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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Malavegreen1 sentence2019Jurors are entitled to draw a negative inference when such a witness refuses to provide relevant testimony.”); State v. Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 452 (Conn. 1999) (parties may comment on the absence of witnesses so long as the parties do not explicitly “exhort the jury to draw an adverse inference” from their absence); State v. Tahair, 772 A.2d 1079 , 1082–86 (Vt. 2001) (“missing witness instruction” should no longer be given in criminal cases, but no restriction on trier of fact’s ability to “naturally” infer that an absent witness’s testimony would have been unfavorable). 16 STATE v. QUIJADA Opi | 1 | 1 |
Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safetygreen2 sentences2019Under Brenda D. , a parent's mere late appearance without good cause serves as a failure to appear that triggers the default procedure under Rule 66(D)(2), a situation that Justice Timmer correctly noted "unacceptably dilutes the state's burden of proof because the parent is robbed of the ability to test the state's evidence." Id. at 450 ¶ 48, 410 P.3d at 432 (Timmer, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). ¶47 Most recently, the Court in Alma S. concluded that the state need not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has made diligent efforts to reunify the family or that a pa 2019Under Brenda D. , a parent's mere late appearance without good cause serves as a failure to appear that triggers the default procedure under Rule 66(D)(2), a situation that Justice Timmer correctly noted "unacceptably dilutes the state's burden of proof because the parent is robbed of the ability to test the state's evidence." Id. at 450 ¶ 48, 410 P.3d at 432 (Timmer, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). ¶47 Most recently, the Court in Alma S. concluded that the state need not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has made diligent efforts to reunify the family or that a pa | 1 | 1 |
Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safetygreen1 sentence2019Under Brenda D. , a parent's mere late appearance without good cause serves as a failure to appear that triggers the default procedure under Rule 66(D)(2), a situation that Justice Timmer correctly noted "unacceptably dilutes the state's burden of proof because the parent is robbed of the ability to test the state's evidence." Id. at 450 ¶ 48, 410 P.3d at 432 (Timmer, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). ¶47 Most recently, the Court in Alma S. concluded that the state need not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has made diligent efforts to reunify the family or that a pa | 1 | 1 |
Alderman v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2018“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2018Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 . ¶10 Although our courts, including the trial court in this case, have sometimes referred to a person’s ability to challenge a search “as ‘standing’ for the sake of brevity,” State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244 , 247 ¶ 8 (2016), the key inquiry is whether the search “has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect,” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). 2018“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2016“A defendant has a constitutional right to be present in the courtroom at every critical stage of the proceedings against him.” State v. Hall, 136 Ariz. 219, 222 , 665 P.2d 101, 104 (App. 1983). 2016“A defendant has a constitutional right to be present in the courtroom at every critical stage of the proceedings against him.” State v. Hall, 136 Ariz. 219, 222 , 665 P.2d 101, 104 (App. 1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Speergreen2 sentences2011“To safeguard that right, the [Supreme] Court has developed what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶ 40 In determining whether the state’s failure to preserve evidence violates a defendant’s constitutional rights, “[t]he critical distinction ... is between material exculpatory evidence and potentially useful evidence.” State v. Speer, 221 Ariz. 449 , 457 ¶ 37, 212 P.3d 787, 795 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2011“To safeguard that right, the [Supreme] Court has developed what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶ 40 In determining whether the state’s failure to preserve evidence violates a defendant’s constitutional rights, “[t]he critical distinction ... is between material exculpatory evidence and potentially useful evidence.” State v. Speer, 221 Ariz. 449 , 457 ¶ 37, 212 P.3d 787, 795 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bennigno R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
1 sentence2023See id.; Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 19. ¶25 Notwithstanding waiver, we have reviewed the record and conclude that it contains sufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s factual findings and its conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide Mother and Father appropriate reunification services, and any additional services would be futile. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Lehr
green
1 sentence2022See 15 STATE v. GOMES Decision of the Court State v. Vargas, 251 Ariz. 157 , 177, ¶ 72 (App. 2021); State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, 522 , ¶¶ 55–57 (2002). ¶64 Also, the State can “comment on the defendant’s failure to present exculpatory evidence.” State ex. rel. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Tahair
green
1 sentence2019Jurors are entitled to draw a negative inference when such a witness refuses to provide relevant testimony.”); State v. Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 452 (Conn. 1999) (parties may comment on the absence of witnesses so long as the parties do not explicitly “exhort the jury to draw an adverse inference” from their absence); State v. Tahair, 772 A.2d 1079 , 1082–86 (Vt. 2001) (“missing witness instruction” should no longer be given in criminal cases, but no restriction on trier of fact’s ability to “naturally” infer that an absent witness’s testimony would have been unfavorable). 16 STATE v. QUIJADA Opi | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Jones
green
1 sentence2018Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 . ¶10 Although our courts, including the trial court in this case, have sometimes referred to a person’s ability to challenge a search “as ‘standing’ for the sake of brevity,” State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244 , 247 ¶ 8 (2016), the key inquiry is whether the search “has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect,” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Arizona v. Robin Peoples
green
1 sentence2018Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 . ¶10 Although our courts, including the trial court in this case, have sometimes referred to a person’s ability to challenge a search “as ‘standing’ for the sake of brevity,” State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244 , 247 ¶ 8 (2016), the key inquiry is whether the search “has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect,” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2018Cf. id. at 747-48 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."). 2018Cf. id. at 747-48 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ("Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
California v. Trombetta
green
2 sentences2011The court denied Lehr’s motion, but permitted him to “attack the manner in which the test was conducted and argue to the jury that consumption of the initial sample deprived [Lehr] of the ability to test the original sample.” The court also noted that Lehr was “welcome to retest the extraction.” In denying Lehr’s motion for reconsideration, the court noted that he had “not challenged *150 the test performed, sought expert testimony concerning the extraction procedure or test results, nor requested to have the extraction re-tested.” The court found that “no showing can be made that any re-testi 2011The court denied Lehr’s motion, but permitted him to “attack the manner in which the test was conducted and argue to the jury that consumption of the initial sample deprived [Lehr] of the ability to test the original sample.” The court also noted that Lehr was “welcome to retest the extraction.” In denying Lehr’s motion for reconsideration, the court noted that he had “not challenged *150 the test performed, sought expert testimony concerning the extraction procedure or test results, nor requested to have the extraction re-tested.” The court found that “no showing can be made that any re-testi | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Towery
green
1 sentence2003Id. at 177, 920 P.2d at 299 . ¶ 15 In determining whether a trial court’s refusal to allow cross-examination by defendant into privileged area is prejudicial, the question is whether defendant’s inability to make the inquiry created substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness’s direct testimony. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Murray v. Polglase
neutral
2 sentences1914Mun'ay v. Polglase, 23 Mont. 401 , 59 Pac. 439 . 1914Mun'ay v. Polglase, 23 Mont. 401 , 59 Pac. 439 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.