ability challenge in Illinois

2010"This test mandates disqualification when a reasonable person might question the judge's ability to rule impartially." Barth, 228 Ill.2d at 176 , 319 Ill.Dec. 852 , 886 N.E.2d 976 .

2010"This test mandates disqualification when a reasonable person might question the judge's ability to rule impartially." Barth, 228 Ill.2d at 176 , 319 Ill.Dec. 852 , 886 N.E.2d 976 .

2023The distinction is generally drawn between invoking the privilege as to ‘collateral matters,’ not requiring the striking of direct testimony, and invoking it as to ‘direct’ matters. [Citations.] But the line between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ is not clear, and the question in each case must finally be whether defendant’s inability to make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness’s direct testimony.” Fountain, 384 F.2d at 628 .

2012Our supreme court has explained: “As a reviewing court, we are not required to isolate the particular limitation on cross-examination to determine whether reversible error has occurred. [Citation.] Rather, ‘the question in each case must finally be whether defendant’s inability to make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness’s direct testimony.’ (United States v. Rogers (7th Cir. 1973), 475 F.2d 821, 827 , quoting Fountain v. United States (5th Cir. 1967), 384 F.2d 624, 628 .) In answering this question the court mu

2021In Newberry, our supreme court held that the defendant’s ability to test the evidence that was destroyed was “essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case,” and he did not “have any realistic hope of exonerating himself absent the opportunity to have [the destroyed evidence] examined by his own experts.” Id. at 315 . ¶ 52 We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the destroyed gunshot residue test kit and his clothing was material to the outcome of his trial.

2018Our supreme court found Youngblood distinguishable because the defendant's ability to test the substance at issue was "essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case," and the defendant did not "have any realistic hope of exonerating himself absent the opportunity to have [the substance] examined by his own experts." Id. at 315 , 209 Ill.Dec. 748 , 652 N.E.2d 288 . ¶ 36 In Illinois v. Fisher , 540 U.S. 544 , 124 S.Ct. 1200 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) ( per curiam ), the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected Newberry 's exception to Youngblood when applied in the context of

2017As this court held in Knight, when the case against a defendant turns almost exclusively upon the -7­ No. 1-16-2381 uncorroborated testimony of the police officer who conducted the surveillance, “disclosure must almost always be ordered.” Knight, 323 Ill.

2017As this court held in Knight, when the case against a defendant turns almost exclusively upon the uncorroborated testimony of the police officer who conducted the surveillance, “disclosure must almost always be ordered.” Knight, 323 Ill.

2023Marshall v. County of Cook, 2016 IL App (1st) 142864, ¶ 15 .

2023Marshall v. County of Cook, 2016 IL App (1st) 142864, ¶ 15 .

2021Id.

2021Id.

2019Id. § 40(c).

2019Id. § 40(c).

2018Our supreme court found Youngblood distinguishable because the defendant's ability to test the substance at issue was "essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case," and the defendant did not "have any realistic hope of exonerating himself absent the opportunity to have [the substance] examined by his own experts." Id. at 315 , 209 Ill.Dec. 748 , 652 N.E.2d 288 . ¶ 36 In Illinois v. Fisher , 540 U.S. 544 , 124 S.Ct. 1200 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) ( per curiam ), the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected Newberry 's exception to Youngblood when applied in the context of

2018Our supreme court found Youngblood distinguishable because the defendant's ability to test the substance at issue was "essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case," and the defendant did not "have any realistic hope of exonerating himself absent the opportunity to have [the substance] examined by his own experts." Id. at 315 , 209 Ill.Dec. 748 , 652 N.E.2d 288 . ¶ 36 In Illinois v. Fisher , 540 U.S. 544 , 124 S.Ct. 1200 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) ( per curiam ), the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected Newberry 's exception to Youngblood when applied in the context of

2016Specifically, Deutsche Bank asserted that the Second District’s decision in Bank of America National Ass’n v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., 2012 IL App (2d) 110729 changed the applicable law concerning the borrowers’ ability to challenge Deutsche Bank’s standing to bring a foreclosure action.

2016Specifically, Deutsche Bank asserted that the Second District’s decision in Bank of America National Ass’n v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., 2012 IL App (2d) 110729 , changed the applicable law concerning the borrowers’ ability to challenge Deutsche Bank’s standing to bring a foreclosure action.

2016Id. at 67 . ¶ 23 To answer the question presented, the Court examined the language of the federal firearms statute and concluded that “[t]he statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action.” Id. at 60-61 .

2016Id. at 67 . ¶ 23 To answer the question presented, the Court examined the language of the federal firearms statute and concluded that “[t]he statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action.” Id. at 60-61 .

2015Id. at 361 ; Scassifero v. Glaser, 333 Ill.

2015Id. at 361 ; Scassifero v. Glaser, 333 Ill.

2014We agree with the reasoning in Smith and conclude that because defendant was released on bond while being subject to electronic monitoring, the trial court did not err in refusing to give him a credit. ¶ 51 Finally, citing Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence without a proper jury finding that the victim was a member of the family or household, a necessary element of the offense of - 19 - 2014 IL App (2d) 130963 involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member (see 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West

2014We agree with the reasoning in Smith and conclude that because defendant was released on bond - 11 - while being subject to electronic monitoring, the trial court did not err in refusing to give him a credit. ¶ 51 Finally, citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___ , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence without a proper jury finding that the victim was a member of the family or household, a necessary element of the offense of involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member (see 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 2012)).

2011The court further held that the case did not present a situation where an objective, reasonable person would have questioned the trial judge's ability to rule impartially. 393 Ill.

2011The court further held that the case did not present a situation where an objective, reasonable person would have questioned the trial judge’s ability to rule impartially. 393 Ill.

2011In People v. West, 145 Ill. 2d 517 , 584 N.E.2d 124 (1991), the supreme court held that the defendant was not eligible for postconviction relief for a sentence that had been fully served even though that sentence was used as an aggravating factor in an out-of-state death sentence.

2011In People v. West, 145 Ill. 2d 517 , 584 N.E.2d 124 (1991), the supreme court held that the defendant was not eligible for postconviction relief for a sentence that had been fully served even though that sentence was used as an aggravating factor in an out-of-state death sentence.

2010Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 475 , 828 N.E.2d at 259 .

2010Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 475 , 828 N.E.2d at 259 .

2010In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), defendants charged with driving under the influence unsuccessfully sought to suppress breath-analysis test results on the ground that the police failed to preserve the breath samples, thereby limiting the defendants' ability to challenge the incriminating test results.

2010In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), defendants charged with driving under the influence unsuccessfully sought to suppress breath-analysis test results on the ground that the police failed to preserve the breath samples, thereby limiting the defendants' ability to challenge the incriminating test results.

2007Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 221 , 802 N.E.2d at 1215 .

2007Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 221 , 802 N.E.2d at 1215 .

2003Williams v. Dorsey , 273 Ill.

2003Williams v. Dorsey, 273 Ill.