ability challenge in New York

2025Similar to Bowes , the incorrect location of the 4:55 a.m. statement "'did not change the substance of the notice or the ability of defense counsel to make a timely motion for a [suppression] hearing.'" ([ People v. Bowes, 206 AD3d a t 1265, quoting People v. Daggett , 150 AD3d 1680, 1683 [4th Dept., 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1125 [2017]).

2025Similar to Bowes , the incorrect location of the 4:55 a.m. statement "'did not change the substance of the notice or the ability of defense counsel to make a timely motion for a [suppression] hearing.'" ([ People v. Bowes, 206 AD3d a t 1265, quoting People v. Daggett , 150 AD3d 1680, 1683 [4th Dept., 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1125 [2017]).

2012In People v Bialostok, we reaffirmed Hueston , holding that suppression was not required, where formal notice of a warrant was untimely but defendant knew through his attorney about the warrant and the nature of the investigation (Bialostok, 80 NY2d at 747 ).

2009As this deprivation is the direct result of the People’s intentional actions, the correct sanction should be preclusion, as it was in Wagstaff (see also People v Torres, 190 AD2d 52 [3d Dept 1993] [where the Court determined that preclusion was the only appropriate sanction following the sheriffs intentional, though not malicious, destruction of evidence which could have corroborated a viable defense theory and severely undercut the People’s case]; cf. Christopher at 473 [where adverse inference was determined to-be a sufficient sanction because the defendant did not specify how he was prejudi

2008Consequently, it cannot be said that the defendant’s ability to test the accuracy of direct testimony of Thon and Cassatt was impaired such as to create a substantial risk of prejudice, or that the corrective response fashioned by the trial court was an improvident exercise of its discretion (see People v Siegel, 87 NY2d at 544 ; People v Chin, 67 NY2d at 28-29 ).

2008Consequently, it cannot be said that the defendant’s ability to test the accuracy of direct testimony of Thon and Cassatt was impaired such as to create a substantial risk of prejudice, or that the corrective response fashioned by the trial court was an improvident exercise of its discretion (see People v Siegel, 87 NY2d at 544 ; People v Chin, 67 NY2d at 28-29 ).

2000(Morley v Quinones, 208 AD2d 813 [1994].) In Morley , an earlier lawsuit had been brought by one of two plaintiffs who were injured in an occurrence.

2000Since it is often important to maintain the secrecy of the informant’s identity, especially at the early stages of a criminal proceeding, trial courts have the discretion to prohibit a defendant from eliciting the informant’s name or any other information that could reveal the informant’s identity (see, People v Castro, 29 NY2d 324, 326 [finding it “unnecessary” to disclose informant’s name at suppression hearing where other evidence established informant’s reliability]; People v Coffey, 12 NY2d 443, 450-453 [upholding trial court’s decision not to disclose informant’s name where informant’s e

2000(Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65 [1969]; 233233 Co. v City of New York, 171 AD2d 492, 496 [1st Dept 1991].) It has been held that where the termination of legal proceedings in favor of a litigant aggrieved by an earlier interlocutory ruling deprives that litigant of the ability to challenge the interlocutory ruling, a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue has not been afforded so as to permit the utilization of the earlier interlocutory ruling for purposes of collateral estoppel in a later litigation.

1999To the extent that the challenged rebuttal testimony was relevant to the ability of the defense witness to perceive and remember events, such evidence was not collateral and the court properly exercised its discretion to receive it (see, People v Ortiz, 40 AD2d 857, 858 ).

1999There simply cannot have been any other purpose given that the prosecutor already knew that no case could be proven against them * * * [0]ne can only conclude that the police arrested and charged them for the sole purpose of preventing them from being witnesses on the defendant’s behalf.” (Affirmation of defendant’s attorney ¶ 12.) This court is not in accord with the proposition that only this one factual conclusion can be reached, and, “an interest of justice rationale * * * is not a basis upon which a trial court can set aside a verdict.” (People v Ponnapula, supra, at 267 .) “Thus, defenda

1999There simply cannot have been any other purpose given that the prosecutor already knew that no case could be proven against them * * * [0]ne can only conclude that the police arrested and charged them for the sole purpose of preventing them from being witnesses on the defendant’s behalf.” (Affirmation of defendant’s attorney ¶ 12.) This court is not in accord with the proposition that only this one factual conclusion can be reached, and, “an interest of justice rationale * * * is not a basis upon which a trial court can set aside a verdict.” (People v Ponnapula, supra, at 267 .) “Thus, defenda

1999There simply cannot have been any other purpose given that the prosecutor already knew that no case could be proven against them * * * [0]ne can only conclude that the police arrested and charged them for the sole purpose of preventing them from being witnesses on the defendant’s behalf.” (Affirmation of defendant’s attorney ¶ 12.) This court is not in accord with the proposition that only this one factual conclusion can be reached, and, “an interest of justice rationale * * * is not a basis upon which a trial court can set aside a verdict.” (People v Ponnapula, supra, at 267 .) “Thus, defenda

1989Thus, it is of no moment that courts have recognized that in-court identifications may be prompted by suggestive procedures (see, People v James, 100 AD2d 552, 553 , supra; People v Banks, 73 AD2d 907 , affd 53 NY2d 819 ; People v Huggler, 50 AD2d 471, 474 ; Boyd v Henderson, 555 F2d 56, 59-60, cert denied 434 US 927 ).

1989(Cf., Alonzo v State of New York, 73 AD2d 760 .) We also note that neither claimant had any choice nor the ability to challenge the information provided.

1989Thus, it is of no moment that courts have recognized that in-court identifications may be prompted by suggestive procedures (see, People v James, 100 AD2d 552, 553 , supra; People v Banks, 73 AD2d 907 , affd 53 NY2d 819 ; People v Huggler, 50 AD2d 471, 474 ; Boyd v Henderson, 555 F2d 56, 59-60, cert denied 434 US 927 ).

1989The employer’s reliance on Matter of Rufft.no v Rosen & Sons ( 142 AD2d 177 , affd 74 NY2d 861 ) to impugn the Fund’s ability to challenge the finding of occupational disease under section 3 (2) (29) is without merit.