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27 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Herbelgreen2 sentences2016We upheld the “any/any” reasonable doubt instruction in State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While the older PIK instruction used in Herbels trial was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”). 2016Herbel acknowledged that the instruction using "any" instead of "each" was not the preferred instruction but found that it was not a clear misstatement of law, so as to be legally inappropriate. 296 Kan. at 1124 ; see also State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 779 , 335 P.3d 93 (2014). 19 Here, Solis urges this court to reconsider Herbel, believing that the Herbel court would have reached a different result if it had considered letters of additional authority submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2012 Kan. | 4 | 8 |
Nelson v. Paxtongreen2 sentences1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. 1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Waggonergreen2 sentences2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. 2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smysergreen2 sentences2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. 2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Guardianship of Williamsgreen2 sentences2019However, absent highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances it has no application in determining whether a parent, not found to be unfit, is entitled to custody as against a third-party nonparent." 254 Kan. at 826 , 869 P.2d 661 . 2019However, absent highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances it has no application in determining whether a parent, not found to be unfit, is entitled to custody as against a third-party nonparent." 254 Kan. at 826 , 869 P.2d 661 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sappingtongreen2 sentences2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b 2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortegagreen2 sentences2016Herbel acknowledged that the instruction using "any" instead of "each" was not the preferred instruction but found that it was not a clear misstatement of law, so as to be legally inappropriate. 296 Kan. at 1124 ; see also State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 779 , 335 P.3d 93 (2014). 19 Here, Solis urges this court to reconsider Herbel, believing that the Herbel court would have reached a different result if it had considered letters of additional authority submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2012 Kan. 2016Herbel acknowledged that the instruction using "any" instead of "each" was not the preferred instruction but found that it was not a clear misstatement of law, so as to be legally inappropriate. 296 Kan. at 1124 ; see also State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 779 , 335 P.3d 93 (2014). 19 Here, Solis urges this court to reconsider Herbel, believing that the Herbel court would have reached a different result if it had considered letters of additional authority submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2012 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dealgreen2 sentences2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. 2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. 2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. WOMELSDORFgreen1 sentence2013See Wom-elsdorf, 47 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
| Honer v. Hanover State Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chetopa State Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1933It is disclosed that the bank clipped the coupons from the bonds and placed the proceeds of the same to the accounts of the several owners, but the certificates showed that the bonds as deposited were to be returned “on surrender of the certificates properly indorsed.” The principle to be applied to special deposits, where a preference is claimed as against funds which passed into the hands of the receiver, is briefly stated in State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463 , 218 Pac. 1000 , as follows: “Before a claim can be allowed as a preferred claim against the receiver of an insolvent bank, it i 1933It is disclosed that the bank clipped the coupons from the bonds and placed the proceeds of the same to the accounts of the several owners, but the certificates showed that the bonds as deposited were to be returned “on surrender of the certificates properly indorsed.” The principle to be applied to special deposits, where a preference is claimed as against funds which passed into the hands of the receiver, is briefly stated in State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463 , 218 Pac. 1000 , as follows: “Before a claim can be allowed as a preferred claim against the receiver of an insolvent bank, it i | 8 | 1924–1934 |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1922(Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bank, 109 Kan. 772 , 204 Pac. 992 .) The judgment is therefore modified with the direction that the entire amount, $3,875, be allowed and adjudged to be a preferred claim to be paid in full out of the assets in the hands of the receiver. 1922(Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bank, 109 Kan. 772 , 204 Pac. 992 .) The judgment is therefore modified with the direction that the entire amount, $3,875, be allowed and adjudged to be a preferred claim to be paid in full out of the assets in the hands of the receiver. | 3 | 1922–1934 |
Schoen v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 . 1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 . | 2 | 1933–1934 |
Arnold Investment Co. v. Citizens State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 . 1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 . | 2 | 1924–1933 |
Kirby v. Wait
neutral
2 sentences1932The syllabus in the latter case is as follows: “In an action by a depositor against the receiver of an insolvent bank to determine the question of preference, the record considered and ■ held, the relationship established by the plaintiff and the bank was that of debtor and creditor and not that of principal and agent, nor trustees and cestui que trust.” The second paragraph of the syllabus in the case of Kirby v. Wait, 120 Kan. 400 , 243 Pac. 1058 , cited by appellant, is as follows: “Money placed in a bank as a trust fund to pay a certain debt cannot, after the failure of the bank and the ap 1932The syllabus in the latter case is as follows: “In an action by a depositor against the receiver of an insolvent bank to determine the question of preference, the record considered and ■ held, the relationship established by the plaintiff and the bank was that of debtor and creditor and not that of principal and agent, nor trustees and cestui que trust.” The second paragraph of the syllabus in the case of Kirby v. Wait, 120 Kan. 400 , 243 Pac. 1058 , cited by appellant, is as follows: “Money placed in a bank as a trust fund to pay a certain debt cannot, after the failure of the bank and the ap | 2 | 1929–1932 |
In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of B.H.
green
1 sentence2022In re Guardianship of B.H., 309 Kan. 1097 , 1104, 442 P.3d 457 (2019); see also In re P.J., 56 Kan. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Busse
green
2 sentences2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b 2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Pierce
green
2 sentences2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. 2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences2014Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921, 939 , 318 P.3d 155 (2014); see PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp.); see, e.g., State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the [older PIK] reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the [older] reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While the older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”). 2014Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921, 939 , 318 P.3d 155 (2014); see PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp.); see, e.g., State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the [older PIK] reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the [older] reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While the older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Steele v. Citizens State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1980In Steele et al. v. State Bank et al., 116 Kan. 510 , 227 Pac. 352 (1924), a person defrauded in a land sale was allowed a preferred claim over general creditors of a bank against land transferred to the bank as a result of fraud. 1980In Steele et al. v. State Bank et al., 116 Kan. 510 , 227 Pac. 352 (1924), a person defrauded in a land sale was allowed a preferred claim over general creditors of a bank against land transferred to the bank as a result of fraud. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Kesl v. Hanover State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. 1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Secrest v. Organ
neutral
2 sentences1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. 1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Snodgrass v. Carlson
neutral
2 sentences1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous. 1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
State ex rel. Conly v. Riverside Drainage District
green
2 sentences1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous. 1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Baker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord
green
2 sentences1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. 1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Matzen v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. 1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Griffith v. Burlington State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. 1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Clark v. Toronto Bank green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Hattley v. Hattley green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
First National Bank v. Farmers State Bank
neutral
1 sentence1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
El Dorado National Bank v. Butler County State Bank
neutral
2 sentences1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly. 1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Guymon-Petro Mercantile Co. v. Farmers State Bank neutral | 1 | 1933–1933 |
First National Bank v. Farmers State Bank
green
2 sentences1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly. 1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Butler v. Western German Bank green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| State Ex Rel. Rankin v. Banking Corp. neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Vincent Grain Co. v. Docking neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Richardson v. Louisville Banking Co. neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Chemical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Rugger v. Hammond green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Fourth Street Bank of Philadelphia v. Yardley green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Citizens State Bank v. First National Bank green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Sherwood v. Central Michigan Savings Bank neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.