preferred claim in Pennsylvania

1955Section 211 of the Fiduciaries Act of April 18,1949, P. L. 512, provides: “The spouse of any decedent dying domiciled in the Commonwealth, and if there be no spouse, or if he has forfeited his rights, then such children as form a part of the decedent’s household, may retain or claim as an exemption and as a reasonable requirement for support during the settlement of the estate, either real or personal property, or both, not theretofore sold by the personal representative, to the value of seven hundred and fifty dollars . . .” The statutory exemption is a preferred claim or gift of the law prom

1954The statutory exemption is a preferred claim or gift of the law prompted by consideration of public policy; Peebles’ Estate, 157 Pa. 605 , 27 A. 792 , and exemption statutes have always received an interpretation consistent with their conception; Hildebrand’s Estate, supra. These statutes have always been considered rather according to their spirit than to the letter: Nevin’s Appeal, 47 Pa. 230 .

1954Compiler v. Compiler, 25 Pa. 31 .

1939In Peebles’ Estate, 157 Pa. 605, 609 , it is said: “The statutory exemption in her favor may, therefore, be regarded as a preferred claim or gift of the law, prompted by considerations of public policy”; and in Compher v. Compher et al., 25 Pa. 31, 34 , the court says: “ ‘So much of the estate is withdrawn from the general course of administration, and specifically appropriated by law to the use of the ‘widow and family’ ”.

1954“The exemption has been variously described: a gratuity, Cramm’s Estate, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 446 , 193 A. 135 , affirmed 329 Pa. 528 , 198 A. 653 ; ‘a preferred claim or gift of the law, prompted by considerations of public policy’, Peebles’ Est., 157 Pa. 605, 609 , 27 A. 792 ; an independent bounty whereby the exempted property is withdrawn from the estate and the general course of administration.

1954“The exemption has been variously described: a gratuity, Cramm’s Estate, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 446 , 193 A. 135 , affirmed 329 Pa. 528 , 198 A. 653 ; ‘a preferred claim or gift of the law, prompted by considerations of public policy’, Peebles’ Est., 157 Pa. 605, 609 , 27 A. 792 ; an independent bounty whereby the exempted property is withdrawn from the estate and the general course of administration.

1954“The exemption has been variously described: a gratuity, Cramm’s Estate, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 446 , 193 A. 135 , affirmed 329 Pa. 528 , 198 A. 653 ; ‘a preferred claim or gift of the law, prompted by considerations of public policy’, Peebles’ Est., 157 Pa. 605, 609 , 27 A. 792 ; an independent bounty whereby the exempted property is withdrawn from the estate and the general course of administration.

1954“The exemption has been variously described: a gratuity, Cramm’s Estate, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 446 , 193 A. 135 , affirmed 329 Pa. 528 , 198 A. 653 ; ‘a preferred claim or gift of the law, prompted by considerations of public policy’, Peebles’ Est., 157 Pa. 605, 609 , 27 A. 792 ; an independent bounty whereby the exempted property is withdrawn from the estate and the general course of administration.

1954The statutory exemption is a preferred claim or gift of the law prompted by consideration of public policy; Peebles’ Estate, 157 Pa. 605 , 27 A. 792 , and exemption statutes have always received an interpretation consistent with their conception; Hildebrand’s Estate, supra. These statutes have always been considered rather according to their spirit than to the letter: Nevin’s Appeal, 47 Pa. 230 .

1939The statutory exemption is a preferred claim or gift of the law prompted by consideration of public policy; Peebles Estate, 157 Pa. 605 , 27 A. 792 , and exemption statutes have always received *15 an interpretation consistent with their conception: Hildebrand’s Estate, supra. These statutes have always been considered rather according to their spirit than to the letter: Nevin’s Appeal, 47 Pa. 230 .

1935The distribution of capital upon dissolution is in the same proportion in which such capital was furnished.” See also Plumly’s App., 1 Mona. 177 .

1908The distribution of capital upon dissolution is in the same proportion in which such capital was furnished.” A Pennsylvania case clearly establishing this principle and applying in its facts to the present case, is Plumly’s Appeal, 1 Mona. 177 , where the master said (p. 178): “ When the partnership came to an end, December 31, 1884, it was the plaintiff’s right to have the assets converted into money, to have all liabilities to non-partners satisfied therefrom, and, out of what remained, to have returned to each partner his capital.

2008Preferred’s brief at 18 (citing Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 665 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.1981)) (wherein a limitation period explicitly set forth in the language of a payment bond prevailed over one established in the general Pennsylvania statute). ¶ 9 Preferred proposes that bond provisions should be construed most strongly against the surety, i.e., to the extent that any ambiguity exists, they “are to be liberally construed in favor of laborers and materialmen.” Id. at 18 (citing Miller v. Commercial Elec.

2008Preferred’s brief at 18 (citing Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 665 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.1981)) (wherein a limitation period explicitly set forth in the language of a payment bond prevailed over one established in the general Pennsylvania statute). ¶ 9 Preferred proposes that bond provisions should be construed most strongly against the surety, i.e., to the extent that any ambiguity exists, they “are to be liberally construed in favor of laborers and materialmen.” Id. at 18 (citing Miller v. Commercial Elec.

2008While Preferred acknowledges that a prior inspection had occurred, it argues that “where a contractor is summoned back to the job by a contracting body to make repairs or adjustments after the ostensible date of completion, and where such work is substantial and is not a sham or device employed to extend the period of limitations, the limitations period does not begin to run until the completion of the work performed upon the demand of the contracting body.” Id. at 14-15 (citing Valley Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Constr., Inc., 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 603 , 894 A.2d 677 , 678-79 (1978) (“Valley Forge I

2008While Preferred acknowledges that a prior inspection had occurred, it argues that "where a contractor is summoned back to the job by a contracting body to make repairs or adjustments after the ostensible date of completion, and where such work is substantial and is not a sham or device employed to extend the period of limitations, the limitations period does not begin to run until the completion of the work performed upon the demand of the contracting body." Id. at 14-15 (citing Valley Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Constr., Inc., 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 603 , 394 A.2d 677, 678-79 (1978) (" Valley Forge I

1961Exemption acts have been conceived in a spirit favorable to widows, and have received an interpretation consistent with their conception; and the statutory exemption is a preferred claim or gift of law prompted by consideration of public policy”: Murray Estate, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 504, 509 .

1949The rights of the execution creditor having previously at tached, the Act of June 16, 1836, supra, limiting lessor’s right to payment out of such fund to an amount not exceeding one year’s rent, as a preferred claim, becomes operative: General Tire & Rubber Co. et al. v. The General Tire & Sales Co., Inc., et al., 93 Pa. Superior Ct. 173, 176 .

1948As; to, a. widow’s exemption, the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, § 12(a), as amended, 20 PS § 471, provides that the widow “may retain or claim; either-real or personal-property, ., . . belonging td sáid .estate,- to the value of. five hundred dollars!” The' widow?s exemption is recognized- as a preferred claim, or i gift: prompted , by . considerations of public policy.. .“Exemption acts have been conceived in a. spirit favor able. t,o widows and have received an interpretation . consistent- with their- conception”: Davies’ Estate, 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 7, 13 , 21 A. 2d 517 .

1948As; to, a. widow’s exemption, the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, § 12(a), as amended, 20 PS § 471, provides that the widow “may retain or claim; either-real or personal-property, ., . . belonging td sáid .estate,- to the value of. five hundred dollars!” The' widow?s exemption is recognized- as a preferred claim, or i gift: prompted , by . considerations of public policy.. .“Exemption acts have been conceived in a. spirit favor able. t,o widows and have received an interpretation . consistent- with their- conception”: Davies’ Estate, 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 7, 13 , 21 A. 2d 517 .

1946R. 484 (1913); and a preferred claim for services and medicine furnished was sustained where the illness was found to have been fatal from the first, and that the attendance given during the year and a half of said last illness was justifiable under the circumstances: Staggers’ Estate, 8 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 (1898); and a claim against decedent’s estate for medical attendance was allowed where the patient was suffering from fatal illness extending over a number of years, although the exact cause of death was not given: Crocker’s Estate, 65 Pitts.

1946R. 484 (1913); and a preferred claim for services and medicine furnished was sustained where the illness was found to have been fatal from the first, and that the attendance given during the year and a half of said last illness was justifiable under the circumstances: Staggers’ Estate, 8 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 (1898); and a claim against decedent’s estate for medical attendance was allowed where the patient was suffering from fatal illness extending over a number of years, although the exact cause of death was not given: Crocker’s Estate, 65 Pitts.

1945Stauffer’s Estate, 89 Pa. *510 Superior Ct. 531, 535; Bell’s Estate, 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 11, 14 , 10 A. 2d 835 ; Peebles’s Estate, 157 Pa. 605, 609 , 27 A. 792 .

1945Stauffer’s Estate, 89 Pa. *510 Superior Ct. 531, 535; Bell’s Estate, 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 11, 14 , 10 A. 2d 835 ; Peebles’s Estate, 157 Pa. 605, 609 , 27 A. 792 .

1941The appellant relies very strongly upon Hartman’s Appeal, 107 Pa. 327 , and Rothwell v. Kremer & Hoffman, 95 Pa. Superior Ct. 36 , cases involving a construction of wage claim acts which gave to laborers, in the event of *164 the sale of property of the employers, a preferred claim on the proceeds.

1941The appellant relies very strongly upon Hartman’s Appeal, 107 Pa. 327 , and Rothwell v. Kremer & Hoffman, 95 Pa. Superior Ct. 36 , cases involving a construction of wage claim acts which gave to laborers, in the event of *164 the sale of property of the employers, a preferred claim on the proceeds.

1936Even though it he presumed as a matter of law that whatever money was used to purchase the mortgages taken in the name of the bank was its own money, and that therefore it continued to hold as trustee the cash constituting the trust fund, nevertheless, if petitioner, on behalf of the beneficiary of the trust fund, wishes to fasten upon respondent a preferred claim, it must trace the trust res from the time when the latter acquired it, in accordance with the principles laid down in Mehler’s Appeal, 310 Pa. 25 ; Royersford Trust Co.’s Case, 317 Pa. 490 , and other pertinent authorities.

1936Even though it he presumed as a matter of law that whatever money was used to purchase the mortgages taken in the name of the bank was its own money, and that therefore it continued to hold as trustee the cash constituting the trust fund, nevertheless, if petitioner, on behalf of the beneficiary of the trust fund, wishes to fasten upon respondent a preferred claim, it must trace the trust res from the time when the latter acquired it, in accordance with the principles laid down in Mehler’s Appeal, 310 Pa. 25 ; Royersford Trust Co.’s Case, 317 Pa. 490 , and other pertinent authorities.

1933The court held the Ottumwa Bank had a preferred claim, and said (p. 118) : “The relation between the bank and the trust company was not the ordinary one of debtor and creditor, but that of principal and agent (Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 138 ; First National Bank of Spring Mills v. Walker, 289 Pa. 252, 256 ), and the trust is an express one: Vosburgh’s Est., 279 Pa. 329, 332 .” “In Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135 , under facts much like those appearing here, the preference was allowed, and that decision is controlling.

1933In the case of Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Loose, 19 Pa. 15 , it was held as follows: “Where the reason of a rule is general, and the provision special, the rule is general in its application.

1933The court held the Ottumwa Bank had a preferred claim, and said (p. 118) : “The relation between the bank and the trust company was not the ordinary one of debtor and creditor, but that of principal and agent (Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 138 ; First National Bank of Spring Mills v. Walker, 289 Pa. 252, 256 ), and the trust is an express one: Vosburgh’s Est., 279 Pa. 329, 332 .” “In Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135 , under facts much like those appearing here, the preference was allowed, and that decision is controlling.

1933The court held the Ottumwa Bank had a preferred claim, and said (p. 118) : “The relation between the bank and the trust company was not the ordinary one of debtor and creditor, but that of principal and agent (Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 138 ; First National Bank of Spring Mills v. Walker, 289 Pa. 252, 256 ), and the trust is an express one: Vosburgh’s Est., 279 Pa. 329, 332 .” “In Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135 , under facts much like those appearing here, the preference was allowed, and that decision is controlling.

1933The court held the Ottumwa Bank had a preferred claim, and said (p. 118) : “The relation between the bank and the trust company was not the ordinary one of debtor and creditor, but that of principal and agent (Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 138 ; First National Bank of Spring Mills v. Walker, 289 Pa. 252, 256 ), and the trust is an express one: Vosburgh’s Est., 279 Pa. 329, 332 .” “In Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135 , under facts much like those appearing here, the preference was allowed, and that decision is controlling.

1933The statement (page 138) that ‘an entirely different question would be presented . . . had the agent-been a banking institution,’ is shown in Conneautville Bank’s Assigned Est., 280 Pa. 545, 548 , to apply only where ‘the usual relation between bank and depositor should exist, or the relation between them should be the [ordinary one] of trustee and cestui que trust,’ which is not the situation in the present case”: Cameron v. Carnegie Trust Co., supra, 121.

1927In Prenatt v. Messenger Printing Co. (No. 2), 250 Pa. 406 , we bad before us a case where a receiver of an insolvent corporation bad in bis possession a leased machine which be used in carrying on tbe business entrusted to bis care and it was determined that the claim for rent for tbe time the receiver bad possession of and used tbe machine was a preferred claim.