preferred claim in Indiana

1953Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; In re Mertes Estate (1914), 181 Ind. 478 , 104 N. E. 753 ; Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449 , 73 N. E. 130 .

1953Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; In re Mertes Estate (1914), 181 Ind. 478 , 104 N. E. 753 ; Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449 , 73 N. E. 130 .

1953Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; In re Mertes Estate (1914), 181 Ind. 478 , 104 N. E. 753 ; Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449 , 73 N. E. 130 .

1953Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; In re Mertes Estate (1914), 181 Ind. 478 , 104 N. E. 753 ; Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449 , 73 N. E. 130 .

1953Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; In re Mertes Estate (1914), 181 Ind. 478 , 104 N. E. 753 ; Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449 , 73 N. E. 130 .

1953Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; In re Mertes Estate (1914), 181 Ind. 478 , 104 N. E. 753 ; Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449 , 73 N. E. 130 .

1933Barnard v. Black (1930), 91 Ind. App. 283 , 169 N. E. 872 , and authorities there cited. *188 *187 On the trial of this cause in the lower court, the appellant did not trace its funds into any specific item of *188 property making up the entire mass of assets passing into the possession of the receiver, except into the cash item of $8,074.64, a bond, and some other securities amounting to the aggregate sum of $11,816.40.

1933Barnard v. Black (1930), 91 Ind. App. 283 , 169 N. E. 872 , and authorities there cited. *188 *187 On the trial of this cause in the lower court, the appellant did not trace its funds into any specific item of *188 property making up the entire mass of assets passing into the possession of the receiver, except into the cash item of $8,074.64, a bond, and some other securities amounting to the aggregate sum of $11,816.40.

1915Shipman v. Keys (1891), 127 Ind. 353 , 26 N. E. 896 ; Claypool v. Jaqua (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; Welch v. Collier (1901), 27 Ind. App. 502 , 61 N. E. 757 .

1915Shipman v. Keys (1891), 127 Ind. 353 , 26 N. E. 896 ; Claypool v. Jaqua (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; Welch v. Collier (1901), 27 Ind. App. 502 , 61 N. E. 757 .

2005See Cochrane v. Lovett, 166 Ind.App. 684 , 337 N.E.2d 565 , 570 n. 6 (1975) (noting that the Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions have the "apparent approval of the Indiana Supreme Court as evidenced by the preferred treatment given such instructions in [Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 51(E) ]"); *494 see also Byrd v. State, 579 N.E.2d 457 , 463 n. 7 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (stating that "the preferred instruction on voluntary intoxication may be found" in the Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions).

1996With respect to the allowance of a claim, "(tlhe statute fixes the order of priority of claims, and this the court cannot change." Goodbub v. Hornung's Estate (1891), 127 Ind. 181 , 26 N.E. 770 , 77l.

1996With respect to the allowance of a claim, "(tlhe statute fixes the order of priority of claims, and this the court cannot change." Goodbub v. Hornung's Estate (1891), 127 Ind. 181 , 26 N.E. 770 , 77l.

1996As our supreme court has observed, the Indiana statute provides for the county department "to have a preferred claim against the estate of the person receiving the aid." Dep't of Public Welfare v. Tyree (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 18, 21 .

1989McDaniel, supra 166 Ind. at 4 , 75 N.E. at 648 . .

1989McDaniel, supra 166 Ind. at 4 , 75 N.E. at 648 . .

1983Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields et al. (1970), 254 Ind. 219 , 259 N.E.2d 651 .

1983Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields et al. (1970), 254 Ind. 219 , 259 N.E.2d 651 .

1953DeHaven v. Muncipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 198 , 7 N. E. 2d 184 ; Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349 , 115 N. E. 83 ; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651 , 92 N. E. 374 ; I Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack’s Ed.) §2012.

1953DeHaven v. Muncipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 198 , 7 N. E. 2d 184 ; Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349 , 115 N. E. 83 ; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651 , 92 N. E. 374 ; I Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack’s Ed.) §2012.

1953DeHaven v. Muncipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 198 , 7 N. E. 2d 184 ; Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349 , 115 N. E. 83 ; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651 , 92 N. E. 374 ; I Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack’s Ed.) §2012.

1953DeHaven v. Muncipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 198 , 7 N. E. 2d 184 ; Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349 , 115 N. E. 83 ; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651 , 92 N. E. 374 ; I Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack’s Ed.) §2012.

1953In Indiana Dept. of State Rev. v. Alexander’s Estate (1953), 232 Ind. 661 , 115 N. E. 2d 747 , we held that the widow’s preferred claim was not subject to inheritance tax.

1953In Indiana Dept. of State Rev. v. Alexander’s Estate (1953), 232 Ind. 661 , 115 N. E. 2d 747 , we held that the widow’s preferred claim was not subject to inheritance tax.

1953Chapter 201 of the 1941 Acts struck out all the existing provisions of the Welfare Act at that time which gave the county department and the state a lien for old age assistance advanced, and in County Department of Public Welfare v. Potthoff (1942), 220 Ind. 574 , 44 N. E. 2d 494 , this court held existing liens were vacated also.

1953Chapter 201 of the 1941 Acts struck out all the existing provisions of the Welfare Act at that time which gave the county department and the state a lien for old age assistance advanced, and in County Department of Public Welfare v. Potthoff (1942), 220 Ind. 574 , 44 N. E. 2d 494 , this court held existing liens were vacated also.

1953DeHaven v. Muncipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 198 , 7 N. E. 2d 184 ; Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349 , 115 N. E. 83 ; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651 , 92 N. E. 374 ; I Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack’s Ed.) §2012.

1953DeHaven v. Muncipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 198 , 7 N. E. 2d 184 ; Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349 , 115 N. E. 83 ; Stiers v. Mundy (1910), 174 Ind. 651 , 92 N. E. 374 ; I Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack’s Ed.) §2012.

1936See Rottger v. First National Bank of Lafayette (1934), 98 Ind. App. 139 , 184 N. E. 267 ; Rottger v. Delta Delta Delta Realty Corp. (1934), 98 Ind. App. 680 , 184 N. E. 412 .

1936See Rottger v. First National Bank of Lafayette (1934), 98 Ind. App. 139 , 184 N. E. 267 ; Rottger v. Delta Delta Delta Realty Corp. (1934), 98 Ind. App. 680 , 184 N. E. 412 .

1935This section of the statutes was held unconstitutional in the case of McErlain v. Taylor (1934), 207 Ind. 250 , 192 N. E. 260 , therefore, appellant’s claim is governed by §9343, Burns 1926, being §40-111, Burns 1933 and §10001, Baldwin’s 1934, under which section he is entitled to a preferred claim not exceeding $50.00 and to a general claim for the balance of the amount found, by the court, to be due him.

1934Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 94 Ind. App. 461 , 181 N. E. 369 ; Rottger v. First-Merchants National Bank of Lafayette (1933), ante, 139, 184 N. E. 267 , petition to transfer denied by the Supreme Court January 31, 1934.

1934Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 94 Ind. App. 461 , 181 N. E. 369 ; Rottger v. First-Merchants National Bank of Lafayette (1933), ante, 139, 184 N. E. 267 , petition to transfer denied by the Supreme Court January 31, 1934.

1933In support of their contention, counsel for appellee cite and rely upon the case of Indiana Trust Co. v. International Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1905), 165 Ind. 597 , 76 N. E. 304 .

1933In support of their contention, counsel for appellee cite and rely upon the case of Indiana Trust Co. v. International Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1905), 165 Ind. 597 , 76 N. E. 304 .

1930J. 730; Hyland v. Roe (1901), 111 Wis. 361 , 87 N. W. 252 , 87 Am.

1930J. 730; Hyland v. Roe (1901), 111 Wis. 361 , 87 N. W. 252 , 87 Am.

1929“And proof that the tort-feasor has mingled the trust funds with his own and made payments thereafter out of the common fund, is, nothing else appearing, a sufficient identification of the remainder of that fund coming into the hands of the receiver, not exceeding the smallest amount the fund contained subsequent to the commingling, as trust property, under the legal presumption that he regarded the law and neither paid out the trust fund nor invested it in other property, but kept it sacred.” Brennan v. Tillinghast (1913), 201 Fed. 609, 613 .

1922It is appellant’s contention that the trust company having received appellant’s moneys wrongfully at a time when the trust company was insolvent and commingling the same with its funds, appellant is entitled to an allowance for such amount so misappropriated and commingled, as a preferred claim, citing as authority State, ex rel., v. Farmers, etc., Bank (1919), 71 Ind. App. 216 , 124 N. E. 501 .

1922It is appellant’s contention that the trust company having received appellant’s moneys wrongfully at a time when the trust company was insolvent and commingling the same with its funds, appellant is entitled to an allowance for such amount so misappropriated and commingled, as a preferred claim, citing as authority State, ex rel., v. Farmers, etc., Bank (1919), 71 Ind. App. 216 , 124 N. E. 501 .

1915It is urged by appellant that this statute entitled the widow to $500 out of her husband’s estate, as a preferred claim, which is senior to all demands against the estate, save expense of administration, last sickness and funeral expenses (Comer v. Light [1911], 175 Ind. 367 , 93 N. E. 660 , 94 N. E. 325 ), and that it is analogous to dower, and can not be defeated by the husband by testamentary provisions.

1915It is urged by appellant that this statute entitled the widow to $500 out of her husband’s estate, as a preferred claim, which is senior to all demands against the estate, save expense of administration, last sickness and funeral expenses (Comer v. Light [1911], 175 Ind. 367 , 93 N. E. 660 , 94 N. E. 325 ), and that it is analogous to dower, and can not be defeated by the husband by testamentary provisions.

1915Shipman v. Keys (1891), 127 Ind. 353 , 26 N. E. 896 ; Claypool v. Jaqua (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; Welch v. Collier (1901), 27 Ind. App. 502 , 61 N. E. 757 .

1915Shipman v. Keys (1891), 127 Ind. 353 , 26 N. E. 896 ; Claypool v. Jaqua (1893), 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 ; Welch v. Collier (1901), 27 Ind. App. 502 , 61 N. E. 757 .

1896Thus, in Pendergast v. Yandes, 124 Ind. 159 , no question of superiority of one lien over another arose, but the sole point discussed and decided was that the plaintiff, who was the superintendent of the defendant’s lines of gas pipes, with authority to hire and discharge employes, was a laborer within the meaning of the statute and was therefore entitled to have his claim for wages declared a preferred claim, as against the claims of general creditors.

1882As to vendors’ liens see McCauley v. Holtz, 62 Ind. 205 ; Martin v. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67 .

1882As to vendors’ liens see McCauley v. Holtz, 62 Ind. 205 ; Martin v. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67 .