ability challenge in California

2023(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-462 [with respect to a challenge to the witness certainty language in the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 315, the defendant’s challenge to the inclusion of the certainty language was forfeited because the defendant did not request a modification of the instruction].) Defendant asserts if this court finds he forfeited his claim, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

2021(People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-462 [with respect to a challenge to the witness certainty language in the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 315, the defendant’s challenge to the inclusion of the certainty language was forfeited because the defendant did not request a modification of the instruction].) A finding of forfeiture is especially appropriate where, as here, inclusion of the language on eyewitness certainty might have been beneficial to the defendant in that the evidence “involved many identifications, some certain, some uncertain,” and “[d]efendant would surely want

2023(People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 544 ; People v. Sylva (1904) 143 Cal 62, 64; People v. Lee Kong (1892) 95 Cal. 666, 669 (Lee Kong).) The California Supreme Court defined the present ability requirement in People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164 (Chance).

2015(Ibid.; see also People v. Kong (1892) 95 Cal. 666, 670 [defendant who fired through roof at officer but was mistaken as to officer’s exact location had the present ability to inflict injury]; People v. Craig (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 644 , [defendant who cut victim’s brakes had present ability to injure, even though it was unlikely that victim would fail to detect the attack].)5 The Supreme Court further clarified the present ability requirement in People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164 .

2021(See Quackenbush, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 76 [“Since . . . this is the first contested case to test the requirements of [regulation] section 2643.6, it cannot be said that the Commissioner had consistently maintained his interpretation.”].)21 Moreover, our starting point is not 2007.

2021(See Quackenbush, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 76 [“Since . . . this is the first contested case to test the requirements of [regulation] section 2643.6, it cannot be said that the Commissioner had consistently maintained his interpretation.”].)21 Moreover, our starting point is not 2007.

2018Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] This discretion is not, however, unlimited, especially when its exercise hampers the ability of the defense to present evidence.' " ( People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268 , 286, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 180 P.3d 351 ; see Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 768 , 774, 150 Cal.Rptr. 419 .) In this case, the trial *594 court abused its broad discretion when, after defendant elected to take the stand in reliance on the court's ruling excluding evidence of the 2010 misdemeanor

2018Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] This discretion is not, however, unlimited, especially when its exercise hampers the ability of the defense to present evidence.' " ( People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268 , 286, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 180 P.3d 351 ; see Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 768 , 774, 150 Cal.Rptr. 419 .) In this case, the trial *594 court abused its broad discretion when, after defendant elected to take the stand in reliance on the court's ruling excluding evidence of the 2010 misdemeanor

2013(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 591 [a defendant who fails to contest the booking fee when the trial court imposes it forfeits the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the fee], disapproving of People v. Pacheco, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 [holding a defendant’s failure to object to imposition of a booking fee does not forfeit an appellate challenge based on insufficiency of the evidence].) DISPOSITION The judgment is modified to impose a $570 drug program fee and a $190 laboratory analysis fee.

2013(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 590 [a defendant who fails to contest the booking fee when the trial court imposes it forfeits the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the fee], disapproving of People v. Pacheco (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 [holding defendant’s failure to object to imposition of a booking fee does not forfeit an appellate challenge based on insufficiency of the evidence].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2012(Coy v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1082, fn. 2.) But even if Transport’s argument were not barred procedurally, it would fail on the merits.

2007(Id at p. 1082, fn. 2, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 .) Because the issue was never addressed, Coy offers no support for defendants' argument.

1964(Estate of Sexton, 199 Cal. 759, 764 [ 251 P. 778 ].) However, it is not necessary that the whole proof of contestant’s case come from any single witness. 4.

1964(Estate of Sexton, 199 Cal. 759, 764 [ 251 P. 778 ].) However, it is not necessary that the whole proof of contestant’s case come from any single witness. 4.

2020(See Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470 [“the prospective SVP should have the ability to challenge the accuracy of such reports by calling such experts for cross-examination”]; Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 8 [same].) The courts never equate questioning experts about the accuracy of their evaluations with an objection to the admissibility of the evaluations on hearsay grounds.

2001The person named in the petition shall be entitled to assistance of counsel at the probable cause hearing." (Welf. & Inst.Code, ง 6602, subd. (a).) The probable cause hearing is similar to the preliminary hearing held in a criminal case. ( In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1469 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 .) The probable cause "hearing should allow the admission of both oral and written evidence. . . . [T]he prosecutor may present the opinions of the experts through the hearsay reports of such persons, the prospective [sexually violent predator] should have the ability to challenge the accurac

2015(Dakota Payphone, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 508 ["[I]t is ultimately the parties' ability to challenge the ruling that is key," for purposes of determining whether there was a substantial modification to the judgment that gives the party more time to appeal.].) It has "generally been held unfair to the parties to allow the trial court to make a change that they cannot, thereafter, challenge." (Id. at p. 507; Sanchez, at pp. 764-767.) Whether we use the "separately appealable order" rule, or the rule that a modification materially affecting the rights of the parties is substantial and thus r

2013Confronted with the issue of whether to dismiss the appeal, the appellate court, after acknowledging that appellate courts generally had no jurisdiction to consider untimely appeals, stated that “[t]he resolution of this issue turns on the question whether the amended judgment superseded the original judgment for purposes of computing the time in which to file a notice of appeal.” (Dakota, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 504 .) “The crux of the problem ... is whether there is a substantial change in the rights of the parties such that allowing an amendment nunc pro tunc (relating back to the orig

2017(See Concepcion, supra , 563 U.S. at pp. 350-352, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) Accordingly, we must direct that the trial court vacate its order and enter a new order denying Z.B.'s motion to arbitrate.

2013(Concepcion, supra, __U.S. __ at p. __ [ 130 S.Ct. at p. 1747 ].) We need not reach this argument since the issue has been forfeited on appeal. 16 Whether Cruz would apply here is a question of fact, i.e., would the injunction plaintiffs seek “more than incidentally benefit the public.” (Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136 .) Plaintiffs failed to make this argument in their opposition to the motion to compel arbitration, denying defendants the opportunity to contest it and the trial court the ability to rule on it.

2016(See Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1102 [ 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 ].) 2 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code. 3 Somewhat confusingly, both the purported assignee’s authority to foreclose and the borrower’s ability to challenge that authority have been framed as questions of “standing.” (See, e.g., Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization.

2016(See Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1102 [ 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 ].) 2 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code. 3 Somewhat confusingly, both the purported assignee’s authority to foreclose and the borrower’s ability to challenge that authority have been framed as questions of “standing.” (See, e.g., Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization.

2008Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] This discretion is not, however, unlimited, especially when its exercise hampers the ability of the defense to present evidence.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 816 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ].) We see no abuse of discretion in this case.

2008Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] This discretion is not, however, unlimited, especially when its exercise hampers the ability of the defense to present evidence.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 816 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ].) We see no abuse of discretion in this case.

2021(Id. at p. 1469.) It then made the following passing reference to hearsay: “While we believe the prosecutor may present the opinions of the experts through the hearsay reports of such persons, the prospective SVP should have the ability to challenge the accuracy of such reports by calling such experts for cross-examination.” (Id. at pp. 1469–1470.) Then in Cooley, where we addressed “the scope and substance of the probable cause determination” under section 34 WALKER v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 6602 (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 235 ), we remarked on Parker’s hears

2020(See Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470 [“the prospective SVP should have the ability to challenge the accuracy of such reports by calling such experts for cross-examination”]; Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 8 [same].) The courts never equate questioning experts about the accuracy of their evaluations with an objection to the admissibility of the evaluations on hearsay grounds.

2005(Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 894 .) The Supreme Court, however, held that the Director retained the ability to challenge the formal evaluations if he or she concluded that the evaluations did not comply with the statutory framework.

2004The Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's suggestion that the SVP Act permitted the filing of a petition, even in the absence of the recommendation of two psychologists. ( People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 894 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 44 P.3d 949 .) The Supreme Court held, however, that the Director retained the ability to challenge the formal evaluations if he or she concluded that the evaluations did not comply with the statutory framework. ( Id. at pp. 912-913, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 44 P.3d 949 .) To provide guidance in performing these evaluations, the Supreme

2023(See, e.g., In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234 [stating that “[c]onditions of parole must be reasonably related to the compelling state interest of fostering a law-abiding lifestyle in the parolee”].) Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of Reeves’s arguments regarding the now-moot condition of probation.