ability test in Texas

2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Internal

2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172-73 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Intern

2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Internal

2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172-73 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Intern

1995In Jones , we explained: The voir dire examination is not an exercise to test the ability of defense counsel to joust with a prospective juror in an attempt to see what quantum of information he may or may not be withholding. [2] Id., 596 S.W.2d at 137 .

1995In Jones , we explained: The voir dire examination is not an exercise to test the ability of defense counsel to joust with a prospective juror in an attempt to see what quantum of information he may or may not be withholding. [2] Id., 596 S.W.2d at 137 .

2014See Thomas v. State, No. 01-12-00487-CR, 2013 WL 1163980, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, no pet.) (“Despite the lack of a written bill of costs, completely apart from the availability of direct appeal, Thomas could also seek correction of an error in costs by moving to correct costs in the trial court.”) (emphasis added); see also Johnson v. State, 389 S.W.3d 513 , *441 517 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (“While [article 108.008] provides a procedure for correcting errors in costs, it does not explicitly or implicitly limit an appellant’s ability to challenge the suff

2013See Nelson, 2013 WL 1858921 , at *3 (concluding that availability of other remedies did not preclude review); see also Johnson, 389 S.W.3d at 517 (stating that section 103.008(a) “does not explicitly or implicitly limit an appellant’s ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a part of the court’s judgment”).

2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172-73 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Intern

2015See Haddock, 287 S.W.3d at 172 ; In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2012, no pet.)(under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression in a contract of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed”)[Internal quotation marks omitted]; Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 , 8 727 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(courts cannot read implied provisions into contracts absent evidence the covenant “so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it”)[Internal

2009See Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet) (concluding the error was harmful when “appellants were effectively deprived of the ability to test the credibility of the complaining witness through cross-examination”); Rubio, 241 S.W.3d at 11 (concluding that the State’s witness’s statement likely contributed to the jury’s conviction and thus the error clearly prejudiced the defendant’s case).

2007Ann. art. 38.30); Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (concluding this right is “simply lost to an accused who, because of a language barrier, is deprived of the ability to test the credibility of a material witness through cross-examination”).

2002Moreover, it is well-settled and self-evident that an "improper argument may present a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim if the prosecutor's argument so infected the trial with unfairness" as to make the result "a denial of due process." Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)).

2002Moreover, it is well-settled and self-evident that an “improper argument may present a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim if the prosecutor’s argument so infected the trial with unfairness” as to make the result “a denial of due process.” Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)).

2024Id. at 318 ; see Tex. Const. art.

2020The importance 19 of the meaning of “inability to pay” in this context is highlighted by the legal landscape that now exists after R Communications reinstated a taxpayer’s ability to challenge its tax assessment through a declaratory judgment action, curing the original section 112.108’s Open Courts defect. 875 S.W.2d at 315–16.

2002Here, by urging the jury to consider matters not before them, and while effectively acknowledging that to do so was a violation of their solemn oath [3] as jurors, the prosecutor's remarks violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [4] and implicated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [5] The ability to test the accuracy of evidence is "so important that the absence of proper confrontation at trial `calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting Cha

2002Here, by urging the jury to consider matters not before them, and while effectively acknowledging that to do so was a violation of their solemn oath [3] as jurors, the prosecutor's remarks violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [4] and implicated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [5] The ability to test the accuracy of evidence is "so important that the absence of proper confrontation at trial `calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting Cha

2002Here, by urging the jury to consider matters not before them, and while effectively acknowledging that to do so was a violation of their solemn oath [3] as jurors, the prosecutor's remarks violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [4] and implicated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [5] The ability to test the accuracy of evidence is "so important that the absence of proper confrontation at trial `calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting Cha

2002Here, by urging the jury to consider matters not before them, and while effectively acknowledging that to do so was a violation of their solemn oath [3] as jurors, the prosecutor's remarks violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [4] and implicated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [5] The ability to test the accuracy of evidence is "so important that the absence of proper confrontation at trial `calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting Cha

2002Moreover, it is well-settled and self-evident that an "improper argument may present a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim if the prosecutor's argument so infected the trial with unfairness" as to make the result "a denial of due process." Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)).

2002Moreover, it is well-settled and self-evident that an "improper argument may present a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim if the prosecutor's argument so infected the trial with unfairness" as to make the result "a denial of due process." Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)).

1999Polley, 937 S.W.2d at 625 ; Ramirez, 888 S.W.2d at 31 ; Spellman, 887 S.W.2d at 481 .

1997Spellman, 887 S.W.2d at 481; Ramirez, 888 S.W.2d at 31 . 3 We agree with the Spellman *626 and Ramirez courts: a timely tendered motion for new trial extends the appellate timetable regardless when the filing fee is paid.

2025See Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 504–05; see also TEX.

2022See Williams, 244 S.W.3d at 568–69 (“Many Texas courts have held that without a complete record of the evidence presented to the arbitrator at the arbitration proceedings, there can be no appellate review of the arbitrator’s decision.” (first citing Gumble v. Grand Homes 2000, L.P., 334 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); then citing Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed); then citing GJR Mgmt.

2022See Williams, 244 S.W.3d at 568–69 (“Many Texas courts have held that without a complete record of the evidence presented to the arbitrator at the arbitration proceedings, there can be no appellate review of the arbitrator’s decision.” (first citing Gumble v. Grand Homes 2000, L.P., 334 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); then citing Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed); then citing GJR Mgmt.

2022See Williams, 244 S.W.3d at 568–69 (“Many Texas courts have held that without a complete record of the evidence presented to the arbitrator at the arbitration proceedings, there can be no appellate review of the arbitrator’s decision.” (first citing Gumble v. Grand Homes 2000, L.P., 334 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); then citing Grand Homes 96, L.P. v. Loudermilk, 208 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed); then citing GJR Mgmt.

2018See, e.g., Dickson v. Strickland, 265 S.W. 1012, 1018 (Tex. 1924) (“In determining what a ‘contested election’ is, we must bear in mind that an election in this state is not a single event, but a process, and that the entire process is subject to contest.”).

2017Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653, 664 (Tex. 2008).

2016At the time of the trial in this case,29 Texas Rule of Evidence 705(b) provided: Prior to the expert giving the expert’s opinion or disclosing the underlying facts or data, a party against whom the opinion is offered upon request in a criminal trial shall…be permitted to conduct a voir dire 28 See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 37 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd). 29 In March 2015, the Texas Supreme Court and this Court made slight modifications to the wording of this Rule.

2015See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 , 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.).

2015See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 , 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.).

2015As argued by the TEC, such an interpretation would render the TEC “powerless when the respondent filed in an improper venue,” which “makes no sense.” See generally id. § 311.023(5) (West 2013) (allowing courts to consider “consequences of a particular construction” in construing a statute); State v. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex. 2002) (allowing courts to consider statute’s objectives and consequences of particular construction even if statute is clear and unambiguous).

2015Ind. 2014) ("commingfing of an eamed income credit refund with other funds does not affect the ability to claim the statutory earned income 0 N credit exemption•); In re Lantz, 451 B.R. 843, 647 (Bankr..

2015See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 , 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); ReadyOne Indus., Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.).