policy behind rule in Florida

2021Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 508 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“The doctrine of subrogation is generally invoked when one person has satisfied the obligations of another and equity compels that the person discharging the debt stand in the shoes of the person whose claim has been discharged, thereby succeeding to the rights and priorities of the original creditor.”); Kala Invs., Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So. 2d 909, 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“The policy behind the doctrine [of equitable subrogation] is to prevent unjust enrichment by assuring that the person who in equity and good conscience is responsibl

2015Equitable Subrogation “The policy behind the doctrine [of equitable subrogation] is to prevent unjust enrichment by assuring that the person who in equity and good conscience is responsible for the debt is ultimately answerable for its discharge.” Kala Invs., Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So.2d 909, 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citing E.

2024Id. at 1094 (explaining that the Florida Supreme Court “did not limit this presumption in Kinney to Florida plaintiffs or indicate in any way that the policy behind this rule would automatically be eviscerated by applying it to out-of-state residents”).

2024Id. at 1094 (explaining that the Florida Supreme Court “did not limit this presumption in Kinney to Florida plaintiffs or indicate in any way that the policy behind this rule would automatically be eviscerated by applying it to out-of-state residents”).

2000See State Dep't of Transp. v. San Marco Contracting Co., 355 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

2000See State Dep’t of Transp. v. San Marco Contracting Co., 355 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

2021Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 508 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“The doctrine of subrogation is generally invoked when one person has satisfied the obligations of another and equity compels that the person discharging the debt stand in the shoes of the person whose claim has been discharged, thereby succeeding to the rights and priorities of the original creditor.”); Kala Invs., Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So. 2d 909, 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“The policy behind the doctrine [of equitable subrogation] is to prevent unjust enrichment by assuring that the person who in equity and good conscience is responsibl

1991Ibid.

1985Hoyas v. State, 456 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 172 (1976).

1984The policy behind the privilege is to promote freedom of consultation with legal advisors without fear of compelled disclosure, however, it has been said that the privilege, being an "exception to the general duty to disclose" and an "obstacle to the investigation of the truth," "ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), quoting from 8 Wigmore, Evidence, supra, § 2291.

2025The policy behind the rule stems from “respect for other branches and levels of government, an awareness of the limitations of judicial power, sensitivity to the burdens of a constitutional adjudication, and appreciation that others may provide a more useful answer.” Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28, 39 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).

2024There, we stated, “We conclude that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable in cases in which section 933.09 is violated, as the application of the doctrine to evidence seized in violation of the knock and announce rule would render section 933.09 and the policy behind the rule meaningless.” Kellom, 849 So. 2d at 396 ; see also State v. Robinson, 565 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (noting that if inevitable discovery applied whenever the knock-and-announce statute was violated, its application would undo the statutory requirement).

2022This Court has explained that the policy behind rule 3.800(a) “includes concerns that a defendant not be subject to punishment or imprisonment beyond that which was lawfully imposed.” Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 604 (Fla. 2007).

2017If, in cases originating in courts inferior to the circuit courts, another appeal from the circuit court is afforded in the guise of certiorari, then a litigant will have two appeals from the court of limited jurisdiction, while a litigant would be limited to only one appeal in cases originating in the trial court of general jurisdiction.” Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 526 n.4; see, e.g., Custer, 62 So. 3d at 1093 (“A more expansive review would also afford a litigant two appeals from a court of limited jurisdiction, while limiting a litigant to only one appeal in cases originating in a trial court of

2013In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the policy behind immunity from suit, distinguishing between the circumstances that surround the instigation of the filing of criminal charges and those that involve formalized judicial proceedings: Although not entirely responsive to the general policy underlying the absolute privilege, we note, as the New Jersey and California courts have noted, that in formal judicial proceedings “the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive contr

2013In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the policy behind immunity from suit, distinguishing between the circumstances that surround the instigation of the filing of criminal charges and those that involve formalized judicial proceedings: Although not entirely responsive to the general policy underlying the absolute privilege, we note, as the New Jersey and California courts have noted, that in formal judicial proceedings “the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive contr

2013In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the policy behind immunity from suit, distinguishing between the circumstances that surround the instigation of the filing of criminal charges and those that involve formalized judicial proceedings: Although not entirely responsive to the general policy underlying the absolute privilege, we note, as the New Jersey and California courts have noted, that in formal judicial proceedings “the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive contr

2013In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the policy behind immunity from suit, distinguishing between the circumstances that surround the instigation of the filing of criminal charges and those that involve formalized judicial proceedings: Although not entirely responsive to the general policy underlying the absolute privilege, we note, as the New Jersey and California courts have noted, that in formal judicial proceedings “the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive contr

2013In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the policy behind immunity from suit, distinguishing between the circumstances that surround the instigation of the filing of criminal charges and those that involve formalized judicial proceedings: Although not entirely responsive to the general policy underlying the absolute privilege, we note, as the New Jersey and California courts have noted, that in formal judicial proceedings “the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive contr

2013In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed the policy behind immunity from suit, distinguishing between the circumstances that surround the instigation of the filing of criminal charges and those that involve formalized judicial proceedings: Although not entirely responsive to the general policy underlying the absolute privilege, we note, as the New Jersey and California courts have noted, that in formal judicial proceedings “the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive contr

2008“Bidders and buyers” at such sales “usually bid and buy to make a profit.” City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 759, 763 , 179 So. 765, 767 (1938).

2008“Bidders and buyers” at such sales “usually bid and buy to make a profit.” City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 759, 763 , 179 So. 765, 767 (1938).

2007"The policy behind the rule is to avoid multiple actions." Gortz v. Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Sharpe, Roca, Fountain & Williams, 769 So.2d 484, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

2006There we found that the "primary evil" addressed by rule 1.525 "was the uncertainty created by excessive tardiness in the filing of motions for fees and costs." Swift , at 887 (quoting Norris v. Treadwell, 907 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), review granted, 919 So.2d 435 (Fla.2006)).

2006Swift v. Wilcox, 924 So.2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), dealt with a different rule of procedure and a different policy behind the rule.

2006There we found that the "primary evil" addressed by rule 1.525 "was the uncertainty created by excessive tardiness in the filing of motions for fees and costs." Swift , at 887 (quoting Norris v. Treadwell, 907 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), review granted, 919 So.2d 435 (Fla.2006)).

2004Since at least 1888, this Court has subscribed to a principle of judicial restraint sometimes called the "last resort rule," [5] in which we avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. [6] The district courts of appeal also subscribe to the rule. [7] The policy behind the rule stems from "respect for other branches and levels of government, an awareness of the limitations of judicial power, sensitivity to the burdens of a constitutional adjudication, and appreciation that others may provide a more useful answer." O'Keefe v. Passaic Val

2004Since at least 1888, this Court has subscribed to a principle of judicial restraint sometimes called the "last resort rule," [5] in which we avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. [6] The district courts of appeal also subscribe to the rule. [7] The policy behind the rule stems from "respect for other branches and levels of government, an awareness of the limitations of judicial power, sensitivity to the burdens of a constitutional adjudication, and appreciation that others may provide a more useful answer." O'Keefe v. Passaic Val

2004Since at least 1888, this Court has subscribed to a principle of judicial restraint sometimes called the "last resort rule," [5] in which we avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. [6] The district courts of appeal also subscribe to the rule. [7] The policy behind the rule stems from "respect for other branches and levels of government, an awareness of the limitations of judicial power, sensitivity to the burdens of a constitutional adjudication, and appreciation that others may provide a more useful answer." O'Keefe v. Passaic Val

1998See id.

1997See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bennett, 96 Fla. at 828 , 119 So. at 394 ; Eastern Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed.

1997See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bennett, 96 Fla. at 828 , 119 So. at 394 ; Eastern Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed.