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78 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1975–2026 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, M., Apltgreen2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms, … the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”). 2025“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms, [. . .] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014). | 16 | 16 |
Commonwealth v. Reichlegreen2 sentences2024See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant's knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); see also Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”); Reichle, 589 A.2d at 1141 (dismissing appellant's appeal of discretionary aspects of sentence where she received 2023See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); see also Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Baney, 860 A.2d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2004) (appellant may not challenge discretionary aspects of | 9 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Baneygreen2 sentences2023See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); see also Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Baney, 860 A.2d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2004) (appellant may not challenge discretionary aspects of 2022See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms … the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea”); see also Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991) (dismissing Appellant’s appeal of discretionary aspects of sentence where she received precisely what she was promised under the terms of her negotiated plea agreement); Commonwealth v. Baney, 860 A.2d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2004) (find | 5 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Halleygreen2 sentences2025Finally, in Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005), the high court determined ineffectiveness per se occurred where counsel failed to “perfect” the defendant’s appeal by not filing a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement; this inaction resulted in the waiver of all claims and left the defendant “without an ability to challenge his conviction and sentence by means of the direct appeal.” Halley, 870 A.2d at 800 . 2025Finally, in Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005), the high court determined ineffectiveness per se occurred where counsel failed to “perfect” the defendant’s appeal by not filing a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement; this inaction resulted in the waiver of all claims and left the defendant “without an ability to challenge his conviction and sentence by means of the direct appeal.” Halley, 870 A.2d at 800 . | 4 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. O'Malleygreen2 sentences2024Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-610 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”).3 Judgment of s 2024See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant's knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); see also Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”); Reichle, 589 A.2d at 1141 (dismissing appellant's appeal of discretionary aspects of sentence where she received | 4 | 4 |
Trach v. Fellingreen2 sentences2021Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Trach, 817 A.2d at 1113 ). 2021Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Trach, 817 A.2d at 1113 ). | 3 | 5 |
Com. v. Hopkins, G.green2 sentences2021Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Trach, 817 A.2d at 1113 ). 2021Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Trach, 817 A.2d at 1113 ). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Lincolngreen2 sentences2024Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-610 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”).3 Judgment of s 2018Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 609 - 10. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Radeckigreen1 sentence2024Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-610 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”).3 Judgment of s | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Brown, M.green1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 A.3d 970, 972 (Pa. Super. 2020). - 22 - J-S09032-24 Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013).12 Hargrove, through Attorney Hurley, did preserve the ability to challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence by objecting generally to the sentence in a post-sentence motion. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bakergreen1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 A.3d 970, 972 (Pa. Super. 2020). - 22 - J-S09032-24 Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013).12 Hargrove, through Attorney Hurley, did preserve the ability to challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence by objecting generally to the sentence in a post-sentence motion. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Caldwellgreen1 sentence2024“A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial question[.]” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal denied, 126 A.3d 1282 (Pa. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Zemprelli v. Danielsgreen1 sentence2023Cf. Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1170 (Pa. 1981) (“Unquestionably the Senate has exclusive power over its internal affairs and proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Dime Savings Bank, FSB v. Greenegreen1 sentence2020See Dime Savings Bank, FSB, 813 A.2d at 895 . | 1 | 1 |
H.R. v. Department of Public Welfaregreen1 sentence2020See H.R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 676 A.2d 755 , 759- 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (“An order sustaining subject matter jurisdiction . . . is fully reviewable on appeal from a final judgment . . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Twelve Vein Coal Co. v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Delligattigreen1 sentence2019Accordingly, we find this issue merits no relief. -5- J-S51008-19 As far as Morgan attempts to raise a challenge to the legality of his plea, although this issue would be properly before us, we find this claim waived as he did not develop this issue at all in the argument section of his brief. 3 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1175 (Pa. 1999) (noting that relief is unavailable based upon undeveloped claims for which insufficient arguments are presented on appeal); Commonwealth v. Delligatti, 538 A.2d 34, 41 (Pa. Super. 1988) (“When issues are not properly raised and developed in b | 1 | 1 |
| Keith v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon, J. v. Northwestern Mutualgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morrissey v. Brewergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Waters v. COM. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONSgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Austin v. Lehmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silo v. Ridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Infantegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Zookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re ALDgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roe v. Flores-Ortegagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lower Gwynedd Township v. Gwynedd Properties, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Luszczynski v. Bradleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hudson v. Palmergreen | 1 | 1 |
| North Carolina National Bank v. Gillespiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| McClendon v. Clinardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Perringreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Young v. Com. Bd. of Probation and Parole
green
2 sentences2025(Id. at 165.) The Board reasoned that under Section 6138(a)(2) of the Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2), “[t]he Board has the statutory authority to recalculate the max[imum] dates of [a CPV] to reflect that the[ CPV] received no credit for the time spent at liberty on parole,” and that Iwanicki was advised “of this potential penalty on the parole conditions [document Iwanicki] signed on April 22, 2019.” (Id.) The Board further reasoned that “the ability to challenge the recalculation decision after it is imposed satisfies [Iwanicki’s] due process rights.” (Id.) On this issue, the Board determined 2018The Board also stated that “the ability to challenge the 5 On September 18, 2013, the day prior to his release on parole, Johnson signed a “Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole” form, which in part stated: “If you are convicted of a crime committed while on parole/reparole, the Board has the authority, after an appropriate hearing, to recommit you to serve the balance of the sentence or sentences which you were serving when paroled/reparoled, with no credit for time at liberty on parole.” C.R. at 7. 4 recalculation decision after it is imposed satisfies [Johnson’s] due process rights” so that | 6 | 2017–2025 |
Criswell v. King
green
2 sentences2018Id. (citing Picca, 645 A.2d at 868 ). 2018Id. (citing Picca , 645 A.2d at 868 ). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Picca v. Kriner
green
2 sentences2018Id. (citing Picca, 645 A.2d at 868 ). 2018Id. (citing Picca , 645 A.2d at 868 ). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Beasley v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2018We made no mention of the 60-day limit in Section 306(a.2)(2) in Beasley v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (PECO Energy Company), 152 A.3d 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). 2018We made no mention of the 60-day limit in Section 306(a.2)(2) in Beasley v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (PECO Energy Company) , 152 A.3d 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Petroski
green
2 sentences1999In support of this holding, the majority also cited Commonwealth v. Petroski, 695 A.2d 844 (Pa.Super.1997), in which a Superior Court panel previously held that a PCRA petitioner lacked the ability to challenge his counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a direct appeal. 1999In support of this holding, the majority also cited Commonwealth v. Petroski, 695 A.2d 844 (Pa.Super.1997), in which a Superior Court panel previously held that a PCRA petitioner lacked the ability to challenge his counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a direct appeal. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Smith v. Board of Probation & Parole
green
1 sentence2025(C.R. at 166.) Thus, the Board found that “the decision for [Iwanicki] to serve 12 months falls within the presumptive range and is not subject to challenge.” (Id. (citing Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 574 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1990)).) Finally, through recounting Iwanicki’s conviction and parole violation history, the Board determined that Iwanicki “still had a total of 4[,]445 days 6 remaining on [the original] sentence based on [Iwanicki’s] recommitment.” (Id. at 166.) The Board concluded that [t]he [] Code provides that [CPVs] who are paroled from a state correctional institution and then re | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Com. v. Eddington
neutral
1 sentence2025We therefore reverse the PCRA court’s order denying Burke post-conviction relief and reinstate his right to file a direct appeal.3 In so doing, we deny current counsel’s motion to withdraw. ____________________________________________ 2 On remand, this Court decided “the best resolution of this matter is to put [Rosado] in a position that will fully restore his direct appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. Rosado, 160 A.3d 258 (Pa. Super. 2017) (non- precedential decision at 4). 3 Burke acknowledges that, because he entered a guilty plea his appellate issues are limited to claims involving the court’ | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Com. v. CHIKONYERA
green
1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (“When a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms[,] the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew was a proper consequence of his plea.”); see also Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Baney, 860 A.2d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2004) (appellant may not challenge discretionary aspects of | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
1 sentence2023Attorney Galloway has filed an appellate brief in this Court. 5 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). -5- J-S30021-23 [h]earing to challenge the fraudulent [a]ffidavit of [p]robable [c]ause[?] b) Request and provide [Woods] with any and all pre-trial discovery which [Woods] has not yet received in violation of the [Brady6] rule? c) To investigate and/or interview all law enforcement officers involved in the alleged investigation of [Woods]? d) Request the testimony of the two alleged [CIs] thereby denying [Woods] the ability to test the Commonwealth’s prima facie case, no witnesses to cross | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2023Was [Woods] denied the effective assistance of PCRA counsel when he . . . [f]ailed to properly argue exigent circumstances and the constitutionality of Commonwealth v. Gary, [] 91 A.3d 102 (Pa[.] 2014) and failed to raise other meritorious issues[?] 3. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Petrongola v. Comcast-Spectacor, L.P.
green
1 sentence2021It also “had the ability to rule differently” because Encompass’s “new preliminary objections were filed to a different complaint.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Groller v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2020Claimant also argues that IRE orders evade appellate review; however, because an IRE order, by itself, has no effect on WC benefits and WC benefits are only affected after a modification petition is decided, claimants retain the ability to challenge the appropriateness of an IRE at a 4 In Groller, the underlying issue was whether the claimant was barred by res judicata from arguing that an IRE was untimely where the claimant did not appeal the WCJ’s IRE order, but instead, filed a review petition after he had already attended the IRE and after the employer’s insurer had changed his disability | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2020In Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2006), our Supreme Court distinguished between situations in which “counsel has narrowed the ambit of appellate review by the claims he has raised or - 10 - J-S25012-20 foregone,” versus those “in which counsel failed to file an appeal at all,” with the second category amounting to per se ineffectiveness. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc.
green
1 sentence2019“It may not be used to affirm a decision when the appellate court must weigh evidence and engage in fact finding or make credibility determinations to reach a legal conclusion.” Id. 12 While it appears the question of whether our Supreme Court has the ability to apply this doctrine in discretionary appeals is “unsettled,” the doctrine’s use by the intermediate appellate courts is settled. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Boyle Land & Fuel Co. v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Minich green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Thompson v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Exelon Corp.) green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Riley v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Adams v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 3 v. School District of Philadelphia green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Daugherty v. County of Allegheny green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Florig v. Estate of O'Hara green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Commonwealth v. Nelson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Fordyce v. Clerk of Courts green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Board of Education of the School District v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers Local No. 3 green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Musheno v. Department of Public Welfare green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Mott green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| McClendon v. Clinard green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Bighum green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Commonwealth v. Roots green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Commonwealth v. Green green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Painter v. Painter green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| United States Ex Rel. Spears v. Rundle green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States v. Rundle neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.