11 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perdue v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022In interpreting a statute, we “use the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.” Perdue v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.3d 786, 790 (Ky. App. 2013) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Stout v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016Both the defense and the Commonwealth relied primarily on their written memoran-da, with defense counsel arguing Caldwell, in which the Supreme Court of Kentucky had held “KRS 635.020(4) is constitutional[,]” 133 S.W.3d at 453, was no longer good law and to be valid, a statute must specify the standard of proof to be applied during the transfer hearing, a theory rejected in Stout v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Ky.App.2000). 2016Id. at 788-89 . | 1 | 1 |
Schooley v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2012The court concluded that issue was really a question of due process, based on one of its own prior decisions, since the case was at the collateral attack stage, and required “an error of such magnitude to render the judgment of conviction so fundamentally *15 unfair that the defendant can be said to have been denied due process of law.” Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Ky.App.1977). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Berrygreen2 sentences2004See State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); State v. Mayfield, 241 Kan. 555 , 738 P.2d 861 (1987); State v. N.G., 305 N.J.Super. 132 , 701 A.2d 976 (1997). 2004See State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); State v. Mayfield, 241 Kan. 555 , 738 P.2d 861 (1987); State v. N.G., 305 N.J.Super. 132 , 701 A.2d 976 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Muhammadgreen2 sentences2004On this point, the preliminary hearing "does not result in any determination of guilt or innocence or in confinement or punishment." State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850 , 703 P.2d 835, 839-40 (1985) (holding that, under Kansas state law, a court may conduct a transfer hearing "without a voluntary waiver of appearance by the juvenile if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juvenile's behalf.") Moreover, applying the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Townsend, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (2002), if a defendant can waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury, which he can, there is no reas 2004On this point, the preliminary hearing "does not result in any determination of guilt or innocence or in confinement or punishment." State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850 , 703 P.2d 835, 839-40 (1985) (holding that, under Kansas state law, a court may conduct a transfer hearing "without a voluntary waiver of appearance by the juvenile if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juvenile's behalf.") Moreover, applying the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Townsend, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (2002), if a defendant can waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury, which he can, there is no reas | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Townsendgreen2 sentences2004On this point, the preliminary hearing "does not result in any determination of guilt or innocence or in confinement or punishment." State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850 , 703 P.2d 835, 839-40 (1985) (holding that, under Kansas state law, a court may conduct a transfer hearing "without a voluntary waiver of appearance by the juvenile if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juvenile's behalf.") Moreover, applying the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Townsend, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (2002), if a defendant can waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury, which he can, there is no reas 2004On this point, the preliminary hearing “does not result in any determination of guilt or innocence or in confinement or punishment.” State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850 , 703 P.2d 835, 839-40 (1985) (holding that, under Kansas state law, a court may conduct a transfer hearing “without a voluntary waiver of appearance by the juvenile if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juvenile’s behalf.”) Moreover, applying the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Townsend, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (2002), if a defendant can waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury, which he can, there is no reas | 1 | 1 |
Marino v. Watersgreen2 sentences1977In holding that a similar transfer rule was not arbitrary, the Louisiana appellate court stated in Marino v. Waters, La.App., 220 So.2d 802 at 806 (1969): “The transfer rule of the Louisiana High School Athletic Association has been in effect since around 1920 when the youthful association moved to eliminate the recruiting of high school athletes. 1977In holding that a similar transfer rule was not arbitrary, the Louisiana appellate court stated in Marino v. Waters, La.App., 220 So.2d 802 at 806 (1969): “The transfer rule of the Louisiana High School Athletic Association has been in effect since around 1920 when the youthful association moved to eliminate the recruiting of high school athletes. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Deweese
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 374 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. N.G.
green
2 sentences2004See State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); State v. Mayfield, 241 Kan. 555 , 738 P.2d 861 (1987); State v. N.G., 305 N.J.Super. 132 , 701 A.2d 976 (1997). 2004See State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); State v. Mayfield, 241 Kan. 555 , 738 P.2d 861 (1987); State v. N.G., 305 N.J.Super. 132 , 701 A.2d 976 (1997). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Benge v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2004On this point, the preliminary hearing "does not result in any determination of guilt or innocence or in confinement or punishment." State v. Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850 , 703 P.2d 835, 839-40 (1985) (holding that, under Kansas state law, a court may conduct a transfer hearing "without a voluntary waiver of appearance by the juvenile if counsel is present and allowed to participate on the juvenile's behalf.") Moreover, applying the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Townsend, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (2002), if a defendant can waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury, which he can, there is no reas 2004(Toivnsend held that a defendant could waive the “finally discharged” provision of KRS 640.030(2)(b).) Humphrey further supports his argument that the preliminary hearing cannot be waived by citing Benge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 311 (1961) for the proposition that, since a transfer hearing is a jurisdictional requirement, a juvenile is unable to waive that hearing. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Mayfield
green
2 sentences2004See State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); State v. Mayfield, 241 Kan. 555 , 738 P.2d 861 (1987); State v. N.G., 305 N.J.Super. 132 , 701 A.2d 976 (1997). 2004See State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); State v. Mayfield, 241 Kan. 555 , 738 P.2d 861 (1987); State v. N.G., 305 N.J.Super. 132 , 701 A.2d 976 (1997). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Harden v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2001Id. at 325 . 2001Id. at 325 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
A & H Truck Line, Inc. v. Kentucky Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
neutral
1 sentence1985A & H Truck Line, Inc. v. Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm., Ky., 536 S.W.2d 315 (1976). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Workman v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1984Appellant has argued against the constitutionality of the death penalty with particular emphasis as it applies to juveniles, citing three sources: (1) Briefs filed in behalf of a juvenile faced with the death penalty in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); (2) Our decision in Workman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 374 (1968); and (3) A section of Kentucky's proposed new "Unified Juvenile Code," KRS 208F.040(1), enacted in 1980, present effective date July 1, 1984, which will prohibit inflicting the death penalty upon a juvenile if it ever becomes law. *680 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Eddings v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1984Appellant has argued against the constitutionality of the death penalty with particular emphasis as it applies to juveniles, citing three sources: (1) Briefs filed in behalf of a juvenile faced with the death penalty in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); (2) Our decision in Workman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 374 (1968); and (3) A section of Kentucky's proposed new "Unified Juvenile Code," KRS 208F.040(1), enacted in 1980, present effective date July 1, 1984, which will prohibit inflicting the death penalty upon a juvenile if it ever becomes law. *680 1984Appellant has argued against the constitutionality of the death penalty with particular emphasis as it applies to juveniles, citing three sources: (1) Briefs filed in behalf of a juvenile faced with the death penalty in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); (2) Our decision in Workman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 374 (1968); and (3) A section of Kentucky's proposed new "Unified Juvenile Code," KRS 208F.040(1), enacted in 1980, present effective date July 1, 1984, which will prohibit inflicting the death penalty upon a juvenile if it ever becomes law. *680 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n v. Hopkins County Board of Education
green
1 sentence1978As this court held in Kentucky High School Athletic Association v. Hopkins County Board of Education, supra, courts will not substitute their interpretation of an association’s bylaws for the interpretation placed upon those bylaws by the association itself. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State Ex Rel. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n v. Schoenlaub
green
1 sentence1977Missouri State High School Activities Association v. Schoenlaub, Mo., 507 S.W.2d 354 (1974). *688 Shadowen has not argued that the transfer rule set forth in By-law 6 is completely invalid. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sturrup v. Mahan
green
2 sentences1977In Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463 , 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974), the Indiana Supreme Court did hold the application of a transfer rule to a particular student to be unreasonable and arbitrary. 1977In Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463 , 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974), the Indiana Supreme Court did hold the application of a transfer rule to a particular student to be unreasonable and arbitrary. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Tipton v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1971On the other side of the coin appears Tipton v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 363 , 298 S.W. 990 . 1971On the other side of the coin appears Tipton v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 363 , 298 S.W. 990 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.