ability challenge in New Mexico

2014See State v. Chance, 1923-NMSC-042 , ¶ 8, 29 N.M. 34 , 221 P. 183 (holding that courts cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying an indictment “unless there is some clear statutory authority to do so”).

2014See State v. Chance, 1923-NMSC-042 , ¶ 8, 29 N.M. 34 , 221 P. 183 (holding that courts cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying an indictment “unless there is some clear statutory authority to do so”).

2014See State v. Ulibarri, 1999-NMCA-142, ¶¶ 12-13 , 128 N.M. 546 , 994 P.2d 1164 , aff’d, 2000-NMSC-007 , 128 N.M. 686 , 997 P.2d 818 . {13} A target’s ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury generally is limited to the review permitted by statute.

2014See State v. Ulibarri, 1999-NMCA-142, ¶¶ 12-13 , 128 N.M. 546 , 994 P.2d 1164 , aff’d, 2000-NMSC-007 , 128 N.M. 686 , 997 P.2d 818 . {13} A target’s ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury generally is limited to the review permitted by statute.

2014See State v. Ulibarri, 1999-NMCA-142, ¶¶ 12-13 , 128 N.M. 546 , 994 P.2d 1164 , aff’d, 2000-NMSC-007 , 128 N.M. 686 , 997 P.2d 818 . {13} A target’s ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury generally is limited to the review permitted by statute.

2014See State v. Ulibarri, 1999-NMCA-142, ¶¶ 12-13 , 128 N.M. 546 , 994 P.2d 1164 , aff’d, 2000-NMSC-007 , 128 N.M. 686 , 997 P.2d 818 . {13} A target’s ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury generally is limited to the review permitted by statute.

2016See Millheiser v. Long, 1900-NMSC-012 , ¶¶ 30-32, 10 N.M. 99 , 61 P. 111 (holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use); see also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 40 P. 989 (Colo. 1895) (same); Toohey v. Campbell, 60 P. 396, 397 (Mont. 1900) (same); Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32, 34-35 (Mont. 1898) (same).

2016See Millheiser v. Long, 1900-NMSC-012 , ¶¶ 30-32, 10 N.M. 99 , 61 P. 111 (holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use); see also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 40 P. 989 (Colo. 1895) (same); Toohey v. Campbell, 60 P. 396, 397 (Mont. 1900) (same); Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32, 34-35 (Mont. 1898) (same).

2016See Millheiser v. Long, 1900-NMSC-012 , ¶¶ 30-32, 10 N.M. 99 , 61 P. 111 (holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use); see also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 40 P. 989 (Colo. 1895) (same); Toohey v. Campbell, 60 P. 396, 397 (Mont. 1900) (same); Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32, 34-35 (Mont. 1898) (same).

2010Accurate’s Collateral Attack is not Permissible {14} In Andree G., we held that, where a party had the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the original action, no attack on the final judgment may be made in a collateral matter. 2007-NMCA-156, ¶ 20 , 143 N.M. 195 , 174 P.3d 531 ; see Thoma v. Thoma, 1997-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 , 123 N.M. 137 , 934 P.2d 1066 (filed 1996) (holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court); see also Cordova v. Larsen, 2004

2010Accurate’s Collateral Attack is not Permissible {14} In Andree G., we held that, where a party had the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the original action, no attack on the final judgment may be made in a collateral matter. 2007-NMCA-156, ¶ 20 , 143 N.M. 195 , 174 P.3d 531 ; see Thoma v. Thoma, 1997-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 , 123 N.M. 137 , 934 P.2d 1066 (filed 1996) (holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court); see also Cordova v. Larsen, 2004

2010Accurate’s Collateral Attack is not Permissible {14} In Andree G., we held that, where a party had the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the original action, no attack on the final judgment may be made in a collateral matter. 2007-NMCA-156, ¶ 20 , 143 N.M. 195 , 174 P.3d 531 ; see Thoma v. Thoma, 1997-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 , 123 N.M. 137 , 934 P.2d 1066 (filed 1996) (holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court); see also Cordova v. Larsen, 2004

2010Accurate’s Collateral Attack is not Permissible {14} In Andree G., we held that, where a party had the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the original action, no attack on the final judgment may be made in a collateral matter. 2007-NMCA-156, ¶ 20 , 143 N.M. 195 , 174 P.3d 531 ; see Thoma v. Thoma, 1997-NMCA-016, ¶ 16 , 123 N.M. 137 , 934 P.2d 1066 (filed 1996) (holding that a judgment that may be erroneous and barred by claim preclusion must be challenged on appeal and cannot be attacked collaterally in another proceeding and in another court); see also Cordova v. Larsen, 2004

2006A defendant’s ability to challenge a search turns on two inquiries: (1) whether the defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the premises searched; and (2) whether the defendant’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See State v. Esguerra, 113 N.M. 310, 313 , 825 P.2d 243, 246 (Ct.App.1991); accord Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).

2006A defendant’s ability to challenge a search turns on two inquiries: (1) whether the defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the premises searched; and (2) whether the defendant’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See State v. Esguerra, 113 N.M. 310, 313 , 825 P.2d 243, 246 (Ct.App.1991); accord Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).

2006A defendant’s ability to challenge a search turns on two inquiries: (1) whether the defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the premises searched; and (2) whether the defendant’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See State v. Esguerra, 113 N.M. 310, 313 , 825 P.2d 243, 246 (Ct.App.1991); accord Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).

2006A defendant’s ability to challenge a search turns on two inquiries: (1) whether the defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the premises searched; and (2) whether the defendant’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See State v. Esguerra, 113 N.M. 310, 313 , 825 P.2d 243, 246 (Ct.App.1991); accord Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).

1981See 439 U.S., at 149-150, n. 17 [ 99 S.Ct., at 434, n. 17 ].

1981See 439 U.S., at 149-150, n. 17 [ 99 S.Ct., at 434, n. 17 ].