25 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kent v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1973In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the landmark decision on waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court set forth the following determinative factors to be considered on a transfer hearing: 1. 1973In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the landmark decision on waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court set forth the following determinative factors to be considered on a transfer hearing: 1. | 1 | 4 |
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J—72804green2 sentences1993Matter of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz.App. 560, 564 , 504 P.2d 501, 505 (1972). 1993Matter of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz.App. 560, 564 , 504 P.2d 501, 505 (1972). | 1 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1995See State v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 339, 341 , 823 P.2d 1347, 1349 (App. 1991). 1995See State v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 339, 341 , 823 P.2d 1347, 1349 (App. 1991). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Marksgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Marks, 186 Ariz. 139, 142 (App. 1996); Ariz. R. | 1 | 1 |
McBeth v. Rosegreen1 sentence2023Id. at 400, 403 . | 1 | 1 |
Staley v. Estate of Harbergreen1 sentence2020On these facts, the superior court properly treated this as a transaction between spouses. ¶13 We agree with Husband, however, that the superior court improperly considered the transfer under the analysis applicable to postnuptial agreements discussed in In re Harber's Estate, 104 Ariz. 79, 88 (1969), and Austin v. Austin, 237 Ariz. 201, 208, ¶ 20 (App. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Reymundo F.green2 sentences2017We have previously held that “the juvenile court cannot be divested of jurisdiction to determine the transfer question.” State v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 384, 387 (App. 1994); see also A.R.S. § 8-327(B) (“On request of the state that a juvenile be transferred, the court shall hold a transfer hearing before the adjudication hearing.” (Emphasis added.)). ¶7 Juvenile’s reliance on In re Reymundo F., 217 Ariz. 588 (App. 2008), is unavailing. 2017We have previously held that “the juvenile court cannot be divested of jurisdiction to determine the transfer question.” State v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 384, 387 (App. 1994); see also A.R.S. § 8-327(B) (“On request of the state that a juvenile be transferred, the court shall hold a transfer hearing before the adjudication hearing.” (Emphasis added.)). ¶7 Juvenile’s reliance on In re Reymundo F., 217 Ariz. 588 (App. 2008), is unavailing. | 1 | 1 |
In re Mario L.green1 sentence2017The subsequent transfer hearing was governed by Rule 34, which does not address admissions. ¶6 More fundamentally, a transfer motion asks the juvenile court to “waive its jurisdiction and remand a child under age 18 to the adult court for prosecution.” In re Mario L., 190 Ariz. 381, 383 (App. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. SUPERIOR COURT, NAVAJO COUNTYgreen2 sentences2017We have previously held that “the juvenile court cannot be divested of jurisdiction to determine the transfer question.” State v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 384, 387 (App. 1994); see also A.R.S. § 8-327(B) (“On request of the state that a juvenile be transferred, the court shall hold a transfer hearing before the adjudication hearing.” (Emphasis added.)). ¶7 Juvenile’s reliance on In re Reymundo F., 217 Ariz. 588 (App. 2008), is unavailing. 2017We have previously held that “the juvenile court cannot be divested of jurisdiction to determine the transfer question.” State v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 384, 387 (App. 1994); see also A.R.S. § 8-327(B) (“On request of the state that a juvenile be transferred, the court shall hold a transfer hearing before the adjudication hearing.” (Emphasis added.)). ¶7 Juvenile’s reliance on In re Reymundo F., 217 Ariz. 588 (App. 2008), is unavailing. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525green2 sentences2007Action No. A-25525, 136 Ariz. 528, 533 , 667 P.2d 228, 233 (App.1983). ¶ 6 Upon receipt of a motion to transfer, the court is required to conduct a transfer hearing before it adjudicates the juvenile. 2007Action No. A-25525, 136 Ariz. 528, 533 , 667 P.2d 228, 233 (App.1983). ¶ 6 Upon receipt of a motion to transfer, the court is required to conduct a transfer hearing before it adjudicates the juvenile. | 1 | 1 |
Robbins Ex Rel. Robbins v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'ngreen1 sentence2002See Niles, 715 F.2d at 1031 (finding that the transfer rule is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in equalizing competition); Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 792 (holding that the transfer rule is not “irrational” even though it “catches some non-athletieally motivated transfers in the net constructed to stop only athletically motivated transfers”); Steffes, 222 Cal.Rptr. at 361 ; Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 236 -39 (citing numerous additional cases); Bruce, 189 S.E.2d at 819 (finding that individual determinations would not be possible and that the objective transfer rule is reasonably rel | 1 | 1 |
Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federationgreen2 sentences2002Athletic Ass’n, 699 F.Supp. 719, 728 (S.D.Ind.1988) (explaining, in dicta, that students do not have a . constitutional right to participate in interseholastic athletics); Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356 , *47 366 (D.Ariz.1983) (noting that participation in intercollegiate athletics is not a constitutionally protected interest); Steffes v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 176 Cal.App.3d 739 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 355, 361 (1986) (noting that under the California Constitution, education is a fundamental right, but the right to participate in interscholastic athletics is not). ¶ 2002See Niles, 715 F.2d at 1031 (finding that the transfer rule is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in equalizing competition); Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 792 (holding that the transfer rule is not “irrational” even though it “catches some non-athletieally motivated transfers in the net constructed to stop only athletically motivated transfers”); Steffes, 222 Cal.Rptr. at 361 ; Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 236 -39 (citing numerous additional cases); Bruce, 189 S.E.2d at 819 (finding that individual determinations would not be possible and that the objective transfer rule is reasonably rel | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. University Interscholastic Leaguegreen2 sentences2002In Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex.1981), the Texas Supreme Court found the purpose of a similar transfer rule, to discourage recruitment of high school athletes, was a legitimate state purpose, but held that the transfer rule did not rationally relate to that purpose because it was overbroad. 2002Id. *49 ¶ 20 The transfer rule in Sullivan , however, is distinguishable from the one in the present case. | 1 | 1 |
Catherine Walsh, Etc. v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, Lutheran High School Association of Greater New Orleansgreen1 sentence2002Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that there is no constitutionally protected right to participate in interscholastie athletics, and that no fundamental rights are burdened by the transfer rule); Anderson v. Indiana High Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Mark David Niles v. The University Interscholastic League and the District Iii-17aaaaa Executive Committeegreen1 sentence2002See Niles, 715 F.2d at 1031 (finding that the transfer rule is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in equalizing competition); Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 792 (holding that the transfer rule is not “irrational” even though it “catches some non-athletieally motivated transfers in the net constructed to stop only athletically motivated transfers”); Steffes, 222 Cal.Rptr. at 361 ; Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 236 -39 (citing numerous additional cases); Bruce, 189 S.E.2d at 819 (finding that individual determinations would not be possible and that the objective transfer rule is reasonably rel | 1 | 1 |
Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'ngreen2 sentences2002Athletic Ass’n, 699 F.Supp. 719, 728 (S.D.Ind.1988) (explaining, in dicta, that students do not have a . constitutional right to participate in interseholastic athletics); Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356 , *47 366 (D.Ariz.1983) (noting that participation in intercollegiate athletics is not a constitutionally protected interest); Steffes v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 176 Cal.App.3d 739 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 355, 361 (1986) (noting that under the California Constitution, education is a fundamental right, but the right to participate in interscholastic athletics is not). ¶ 2002Similarly, Anderson concluded that a transfer rule was overbroad when applied to a student who transfers for legitimate, non-athletic reasons and that such application did not further the purpose of preventing recruiting and athletically motivated transfers. 699 F.Supp. at 730 . | 1 | 1 |
Bruce v. South Carolina High School Leaguegreen1 sentence2002See Niles, 715 F.2d at 1031 (finding that the transfer rule is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in equalizing competition); Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 792 (holding that the transfer rule is not “irrational” even though it “catches some non-athletieally motivated transfers in the net constructed to stop only athletically motivated transfers”); Steffes, 222 Cal.Rptr. at 361 ; Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 236 -39 (citing numerous additional cases); Bruce, 189 S.E.2d at 819 (finding that individual determinations would not be possible and that the objective transfer rule is reasonably rel | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Bobby C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Larry O. Black v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Anonymous, Juvenile Court No. 6358-4
green
2 sentences1976In the case of In re Anonymous, Juvenile Court No. 6358-4, 14 Ariz.App. 466 , 484 P.2d 235 (1971), we dealt with the nature of the transfer hearing and stated that it can be divided into two phases: (1) Has an offense been committed and does probable cause exist to believe the child committed the offense? 1976In the case of In re Anonymous, Juvenile Court No. 6358-4, 14 Ariz.App. 466 , 484 P.2d 235 (1971), we dealt with the nature of the transfer hearing and stated that it can be divided into two phases: (1) Has an offense been committed and does probable cause exist to believe the child committed the offense? | 3 | 1975–1979 |
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-84984
green
2 sentences1989Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-84984, 138 Ariz. 282 , 674 P.2d 836 (1983). 1989Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-84984, 138 Ariz. 282 , 674 P.2d 836 (1983). | 2 | 1983–1989 |
Valer C. Austin v. Josiah T. Austin
green
2 sentences2020On these facts, the superior court properly treated this as a transaction between spouses. ¶13 We agree with Husband, however, that the superior court improperly considered the transfer under the analysis applicable to postnuptial agreements discussed in In re Harber's Estate, 104 Ariz. 79, 88 (1969), and Austin v. Austin, 237 Ariz. 201, 208, ¶ 20 (App. 2015). 2020"A postnuptial agreement is defined as '[a]n agreement entered into during marriage to define each spouse's property rights in the event of death or divorce.'" Austin, 237 Ariz. at 206-07 , ¶ 14 (citing Postnuptial Agreement, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
green
1 sentence2002Athletic Ass’n, 699 F.Supp. 719, 728 (S.D.Ind.1988) (explaining, in dicta, that students do not have a . constitutional right to participate in interseholastic athletics); Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F.Supp. 356 , *47 366 (D.Ariz.1983) (noting that participation in intercollegiate athletics is not a constitutionally protected interest); Steffes v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 176 Cal.App.3d 739 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 355, 361 (1986) (noting that under the California Constitution, education is a fundamental right, but the right to participate in interscholastic athletics is not). ¶ | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg Ex Rel. Carlberg
green
2 sentences2002The court concluded that while the rule would deny eligibility to some students who transfer for non-athletic reasons, “conducting a factual inquiry into the motivation for every transfer would impose a considerable burden on both the [Indiana High School Athletic Association] and its member schools.” Id. at 233 . ¶ 23 The purpose of the AIA transfer rule is to deter athletically motivated transfers and recruitment of students and promote “the educational philosophy that participation in athletics is a privilege which should not take a dominant role over academics.” We conclude that these are 2002See Niles, 715 F.2d at 1031 (finding that the transfer rule is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in equalizing competition); Robbins, 941 F.Supp. at 792 (holding that the transfer rule is not “irrational” even though it “catches some non-athletieally motivated transfers in the net constructed to stop only athletically motivated transfers”); Steffes, 222 Cal.Rptr. at 361 ; Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 236 -39 (citing numerous additional cases); Bruce, 189 S.E.2d at 819 (finding that individual determinations would not be possible and that the objective transfer rule is reasonably rel | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Crerand v. State
green
2 sentences2002If a classification does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, courts “generally apply the rational basis test and uphold the statute provided it is rationally and reasonably related to furthering some legitimate governmental interest.” Crerand, 176 Ariz. at 152 , 859 P.2d at 775 . 2002If a classification does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, courts “generally apply the rational basis test and uphold the statute provided it is rationally and reasonably related to furthering some legitimate governmental interest.” Crerand, 176 Ariz. at 152 , 859 P.2d at 775 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sturrup v. Mahan
green
2 sentences2002Therefore, the AIA transfer rule does not sweep as broadly as the transfer rule in Sullivan . ¶ 21 Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463 , 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974), also held that a similar transfer rule violated equal protection because it was overbroad. 2002Therefore, the AIA transfer rule does not sweep as broadly as the transfer rule in Sullivan . ¶ 21 Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463 , 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974), also held that a similar transfer rule violated equal protection because it was overbroad. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Ritch
green
2 sentences2001Id. at 496 , 774 P.2d at 235 . 2001Id. at 496 , 774 P.2d at 235 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County
neutral
2 sentences1996Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV127281, 183 Ariz. 263 , 902 P.2d 1367 (App. 1995). 1996Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV127281, 183 Ariz. 263 , 902 P.2d 1367 (App. 1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action
green
2 sentences1994That rule provides that the county attorney may file a motion to transfer if, in his opinion, “the child is not a proper person over whom the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction.” Further, under the Rules in effect at the time of the transfer hearing, a juvenile court could not make a transfer order that limited the prosecution’s right to decide what *388 charges should be filed against a juvenile. 2 See Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JV-122783, 172 Ariz. at 545 , 838 P.2d at 1306 . 1994That rule provides that the county attorney may file a motion to transfer if, in his opinion, “the child is not a proper person over whom the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction.” Further, under the Rules in effect at the time of the transfer hearing, a juvenile court could not make a transfer order that limited the prosecution’s right to decide what *388 charges should be filed against a juvenile. 2 See Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JV-122783, 172 Ariz. at 545 , 838 P.2d at 1306 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JT-295003
green
2 sentences1992See A.R.S. § 8-236 (1989); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT-295003, 126 Ariz. 409 , 616 P.2d 84 (App. 1980). 1992See A.R.S. § 8-236 (1989); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT-295003, 126 Ariz. 409 , 616 P.2d 84 (App. 1980). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1989Applying the four-fold test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we cannot find that the minor was deprived of his right to a speedy hearing or that the delay increased the likelihood that the minor would be transferred for criminal prosecution. 1989Applying the four-fold test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we cannot find that the minor was deprived of his right to a speedy hearing or that the delay increased the likelihood that the minor would be transferred for criminal prosecution. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 26289-3 neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-74275
green
2 sentences1985He cites Appeal in Juvenile Action J-74275, 117 Ariz. 317 , 572 P.2d 451 (App.1977), and concludes that a transfer standard is not a procedural rule but rather a substantive rule of law. 1985He cites Appeal in Juvenile Action J-74275, 117 Ariz. 317 , 572 P.2d 451 (App.1977), and concludes that a transfer standard is not a procedural rule but rather a substantive rule of law. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Strange v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| In Re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. J-47735-1 green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Lefkowitz v. Turley green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| James L. Watkins v. United States green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| In Re GAULT green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.