14 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smith (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-274 , ¶ 21 (“‘The transfer hearing implicates far more significant issues than the venue or forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile-justice system.’”), quoting Aalim at ¶ 73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 2022See State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423 , 2022-Ohio-274 , -- N.E.3d --, ¶ 21, quoting Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2017-Ohio- 2956, 83 N.E.3d 883 , at ¶ 73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting) (“The transfer hearing * * * serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile-justice system.”). | 3 | 3 |
Kent v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Smith, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-274, at ¶ 21 (‘“The transfer hearing implicates far more significant issues than the venue or forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile-justice system.’”), quoting State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2017-Ohio-2956 , 83 N.E.3d 883 , ¶ 73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting); Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-554, 556, 560-562 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 . 2022See, e.g., Smith, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-274, at ¶ 21 (‘“The transfer hearing implicates far more significant issues than the venue or forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile-justice system.’”), quoting State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2017-Ohio-2956 , 83 N.E.3d 883 , ¶ 73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting); Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-554, 556, 560-562 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 . | 2 | 4 |
State v. Aalim (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-274 , ¶ 21 (“‘The transfer hearing implicates far more significant issues than the venue or forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile-justice system.’”), quoting Aalim at ¶ 73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 2022The transfer hearing implicates far more significant issues than the venue or forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the juvenile- justice system. 12 January Term, 2022 (Footnote deleted.) State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2017-Ohio-2956 , 83 N.E.3d 883 , ¶ 71-73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). | 2 | 4 |
State v. D.W.green2 sentences2022Juv.R. 3(A)(1), (E) (“A child’s right to be represented by counsel may not be waived * * * at a hearing conducted pursuant to Juv.R. 30.”); Staff Note to 7-1-94 Amendment to Juv.R. 3 (“Juv.R. 3 now makes specific reference to bindover proceedings delineated in Juv.R. 30 to remind the court and practitioners that a juvenile cannot waive counsel at any stage of the bindover procedure.”); State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434 , 2012- Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 36 (“[T]he child’s right to counsel is required by Juv.R. 3, which provides that a child may not waive the right to be represented by counse 2022Juv.R. 3(A)(1), (E) (“A child’s right to be represented by counsel may not be waived * * * at a hearing conducted pursuant to Juv.R. 30.”); Staff Note to 7-1-94 Amendment to Juv.R. 3 (“Juv.R. 3 now makes specific reference to bindover proceedings delineated in Juv.R. 30 to remind the court and practitioners that a juvenile cannot waive counsel at any stage of the bindover procedure.”); State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434 , 2012- Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 36 (“[T]he child’s right to counsel is required by Juv.R. 3, which provides that a child may not waive the right to be represented by counse | 1 | 2 |
In re D.R.green1 sentence2024Because of the “tremendous consequences” following a decision that a child must lose the protections of the juvenile system and face trial as an adult, a bindover proceeding — a “critically important” stage in juvenile proceedings — must “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-554, 556, 560-562 (1966); see also In re D.M., 2014-Ohio- 3628, ¶ 11; In re D.R., 2022-Ohio-4493, ¶ 14 (Juvenile procedural due process claims are examined “through a framework of fundamental fairness.”), citing In re C.P., 2012-Ohio-1446, ¶ 72 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garnergreen2 sentences2022Lucas No. L-18-1269, 2020-Ohio-4939, ¶ 24 . 2022Lucas No. L-18-1269, 2020-Ohio-4939, at ¶ 24 (Although a transfer hearing is a “critically important” hearing that “directs the proceedings down one of two paths with drastically different potential outcomes, [a child’s] liberty is not yet at stake * * *, [and] further proceedings before a factfinder are required to determine whether [the child] committed the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”); LaRosa at ¶ 36 (“a presumption of innocence is not relevant during an amenability determination * * *”); McKinney at ¶ 13 (“We question whether the transfer of jurisdiction implicates the Due | 1 | 1 |
McGlone v. Grimshawgreen1 sentence2017McGlone v. Grimshaw, 86 Ohio App.3d 279, 285 (4th Dist.1993). {¶ 5} Martin included in his lawsuit a claim that he was transferred to another prison as a result of the assault and that the transfer was a violation of due process of law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re GAULT
green
2 sentences2018In this context, due process "does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet." In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1 , 33-34, 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). 2018In this context, due process "does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet." In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1 , 33-34, 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). | 3 | 2012–2018 |
In re C.P.
green
1 sentence2024Because of the “tremendous consequences” following a decision that a child must lose the protections of the juvenile system and face trial as an adult, a bindover proceeding — a “critically important” stage in juvenile proceedings — must “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-554, 556, 560-562 (1966); see also In re D.M., 2014-Ohio- 3628, ¶ 11; In re D.R., 2022-Ohio-4493, ¶ 14 (Juvenile procedural due process claims are examined “through a framework of fundamental fairness.”), citing In re C.P., 2012-Ohio-1446, ¶ 72 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. D.W.
green
1 sentence2022State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434 , 2012-Ohio-4544 , 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 36 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Quarterman (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034 , 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2 . 2022State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034 , 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re A.J.S.
green
1 sentence2021In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio-5307 , at ¶ 51. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Kirkland (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2021In line with his first three assignments of error, Fuell contends that his inability to confront witnesses, the alleged erroneous - 18 - Clermont CA2020-02-008 admission of certain evidence, and his attorney's failure to challenge the state's expert evidence, when considered collectively, denied him a fair hearing. {¶58} Under the doctrine of cumulative errors, a reviewing court "will reverse a conviction when the cumulative effect of errors deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though each of the instances of trial-court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal." State v. 2021In line with his first three assignments of error, Fuell contends that his inability to confront witnesses, the alleged erroneous - 18 - Clermont CA2020-02-008 admission of certain evidence, and his attorney's failure to challenge the state's expert evidence, when considered collectively, denied him a fair hearing. {¶58} Under the doctrine of cumulative errors, a reviewing court "will reverse a conviction when the cumulative effect of errors deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though each of the instances of trial-court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal." State v. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re D.M. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2021Citing Kent, the Ohio Supreme Court has characterized a transfer hearing as a "'critically important'" proceeding and held that such a proceeding "'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.'" In re D.M., 140 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2014-Ohio-3628 , ¶ 11, quoting Kent at 562 . {¶38} But none of the requirements of due process that apply at a juvenile court proceeding were omitted here. 2021Citing Kent, the Ohio Supreme Court has characterized a transfer hearing as a "'critically important'" proceeding and held that such a proceeding "'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.'" In re D.M., 140 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2014-Ohio-3628 , ¶ 11, quoting Kent at 562 . {¶38} But none of the requirements of due process that apply at a juvenile court proceeding were omitted here. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State ex rel. Ohio State Racing Commission v. Walton
green
2 sentences1996Ohio State Racing Comm. v. Walton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 246 , 525 N.E.2d 756 , in support of her contention that appeal following a final judgment in the Sandusky County case constitutes an inadequate remedy. {¶ 13} In Starner, we affirmed the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition to vacate a court’s transfer of a claim to another county. 1996Ohio State Racing Comm. v. Walton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 246 , 525 N.E.2d 756 , in support of her contention that appeal following a final judgment in the Sandusky County case constitutes an inadequate remedy. {¶ 13} In Starner, we affirmed the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition to vacate a court’s transfer of a claim to another county. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Martha Foster v. Daon Corporation
green
1 sentence1987(C.A. 5, 1983), 713 F. 2d 148 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.