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11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1896–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davidson v. McClellangreen1 sentence2019Subsection (b)(5) “has been construed to apply only to situations not covered by the enumerated provisions” to prevent it “from swallowing the enumerated reasons and subverting the principle of finality.” Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 237, 239 (Colo. 2001) (residuary provision “include[s] only extreme situations and extraordinary circumstances”); see also Cavanaugh, 644 P.2d at 5 (provision is narrowly construed to “avoid undercutting the preferred rule of finality of judgments”). | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Tennesseegreen1 sentence2016And the majority’s clear preference for a change in policy hardly amounts to an assertion that long-established law has for some reason become unworkable.”); see also Payne v. Tennesee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters 19 reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”). ¶ 37 At the end of the day, the Rhodig rule identifies one winner in this type of dispute, whereas the majority’s preferred rul | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. JAU v. RLCgreen1 sentence2003See Sandoval v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 752 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Colo.App.1988); see also People in Interest *1147 of J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo.2002)(C.R.C.P.60(b) balances the preferred rule of finality of judgments and the need to provide relief in the interest of justice in exceptional cases). | 1 | 1 |
Sandoval v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'ngreen1 sentence2003See Sandoval v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 752 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Colo.App.1988); see also People in Interest *1147 of J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo.2002)(C.R.C.P.60(b) balances the preferred rule of finality of judgments and the need to provide relief in the interest of justice in exceptional cases). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cavanaugh v. State, Department of Social Servicesgreen1 sentence2019Subsection (b)(5) “has been construed to apply only to situations not covered by the enumerated provisions” to prevent it “from swallowing the enumerated reasons and subverting the principle of finality.” Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d 233, 237, 239 (Colo. 2001) (residuary provision “include[s] only extreme situations and extraordinary circumstances”); see also Cavanaugh, 644 P.2d at 5 (provision is narrowly construed to “avoid undercutting the preferred rule of finality of judgments”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
De Quintana v. Madril
green
2 sentences1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature 1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature | 2 | 1923–1931 |
Remington v. Remington
neutral
2 sentences1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature 1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature | 2 | 1923–1931 |
Claypool v. Jaqua
green
2 sentences1913This is well declared in the case of Claypool v. Jaqua, 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 , where- the court says: “The widow’s statutory claim to $500 is not an interest in the estate of the decedent, but is a preferred claim payable out of the personal estate, if sufficient for the purpose. 1913This is well declared in the case of Claypool v. Jaqua, 135 Ind. 499 , 35 N. E. 285 , where- the court says: “The widow’s statutory claim to $500 is not an interest in the estate of the decedent, but is a preferred claim payable out of the personal estate, if sufficient for the purpose. | 2 | 1913–1914 |
Parks v. Commissioners of Soldiers' & Sailors' Home
green
2 sentences1896Parks v. The Commissioners of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Home, etc., 22 Colo. 86 , is a preferred claim, it is incumbent on the officer to plead the exhaustion of that fund by antecedent warrants, if such be the real basis of his defense. 1896Parks v. The Commissioners of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Home, etc., 22 Colo. 86 , is a preferred claim, it is incumbent on the officer to plead the exhaustion of that fund by antecedent warrants, if such be the real basis of his defense. | 2 | 1896–1896 |
Ahlf v. King
neutral
2 sentences1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature 1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Deeble v. Alerton
neutral
2 sentences1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature 1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors' and landlords' liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral." In Hale v. Burford , 73 Colo. 197 , 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: "This court has held that the widow's allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the natu | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Grover v. Clover
green
2 sentences1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature 1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Hale v. Burford
neutral
2 sentences1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature 1931While it cannot be treated as a debt against the estate, it is a claim to be preferred over legatees and distributees, and all other claims against the estate of her deceased husband, except debts due the United States, liens for taxes, and vendors’ and landlords’ liens, necessary administration expenses and expenses of last sickness and funeral.” In Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 200 , 214 Pac. 543 , it is stated: “This court has held that the widow’s allowance is not a debt or demand of that nature, that it is not a debt of, or an interest in, the estate, but a preferred claim, in the nature | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Wilson v. Wilson
neutral
1 sentence1922Wilson v. Wilson, 55 Colo. 70 , 132 Pac. 67 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Shipherd v. Furness
neutral
2 sentences1916In Shipherd v. Furness, 153 Ill. 590 -596, 39 N. E. 1096 , the court said: “It has been decided by this court that the word ‘trust’ appearing in said statute, is to be taken as used, not in its broader sense, as embracing every case in which a confidence has been reposed, but in its more restrictive sense; that the statute applies to technical trusts only, and has no application to trusts which the law implies from a contract.” In that case the claimant sought to have allowed as a claim for money received in trust the proceeds of certain negotiable notes which he had placed with one Gamble, wh 1916In Shipherd v. Furness, 153 Ill. 590 -596, 39 N. E. 1096 , the court said: “It has been decided by this court that the word ‘trust’ appearing in said statute, is to be taken as used, not in its broader sense, as embracing every case in which a confidence has been reposed, but in its more restrictive sense; that the statute applies to technical trusts only, and has no application to trusts which the law implies from a contract.” In that case the claimant sought to have allowed as a claim for money received in trust the proceeds of certain negotiable notes which he had placed with one Gamble, wh | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.