ability challenge in Maryland

1993See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7 , 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 , 97 S.Ct. 2177 , 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant's right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 , 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver).

1993See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7 , 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 , 97 S.Ct. 2177 , 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant's right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 , 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver).

1993See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7 , 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 , 97 S.Ct. 2177 , 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant's right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 , 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver).

1993See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7 , 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 , 97 S.Ct. 2177 , 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant's right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 , 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver).

1993See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7 , 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 , 97 S.Ct. 2177 , 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant's right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 , 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver).

1981See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7 , 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant’s right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270 , 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver).

2018Similarly, Maryland Courts have also stressed that we have "confidence in a trial judge's ability to rule on questions of admissibility of evidence and to then assume the role of trier of fact without having carried over to [the judge's] factual deliberations a prejudice on the matters contained in the evidence which [the judge] may have excluded." Ball , 347 Md. at 194 , 699 A.2d 1170 (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227 , 236, 271 A.2d 641 (1970) ).

2018Similarly, Maryland Courts have also stressed that we have "confidence in a trial judge's ability to rule on questions of admissibility of evidence and to then assume the role of trier of fact without having carried over to [the judge's] factual deliberations a prejudice on the matters contained in the evidence which [the judge] may have excluded." Ball , 347 Md. at 194 , 699 A.2d 1170 (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227 , 236, 271 A.2d 641 (1970) ).

2014Such an inquiry need not be extensive and, indeed, in this case, the inquiry sought to be made by the [defendant] can[]not fairly be characterized as extensive and unfocus[ed] questioning . . . [T]he trial court’s refusal to make the requested inquiry denied the [defendant] the ability to challenge [prospective] jurors for cause, [and left] the trial [court] without meaningful information concerning [prospective] juror bias [and prejudices] on which to act, and [shifted] to the prospective jurors themselves the responsibility for making the ultimate decision as to their ability to serve on the

2014Such an inquiry need not be extensive and, indeed, in this case, the inquiry sought to be made by the [defendant] can[]not fairly be characterized as extensive and unfocus[ed] questioning . . . [T]he trial court’s refusal to make the requested inquiry denied the [defendant] the ability to challenge [prospective] jurors for cause, [and left] the trial [court] without meaningful information concerning [prospective] juror bias [and prejudices] on which to act, and [shifted] to the prospective jurors themselves the responsibility for making the ultimate decision as to their ability to serve on the

2014This concept of “assembler’s liability” is justified, this Court said, because the assembler “derives an economic benefit from the sale of the product that incorporates the component; the assembler has the ability to test and inspect the component when it is within its possession; and, by including the component in its finished product, the assembler represents to the consumer and ultimate user that the component is safe.” Wood, 119 Md.App. at 34 , 703 A.2d 1315 (citing Baughman, 780 F.2d at 1132-33 ; Exxon Shipping, 789 F.Supp. at 1527 ). *432 On the other hand, this Court observed that other

2014This concept of “assembler’s liability” is justified, this Court said, because the assembler “derives an economic benefit from the sale of the product that incorporates the component; the assembler has the ability to test and inspect the component when it is within its possession; and, by including the component in its finished product, the assembler represents to the consumer and ultimate user that the component is safe.” Wood, 119 Md.App. at 34 , 703 A.2d 1315 (citing Baughman, 780 F.2d at 1132-33 ; Exxon Shipping, 789 F.Supp. at 1527 ). *432 On the other hand, this Court observed that other

2014This concept of “assembler’s liability” is justified, this Court said, because the assembler “derives an economic benefit from the sale of the product that incorporates the component; the assembler has the ability to test and inspect the component when it is within its possession; and, by including the component in its finished product, the assembler represents to the consumer and ultimate user that the component is safe.” Wood, 119 Md.App. at 34 , 703 A.2d 1315 (citing Baughman, 780 F.2d at 1132-33 ; Exxon Shipping, 789 F.Supp. at 1527 ). *432 On the other hand, this Court observed that other

1998See Baughman, 780 F.2d at 1132-33 ; Pacific Resources, Inc., 789 F.Supp. at 1527 .

1975Accord, State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547 .

1970Recently, in State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547 , 267 A. 2d 190 (1970), we had occasion to discuss the impact which a prior conviction of drunkenness in a motor vehicle case (which was a conviction of questionable admissibility) *237 might have had upon the trial judge as contrasted to a jury.

2017See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305 , 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while

2017See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305 , 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while

2017See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305 , 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while

2017See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305 , 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while

2017See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305 , 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while

2017See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 433 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990) (quoting Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 , 85 S.Ct. 721 , 13 L.Ed.2d 702 (1965)) (“[t]he general rule is that a party waives his objection to testimony by subsequently offering testimony on the same matter' ”); compare Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 305 , 26 A.3d 899 (2011) (holding that when court has ruled in limine that State may impeach defendant with prior conviction, defendant does not necessarily waive the ability to challenge that ruling by bringing up the prior conviction while

2011See Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1981) (explaining that “a witness may of his own free will refuse to be interviewed by either the prosecution or the defense”); United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir.1974) (observing that “a witness is free to talk or not unless compelled by order of court”); accord Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 541 , 207 A.2d 83 (1965) (explaining that the ability of the defense to question a State’s witness was subject to “witness’ acquiescence in such interrogations”).

2011See Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1981) (explaining that “a witness may of his own free will refuse to be interviewed by either the prosecution or the defense”); United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir.1974) (observing that “a witness is free to talk or not unless compelled by order of court”); accord Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 541 , 207 A.2d 83 (1965) (explaining that the ability of the defense to question a State’s witness was subject to “witness’ acquiescence in such interrogations”).

2011See Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1981) (explaining that “a witness may of his own free will refuse to be interviewed by either the prosecution or the defense”); United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir.1974) (observing that “a witness is free to talk or not unless compelled by order of court”); accord Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 541 , 207 A.2d 83 (1965) (explaining that the ability of the defense to question a State’s witness was subject to “witness’ acquiescence in such interrogations”).

2011See Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1981) (explaining that “a witness may of his own free will refuse to be interviewed by either the prosecution or the defense”); United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir.1974) (observing that “a witness is free to talk or not unless compelled by order of court”); accord Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 541 , 207 A.2d 83 (1965) (explaining that the ability of the defense to question a State’s witness was subject to “witness’ acquiescence in such interrogations”).

2009In ruling lliat the inherent powers of the People's Counsel gave it the ability to challenge the validity of a regulation, we began by distinguishing the case of Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229, 240 , 60 A.2d 691, 696 (1948), where we held that the People’s Counsel "lacked the power to appeal a Commission order,” PSC v. MPC, 309 Md. at 9 , 522 A.2d at 372 (emphasis in original).

2009In ruling lliat the inherent powers of the People's Counsel gave it the ability to challenge the validity of a regulation, we began by distinguishing the case of Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229, 240 , 60 A.2d 691, 696 (1948), where we held that the People’s Counsel "lacked the power to appeal a Commission order,” PSC v. MPC, 309 Md. at 9 , 522 A.2d at 372 (emphasis in original).

2009In ruling lliat the inherent powers of the People's Counsel gave it the ability to challenge the validity of a regulation, we began by distinguishing the case of Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229, 240 , 60 A.2d 691, 696 (1948), where we held that the People’s Counsel "lacked the power to appeal a Commission order,” PSC v. MPC, 309 Md. at 9 , 522 A.2d at 372 (emphasis in original).

2009In ruling lliat the inherent powers of the People's Counsel gave it the ability to challenge the validity of a regulation, we began by distinguishing the case of Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229, 240 , 60 A.2d 691, 696 (1948), where we held that the People’s Counsel "lacked the power to appeal a Commission order,” PSC v. MPC, 309 Md. at 9 , 522 A.2d at 372 (emphasis in original).