preferred claim in Montana

1973In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197 , 214 P. 543 , it is said: ‘The widow’s allowance * * * is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature of costs of administration.’ And in In Re James’ Estate, 38 S.D. 107 , 160 N.W. 525 , the Supreme Court of South Dakota used this language: ‘The [widow’s] allowance * * * is not in the nature of an interest in property, it is merely a preferred claim against the estate of a decedent which may or may not be available according to the circumstances. ’ ’ ’ Determination concerning the granting and the amount of family allowa

1973In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197 , 214 P. 543 , it is said: ‘The widow’s allowance * * * is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature of costs of administration.’ And in In Re James’ Estate, 38 S.D. 107 , 160 N.W. 525 , the Supreme Court of South Dakota used this language: ‘The [widow’s] allowance * * * is not in the nature of an interest in property, it is merely a preferred claim against the estate of a decedent which may or may not be available according to the circumstances. ’ ’ ’ Determination concerning the granting and the amount of family allowa

1973In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197 , 214 P. 543 , it is said: ‘The widow’s allowance * * * is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature of costs of administration.’ And in In Re James’ Estate, 38 S.D. 107 , 160 N.W. 525 , the Supreme Court of South Dakota used this language: ‘The [widow’s] allowance * * * is not in the nature of an interest in property, it is merely a preferred claim against the estate of a decedent which may or may not be available according to the circumstances. ’ ’ ’ Determination concerning the granting and the amount of family allowa

1973In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197 , 214 P. 543 , it is said: ‘The widow’s allowance * * * is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature of costs of administration.’ And in In Re James’ Estate, 38 S.D. 107 , 160 N.W. 525 , the Supreme Court of South Dakota used this language: ‘The [widow’s] allowance * * * is not in the nature of an interest in property, it is merely a preferred claim against the estate of a decedent which may or may not be available according to the circumstances. ’ ’ ’ Determination concerning the granting and the amount of family allowa

1925"A claim is the demand of something from some one on the ground of right" (Standard Dictionary), and "in its usual and proper sense is broad enough to include the statutory claim or right of the widow to an allowance from the estate of the testator, and, when a different intention is not manifested by the context, must be so considered." ( In re Lufkin's Estate , 131 Cal. 291 , 63 P. 469 .) The widow's allowance is usually referred to as a preferred claim against the estate.

1925"A claim is the demand of something from some one on the ground of right" (Standard Dictionary), and "in its usual and proper sense is broad enough to include the statutory claim or right of the widow to an allowance from the estate of the testator, and, when a different intention is not manifested by the context, must be so considered." ( In re Lufkin's Estate , 131 Cal. 291 , 63 P. 469 .) The widow's allowance is usually referred to as a preferred claim against the estate.

1979In Hammer v. Chapin (D.Mont. 1966), 256 F.Supp. 818 , the Federal District Court was faced with similarly competing policies and preferred the mechanic’s lien over the security of a federal Small Business Administration mortgage.

1979“The doctrine upon which it is founded is upon the consideration of natural justice, that the party who has enhanced the value of property . . . shall have a preferred claim on said property . . .” Machon v. Sullivan (1871), 1 Mont. 470, 472 . *87 In determining if the legislature intended to further the announced policy of the Small Tract Financing Act by eliminating mechanic’s lien priority under section 45-506, the Court must balance these competing policies.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1936(McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233 , 255 Pac. 733 ; Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16 , 23 Pac. (2d) 956, 958 ; Powell Building & Loan Assn. v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, 100 Mont. 183 , 46 Pac. (2d) 697 ; Conley v. Johnson, 101 Mont. 376 , 54 Pac. (2d) 585 .) In determining whether a deposit constitutes a special deposit, consideration must be given only to the relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

1935It was held by this court in the case of Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, 69 Mont. 140 , 220 Pac. 1114 , where there were not sufficient funds in the bank to pay a preferred claim, that the claimant was entitled to what funds were in the bank, and that as to the balance of his claim it should be allowed as a general claim.

1935It was held by this court in the case of Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, 69 Mont. 140 , 220 Pac. 1114 , where there were not sufficient funds in the bank to pay a preferred claim, that the claimant was entitled to what funds were in the bank, and that as to the balance of his claim it should be allowed as a general claim.

1935In Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Broivne, supra, this court, in allowing the pineapple concern’s claim as a preferred claim, directed that it could collect only a part of the face of its claim, for the reason that there were not sufficient trust funds in the defunct bank to pay the preferred claim in full, but said, “As to the remainder of its claim it is a general creditor.” This view is supported in Slimmer & Thomas v. Meade County Bank, 39 S. D. 8, 162 N. W. 536 , and other eases, and we think that such conclusion cannot be reasonably questioned.

1935In Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Broivne, supra, this court, in allowing the pineapple concern’s claim as a preferred claim, directed that it could collect only a part of the face of its claim, for the reason that there were not sufficient trust funds in the defunct bank to pay the preferred claim in full, but said, “As to the remainder of its claim it is a general creditor.” This view is supported in Slimmer & Thomas v. Meade County Bank, 39 S. D. 8, 162 N. W. 536 , and other eases, and we think that such conclusion cannot be reasonably questioned.

1935Clark v. Bailey, 99 Mont. 484 , 44 Pac. (2d) 740 , that, if a claim was rejected as a preferred claim, it was entitled to be approved as a general claim, if otherwise correct and valid.

1935Clark v. Bailey, 99 Mont. 484 , 44 Pac. (2d) 740 , that, if a claim was rejected as a preferred claim, it was entitled to be approved as a general claim, if otherwise correct and valid.

1934(Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 94 Mont. 508 , 23 Pac. (2d) 959 .) Of course, attachments existing upon specific property or judgments being a lien upon real estate prior to the dissolution of the Federal Surety Company would have been preferred claims and payable as such, but the judgment of Williard, Wheaton and Hay, as trustees, was not a preferred claim.

1934(Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 94 Mont. 508 , 23 Pac. (2d) 959 .) Of course, attachments existing upon specific property or judgments being a lien upon real estate prior to the dissolution of the Federal Surety Company would have been preferred claims and payable as such, but the judgment of Williard, Wheaton and Hay, as trustees, was not a preferred claim.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1933(Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500 , 165 N. W. 524 ; In re James’ Estate, 38 S. D. 107, 160 N. W. 525 ; Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521 ; Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146, 148 ; Spier’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 233 ; Platt’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 ; Hascall v. Stafford, 107 Tenn. 355 , 65 S. W. 423 , 89 Am.

1926The hearing resulted in an order denying the relief sough , and from this order the petitioner has appealed. *500 While other questions are raised in the pleadings and by counsel in their briefs, the only contention we need consider is that the funds in the bank, at the time it closed, were illegally deposited and constituted a trust fund, under the authority of Yellowstone County v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Mont. 439 , 128 Pac. 596 .

1926The hearing resulted in an order denying the relief sough , and from this order the petitioner has appealed. *500 While other questions are raised in the pleadings and by counsel in their briefs, the only contention we need consider is that the funds in the bank, at the time it closed, were illegally deposited and constituted a trust fund, under the authority of Yellowstone County v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Mont. 439 , 128 Pac. 596 .