preferred claim (Kansas) · Go Syfert
← Kansas issues

preferred claim in Kansas

27 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Herbelgreen
kan · 2013 · cited in 8 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2016
2 sentences

2016We upheld the “any/any” reasonable doubt instruction in State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While the older PIK instruction used in Herbels trial was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”).

2016Herbel acknowledged that the instruction using "any" instead of "each" was not the preferred instruction but found that it was not a clear misstatement of law, so as to be legally inappropriate. 296 Kan. at 1124 ; see also State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 779 , 335 P.3d 93 (2014). 19 Here, Solis urges this court to reconsider Herbel, believing that the Herbel court would have reached a different result if it had considered letters of additional authority submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2012 Kan.

48
Nelson v. Paxtongreen
kan · 1923 · cited in 3 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 1924–1934
2 sentences

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

23
State v. Waggonergreen
kan · 2013 · cited in 2 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

22
State v. Smysergreen
kan · 2013 · cited in 2 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

22
In Re Guardianship of Williamsgreen
kan · 1994 · cited in 2 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2019
2 sentences

2019However, absent highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances it has no application in determining whether a parent, not found to be unfit, is entitled to custody as against a third-party nonparent." 254 Kan. at 826 , 869 P.2d 661 .

2019However, absent highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances it has no application in determining whether a parent, not found to be unfit, is entitled to custody as against a third-party nonparent." 254 Kan. at 826 , 869 P.2d 661 .

12
State v. Sappingtongreen
kan · 2007 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b

2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b

11
State v. Ortegagreen
kan · 2014 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Herbel acknowledged that the instruction using "any" instead of "each" was not the preferred instruction but found that it was not a clear misstatement of law, so as to be legally inappropriate. 296 Kan. at 1124 ; see also State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 779 , 335 P.3d 93 (2014). 19 Here, Solis urges this court to reconsider Herbel, believing that the Herbel court would have reached a different result if it had considered letters of additional authority submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2012 Kan.

2016Herbel acknowledged that the instruction using "any" instead of "each" was not the preferred instruction but found that it was not a clear misstatement of law, so as to be legally inappropriate. 296 Kan. at 1124 ; see also State v. Ortega, 300 Kan. 761, 779 , 335 P.3d 93 (2014). 19 Here, Solis urges this court to reconsider Herbel, believing that the Herbel court would have reached a different result if it had considered letters of additional authority submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2012 Kan.

11
State v. Dealgreen
kan · 2012 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

11
State v. Clarkgreen
kan · 1997 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

11
State v. WOMELSDORFgreen
kanctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013See Wom-elsdorf, 47 Kan.

11
Honer v. Hanover State Bankgreen
kan · 1923 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 1924–1924
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (33)

CaseCitedYears
Chetopa State Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank neutral
kan · 1923
2 sentences

1933It is disclosed that the bank clipped the coupons from the bonds and placed the proceeds of the same to the accounts of the several owners, but the certificates showed that the bonds as deposited were to be returned “on surrender of the certificates properly indorsed.” The principle to be applied to special deposits, where a preference is claimed as against funds which passed into the hands of the receiver, is briefly stated in State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463 , 218 Pac. 1000 , as follows: “Before a claim can be allowed as a preferred claim against the receiver of an insolvent bank, it i

1933It is disclosed that the bank clipped the coupons from the bonds and placed the proceeds of the same to the accounts of the several owners, but the certificates showed that the bonds as deposited were to be returned “on surrender of the certificates properly indorsed.” The principle to be applied to special deposits, where a preference is claimed as against funds which passed into the hands of the receiver, is briefly stated in State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463 , 218 Pac. 1000 , as follows: “Before a claim can be allowed as a preferred claim against the receiver of an insolvent bank, it i

81924–1934
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank neutral
kan · 1921
2 sentences

1922(Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bank, 109 Kan. 772 , 204 Pac. 992 .) The judgment is therefore modified with the direction that the entire amount, $3,875, be allowed and adjudged to be a preferred claim to be paid in full out of the assets in the hands of the receiver.

1922(Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bank, 109 Kan. 772 , 204 Pac. 992 .) The judgment is therefore modified with the direction that the entire amount, $3,875, be allowed and adjudged to be a preferred claim to be paid in full out of the assets in the hands of the receiver.

31922–1934
Schoen v. Johnson neutral
kan · 1932
2 sentences

1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 .

1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 .

21933–1934
Arnold Investment Co. v. Citizens State Bank neutral
kan · 1916
2 sentences

1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 .

1933The underlying principles governing the allowance of such a preferred claim, and the reasons for allowing it as such, are well stated in Investment Co. v. Bank, 98 Kan. 412 , 158 Pac. 68 , and commented upon again in Schoen v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 612 , 7 P. 2d 117 .

21924–1933
Kirby v. Wait neutral
kan · 1926
2 sentences

1932The syllabus in the latter case is as follows: “In an action by a depositor against the receiver of an insolvent bank to determine the question of preference, the record considered and ■ held, the relationship established by the plaintiff and the bank was that of debtor and creditor and not that of principal and agent, nor trustees and cestui que trust.” The second paragraph of the syllabus in the case of Kirby v. Wait, 120 Kan. 400 , 243 Pac. 1058 , cited by appellant, is as follows: “Money placed in a bank as a trust fund to pay a certain debt cannot, after the failure of the bank and the ap

1932The syllabus in the latter case is as follows: “In an action by a depositor against the receiver of an insolvent bank to determine the question of preference, the record considered and ■ held, the relationship established by the plaintiff and the bank was that of debtor and creditor and not that of principal and agent, nor trustees and cestui que trust.” The second paragraph of the syllabus in the case of Kirby v. Wait, 120 Kan. 400 , 243 Pac. 1058 , cited by appellant, is as follows: “Money placed in a bank as a trust fund to pay a certain debt cannot, after the failure of the bank and the ap

21929–1932
In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of B.H. green
kan · 2019
1 sentence

2022In re Guardianship of B.H., 309 Kan. 1097 , 1104, 442 P.3d 457 (2019); see also In re P.J., 56 Kan.

12022–2022
State v. Busse green
kan · 1982
2 sentences

2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b

2021See State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, 165 , 169 P.3d 1096 (2007) (defendant may make reasoned decision to forgo defenses ostensibly supported in the evidence that are legally or factually inconsistent with a preferred defense); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 111-12 , 642 P.2d 972 (1982) (defendant waived statutory and constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him when he deliberately withdrew from preliminary hearing on advice of counsel apparently to avoid having those witnesses identify him; preliminary hearing testimony could then be admitted at trial when one of those witnesses b

12021–2021
State v. Pierce green
kan · 1996
2 sentences

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

2014See PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp); see also State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While tire older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 475 , 931 P.2d 664 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the provisions of PIK Crim.

12014–2014
Miller v. State green
kan · 2014
2 sentences

2014Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921, 939 , 318 P.3d 155 (2014); see PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp.); see, e.g., State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the [older PIK] reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the [older] reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While the older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”).

2014Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 921, 939 , 318 P.3d 155 (2014); see PIK Crim. 3d 52.02 (1995 Supp.); see, e.g., State v. Smyser, 297 Kan. 199, 206 , 299 P.3d 309 (2013) (“We hold the [older PIK] reasonable doubt jury instruction was legally appropriate and not error.”); State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 99 , 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[W]e conclude the [older] reasonable doubt instruction in this case was not erroneous.”); State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1124 , 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“While the older PIK instruction . . . was not the preferred instruction, it was legally appropriate.”).

12014–2014
Steele v. Citizens State Bank neutral
kan · 1924
2 sentences

1980In Steele et al. v. State Bank et al., 116 Kan. 510 , 227 Pac. 352 (1924), a person defrauded in a land sale was allowed a preferred claim over general creditors of a bank against land transferred to the bank as a result of fraud.

1980In Steele et al. v. State Bank et al., 116 Kan. 510 , 227 Pac. 352 (1924), a person defrauded in a land sale was allowed a preferred claim over general creditors of a bank against land transferred to the bank as a result of fraud.

11980–1980
Kesl v. Hanover State Bank neutral
kan · 1921
2 sentences

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

11934–1934
Secrest v. Organ neutral
kan · 1922
2 sentences

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

11934–1934
Snodgrass v. Carlson neutral
kan · 1924
2 sentences

1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous.

1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous.

11934–1934
State ex rel. Conly v. Riverside Drainage District green
kan · 1927
2 sentences

1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous.

1934(See Snodgrass v. Carlson, 117 Kan. 353, 232 Pac. 241 , and State, ex rel., v. Riverside Drainage District, 123 Kan. 46 , syl. ¶ 5, 254 Pac. 366 .) The proof shows that-the plaintiff is entitled to a common claim against the defendant bank, but fails to show that it is entitled to a preferred claim, and the judgment of the -lower court allowing the preference is erroneous.

11934–1934
Baker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord green
kan · 1928
2 sentences

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

11934–1934
Matzen v. Johnson neutral
kan · 1928
2 sentences

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

11934–1934
Griffith v. Burlington State Bank neutral
kan · 1929
2 sentences

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

1934While there has been much difference of judicial opinion on the subject, some of which still remains, that is now the generally accepted view.” (Citing cases.) (p. 773.) This test was approved in Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776 , 204 Pac. 994 ; Secrest v. Ladd, Receiver, 112 Kan. 23 , 209 Pac. 824 ; Nelson v. Paxton, Receiver, 113 Kan. 394 , 214 Pac. 784 ; State Bank v. State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 468 , 218 Pac. 1000 ; Raker-Evans Grain Co. v. Ricord, 126 Kan. 107 , 267 Pac. 14 ; Matzen v. Johnson, 127 Kan. 139 , 272 Pac. 164 ; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279 , 277 Pac. 42 ; Schoen v.

11934–1934
Clark v. Toronto Bank green
kan · 1905
11933–1933
Hattley v. Hattley green
kan · 1925
11933–1933
First National Bank v. Farmers State Bank neutral
kan · 1925
1 sentence

1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly.

11933–1933
El Dorado National Bank v. Butler County State Bank neutral
kan · 1926
2 sentences

1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly.

1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly.

11933–1933
Guymon-Petro Mercantile Co. v. Farmers State Bank neutral
kan · 1926
11933–1933
First National Bank v. Farmers State Bank green
kan · 1926
2 sentences

1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly.

1933Other cases in accord with it are Clark v. Bank, 72 Kan. 1 , 82 Pac. 582 ; State Bank v. State Bank, supra; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 119 Kan. 198 , 237 Pac. 652 ; El Dorado Nat’l Bank v. Butler County State Bank, 120 Kan. 109 , 242 Pac. 475 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706 , 244 Pac. 1039 ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483 , 252 Pac. 247 ; Colorado & S. Rly.

11933–1933
Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank green
kan · 1927
11933–1933
Butler v. Western German Bank green
ca5 · 1908
11928–1928
State Ex Rel. Rankin v. Banking Corp. neutral
mont · 1925
11928–1928
Vincent Grain Co. v. Docking neutral
kan · 1927
11928–1928
Richardson v. Louisville Banking Co. neutral
ca5 · 1899
11928–1928
Chemical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong green
ca6 · 1893
11928–1928
Rugger v. Hammond green
wash · 1917
11928–1928
Fourth Street Bank of Philadelphia v. Yardley green
· 1897
11926–1926
Citizens State Bank v. First National Bank green
kan · 1916
11926–1926
Sherwood v. Central Michigan Savings Bank neutral
mich · 1894
11926–1926

Statutes the citing opinions construe

KS § K.S.A. § 60-261 (4) KS § K.S.A. § 20-3018 (3) KS § K.S.A. § 21-3716 (3) KS § K.S.A. § 22-3601 (3) KS § K.S.A. § 60-2101 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 36 (1892–2024) PA 28 (1893–2008) KS 27 (1922–2022) NY 26 (1892–1992) CA 23 (1898–2015) IA 22 (1893–2023) IN 21 (1882–2005) MO 16 (1898–1986) NE 12 (1894–2008) FL 11 (1928–1992) TX 11 (1874–2015) CO 11 (1896–2019) MT 10 (1925–1979) OH 10 (1905–2026) MN 9 (1925–2024) AR 8 (1925–2014) MD 8 (1907–2015) NJ 8 (1918–2025) OK 7 (1906–1966) SD 7 (1926–1998) AZ 7 (1932–2019) MA 7 (1935–2017) AL 7 (1933–1959) VA 6 (1934–2013) ND 6 (1913–2003) TN 6 (1895–1980) OR 6 (1899–1984) WA 5 (1916–2024) GA 5 (1935–2022) LA 4 (1931–2001) MI 4 (1931–2023) WI 3 (1934–1936) HI 3 (2005–2025) NM 3 (1924–2005) NC 3 (1950–1986) NV 2 (1952–2007) UT 2 (1962–2025) WV 2 (1935–2023) SC 2 (1932–1938) KY 2 (1918–1930) CT 2 (1900–1984) ID 2 (1897–1927) WY 2 (1934–1936)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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