ability challenge in Indiana

2020See Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 820-821 (Ind. 2009) (observing that the defendant submitted an “open” guilty plea and holding that “he did not (and under Tumulty v. State, [ 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996),] could not), appeal his convictions”) (footnote omitted); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395 (observing that the defendant told the trial court he wished to plead guilty to all counts and replied affirmatively when the trial court asked if

2020See Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 820-821 (Ind. 2009) (observing that the defendant submitted an “open” guilty plea and holding that “he did not (and under Tumulty v. State, [ 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996),] could not), appeal his convictions”) (footnote omitted); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395 (observing that the defendant told the trial court he wished to plead guilty to all counts and replied affirmatively when the trial court asked if

2020See Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 820-821 (Ind. 2009) (observing that the defendant submitted an “open” guilty plea and holding that “he did not (and under Tumulty v. State, [ 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996),] could not), appeal his convictions”) (footnote omitted); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395 (observing that the defendant told the trial court he wished to plead guilty to all counts and replied affirmatively when the trial court asked if

2006Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind.2004); Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind.1996) (“One consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal.”).

2004It is well settled that "one of the consequences of pleading guilty is that the defendant loses the ability to challenge his conviction on direct appeal; post-conviction relief remains as the proper vehicle for challenging the *249 guilty plea." Beaudry v. State, 763 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

2003It is well settled that "one of the consequences of pleading guilty is that *614 the defendant loses the ability to challenge his comviction on direct appeal; post-conviction relief remains as the proper vehicle for challenging the guilty plea." Beaudry v. State, 763 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) 3 However, a defendant is entitled to contest the merits of a trial court's sentencing decision where the court has exercised sentencing discretion, 4 even following a guilty plea.

2020See Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 820-821 (Ind. 2009) (observing that the defendant submitted an “open” guilty plea and holding that “he did not (and under Tumulty v. State, [ 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996),] could not), appeal his convictions”) (footnote omitted); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395 (observing that the defendant told the trial court he wished to plead guilty to all counts and replied affirmatively when the trial court asked if

2019Id.; see also Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ind. 2008) (“[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he waives his right to appeal his conviction.”); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind. 2009) (a reversal of a conviction on direct appeal due to a guilty plea having an inadequate factual basis is “contrary to [its] precedent in Tumulty[.]”).

2019Id.; see also Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ind. 2008) (“[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he waives his right to appeal his conviction.”); Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on direct appeal.”); Hayes v. State, 906 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind. 2009) (a reversal of a conviction on direct appeal due to a guilty plea having an inadequate factual basis is “contrary to [its] precedent in Tumulty[.]”).

2013Waiver Before turning to the' merits, we address whether Morris’s guilty plea waived the ability to challenge his sentence on direct appeal. 1 It is clear that “a defendant may waive the right to appellate review of his sentence as part of a written plea agreement.” Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind.2008).

2015Collins v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 974 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2015Collins v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 974 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ind.Ct.App.2012).

2005In Weyls v. State, 266 Ind. 301 , 362 N.E.2d 481 (1977), Justice DeBruler restated the long-standing principle that 'a conviction based on a guilty plea may not be challenged by motion to correct errors and direct appeal.' (internal citations omitted.) *659 As a basis for this legal principle, our supreme court noted multiple grounds, [flirst, the plea as a legal act brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as settling civil parties do by submitting an agreed judgment.

2005In Weyls v. State, 266 Ind. 301 , 362 N.E.2d 481 (1977), Justice DeBruler restated the long-standing principle that 'a conviction based on a guilty plea may not be challenged by motion to correct errors and direct appeal.' (internal citations omitted.) *659 As a basis for this legal principle, our supreme court noted multiple grounds, [flirst, the plea as a legal act brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as settling civil parties do by submitting an agreed judgment.

2017This includes double jeopardy challenges, Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind. 2001), without exception for even “‘facially duplicative’ charges.” Mapp, 770 N.E.2d at 334 . [15] Before Joetta pleaded guilty, she watched a “rights advisement DVD.” Tr. p. 69.

2017This includes Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1701-CR-21 | December 6, 2017 Page 4 of 6 double jeopardy challenges, Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind. 2001), without exception for even “‘facially duplicative’ charges.” Mapp, 770 N.E.2d at 334 . [7] Dolick had a choice to either plead guilty to Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine and using a firearm in a controlled substance offense or proceed to trial on eight criminal counts that included dealing and possession of methamphetamine and carrying a handgun without a license.

2014Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004).

2007Stites v. State, 829 N.E.2d 527 (Ind.2005); Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35 (Ind.2004).

2017Waiver notwithstanding, we will still discuss Konsdorf’s argument. [16] “A valid guilty plea is a confession of guilt made directly to a judicial officer and necessarily admits the incriminating facts alleged.” Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. 2000).

2016See Hall v, State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 472 (Ind.2006) ("Precisely because a conviction imposed as a result of a guilty plea is not an issue that is available to a defendant on direct appeal, any challenge to a conviction thus imposed must be made through the procedure afforded by the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies.”); see also Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996) ("One consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal.”). 11 .

2016The State argues that Ivy waived the ability to challenge a good deal of the evidence relating to the statements made by the C.I., that Ivy does not argue fundamental error, and that such an argument fails on the merits. [22] Indiana Evidence Rule 101(d)(2) allows for the admission of evidence during probation revocation hearings that would not be permitted in a full-blown criminal trial.2 Yet, “[t]his does not mean that hearsay evidence may be admitted willy-nilly in a probation revocation hearing.” Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied.

2015While the court was coireet that failure to register within the prescribed time limit results in waiver of the ability to challenge an adoption, see In re Adoption of J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (noting putative father’s failure to register waives right to notice of adoption and irrevocably implies his consent to any adoption, Ind. Code § 31-19-5-18 , and thus prohibits challenge to adoption), we disagree with the court’s finding T.M. failed to register in time.

2015While the court was correct that failure to register within the prescribed time limit results in waiver of the ability to challenge an adoption, see In re Adoption of J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting putative father’s failure to register waives right to notice of adoption and irrevocably implies his consent to any adoption, Ind. Code § 31-19-5-18 , and thus prohibits challenge to adoption), we disagree with the court’s finding T.M. failed to register in time. [9] Indiana law provides: (a) To be entitled to notice of an adoption under IC 31-19-3 or IC 31- 19-4, a putativ

2014See Howard, 813 N.E.2d at 1221 (“[t]he party seeking to avoid discovery has the burden of establishing the essential elements of the privilege being invoked”) (citation omitted); Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 1167 (the provision of some rationale for the assertion of a privilege on question-by-question basis facilitates a court’s ability to rule on the matter with specificity).

2014See Howard, 813 N.E.2d at 1221 (“[t]he party seeking to avoid discovery has the burden of establishing the essential elements of the privilege being invoked”) (citation omitted); Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 1167 (the provision of some rationale for the assertion of a privilege on question-by-question basis facilitates a court’s ability to rule on the matter with specificity).

2013A waiver of that kind should be given effect if “ ‘the record clearly demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir.1999)).

2013See id.

2013After all, a guilty plea is not merely a procedural event that forecloses the necessity of trial and triggers the imposition of sentence; it also conclusively establishes the fact of guilt, a prerequisite in Indiana for the imposition of criminal punishment.” Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (Ind. 2009).

2007Creekmore v. State, 853 N.E.2d 523, 532 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), reh’g denied with opinion on other issues, 858 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.Ct.App.2006); see Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996) (“One consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal.”).

2007Creekmore v. State, 853 N.E.2d 523, 532 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), reh’g denied with opinion on other issues, 858 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.Ct.App.2006); see Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996) (“One consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the conviction on direct appeal.”).

2006Such a view comports with our Supreme Court's decision in Tumulty v. State, where it was held that a defendant is "entitled to contest the merits of a trial court's sentencing [decision] where the court has exercised sentencing discretion." 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind.1996); see also Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 230 ; see also Gornick v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1031 , 1035 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that waiver of the inappropriate standard under Appellate Rule 7(B) in no way impinges upon a defendant's ability to challenge the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion).