege is to secure for the client the ability to confide freely and fully in his or her attorney, without fear that confidential information will be disseminated to others." People v. Knuckles (1995), 165 Ill.2d 125, 130 , 209 Ill.Dec. 1 , 650 N.E.2d 974 . *701 The voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not waive the attorney-client privilege as to all conversations or as to the entire discussion which may have occurred ( Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis (N.D.Ill. 1976), 412 Fed.Supp. 286, 288) and a partial waiver of the privilege as to certain comm

1995"The raison d'etre of the privilege is to secure for the client the ability to confide freely and fully in his or her attorney, without fear that confidential information will be disseminated to others." People v. Knuckles (1995), 165 Ill.2d 125, 130 , 209 Ill.Dec. 1 , 650 N.E.2d 974 . *701 The voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not waive the attorney-client privilege as to all conversations or as to the entire discussion which may have occurred ( Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis (N.D.Ill. 1976), 412 Fed.Supp. 286, 288) and a partial waiver of the privilege as to certain comm

1995"The raison d'etre of the privilege is to secure for the client the ability to confide freely and fully in his or her attorney, without fear that confidential information will be disseminated to others." People v. Knuckles (1995), 165 Ill.2d 125, 130 , 209 Ill.Dec. 1 , 650 N.E.2d 974 . *701 The voluntary disclosure of confidential information does not waive the attorney-client privilege as to all conversations or as to the entire discussion which may have occurred ( Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis (N.D.Ill. 1976), 412 Fed.Supp. 286, 288) and a partial waiver of the privilege as to certain comm

1995(Honner, 15 Ill. at 552 .) The supreme court adopted the rule after fully discussing the policy behind the doctrine and reviewing the case authorities to date.

1995In Honner , the court stated that a master is not liable to one servant for the carelessness of another servant where both servants are engaged in the master's business. ( Honner, 15 Ill. at 552 .) The supreme court adopted the rule after fully discussing the policy behind the doctrine and reviewing the case authorities to date. ( Chicago & Northern R.R.

1995Co. v. Moranda (1879), 93 Ill. 302 .) Illinois has never abolished the fellow servant rule, either by statute or court ruling.

1992(Mound City, 262 Ill. 392 .) The policy behind the requirement of open and notorious communications is that a party should be able to take exception to communications as they occur.

1992Mound City, 262 Ill. at 399 .

1990Finding the policy behind the requirement of special damages in a per quod action equally applicable to a false-light claim based on a defamatory publication, the Fellows court concluded ( 42 Cal. 3d at 251 , 721 P.2d at 108 , 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227 ): “Since virtually every published defamation would support an action for false light invasion of privacy, exempting such actions from the requirement of proving special damages would render the statute a nullity.

1990Finding the policy behind the requirement of special damages in a per quod action equally applicable to a false-light claim based on a defamatory publication, the Fellows court concluded ( 42 Cal. 3d at 251 , 721 P.2d at 108 , 228 Cal. Rptr. at 227 ): “Since virtually every published defamation would support an action for false light invasion of privacy, exempting such actions from the requirement of proving special damages would render the statute a nullity.

1987People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 78, 91-92 , 426 N.E.2d 871 .

1987People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 78, 91-92 , 426 N.E.2d 871 .

1986App. 3d 612, 624 , 454 N.E.2d 1156 .) The policy behind the rule is to promote settlement and simplify litigation.

1986Exchange National Bank v. DeGraff (1982), 110 Ill.

1985(See United States v. Stirling (2d Cir. 1978), 571 F.2d 708 , 730 n.17, for substance of rule.) The court discussed the policy behind the rule, saying that “for plea bargaining to work effectively and fairly, a defendant must be free to negotiate without fear that his statements will later be used against him.” ( 571 F.2d 708 , 731.) However, the court stated that “ ‘the primary concern of the draftsman *** was with fairly formal plea bargaining between the United States Attorney and counsel for defendant after charges had been, or were about to be made.’ ” ( 571 F.2d 708 , 731, quoting 2 Wein

1985(See United States v. Stirling (2d Cir. 1978), 571 F.2d 708 , 730 n.17, for substance of rule.) The court discussed the policy behind the rule, saying that “for plea bargaining to work effectively and fairly, a defendant must be free to negotiate without fear that his statements will later be used against him.” ( 571 F.2d 708 , 731.) However, the court stated that “ ‘the primary concern of the draftsman *** was with fairly formal plea bargaining between the United States Attorney and counsel for defendant after charges had been, or were about to be made.’ ” ( 571 F.2d 708 , 731, quoting 2 Wein

1981App. 3d 689 , 392 N.E.2d 919 .) The policy behind the requirement of joining indispensable parties is that the entering of a judgment without such party may result in the absent party’s loss of a property right without due process of law.

1979App. 3d 593 , 286 N.E.2d 130 .) The underlying policy behind the rule is that government functions may not be impeded or obstructed.

1979App.3d 593 , 286 N.E.2d 130 .) The underlying policy behind the rule is that government functions may not be impeded or obstructed.