transfer hearing in Virginia

2002The statutory language dictates that, when read in context, “all other cases” references those instances where the juvenile court failed to find probable cause to trigger the automatic transfer provision of Code § 16.1-269.1(C). “[T]he juvenile and domestic relations district court must conduct a transfer hearing before the circuit court may obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to have committed a criminal offense.” Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 38, 46 , 473 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1996) (citing Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 79-80 , 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966)). “ ‘The legislative purpose

2002The statutory language dictates that, when read in context, “all other cases” references those instances where the juvenile court failed to find probable cause to trigger the automatic transfer provision of Code § 16.1-269.1(C). “[T]he juvenile and domestic relations district court must conduct a transfer hearing before the circuit court may obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to have committed a criminal offense.” Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 38, 46 , 473 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1996) (citing Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 79-80 , 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966)). “ ‘The legislative purpose

2002The statutory language dictates that, when read in context, “all other cases” references those instances where the juvenile court failed to find probable cause to trigger the automatic transfer provision of Code § 16.1-269.1(C). “[T]he juvenile and domestic relations district court must conduct a transfer hearing before the circuit court may obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to have committed a criminal offense.” Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 38, 46 , 473 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1996) (citing Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 79-80 , 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966)). “ ‘The legislative purpose

2002The statutory language dictates that, when read in context, “all other cases” references those instances where the juvenile court failed to find probable cause to trigger the automatic transfer provision of Code § 16.1-269.1(C). “[T]he juvenile and domestic relations district court must conduct a transfer hearing before the circuit court may obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to have committed a criminal offense.” Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 38, 46 , 473 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1996) (citing Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 79-80 , 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966)). “ ‘The legislative purpose

2001We said, “especially is the jurisdictional argument negated by the . . . provision that the transfer hearing itself may be waived.” Id. at 669 , 222 S.E.2d at 520 .

2001We said, “especially is the jurisdictional argument negated by the . . . provision that the transfer hearing itself may be waived.” Id. at 669 , 222 S.E.2d at 520 .

2003However, citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1053-54 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), appellant contends he had a constitutional right to a transfer hearing and to representation by counsel at that hearing before being stripped of his juvenile status and being tried as an adult.

2003However, citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1053-54 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), appellant contends he had a constitutional right to a transfer hearing and to representation by counsel at that hearing before being stripped of his juvenile status and being tried as an adult.

1998Burfoot, 23 Va.App. at 49 , 473 S.E.2d at 730 (citing Matthews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 358, 359 , 218 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1975); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 80 , 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966)).

1998Burfoot, 23 Va.App. at 49 , 473 S.E.2d at 730 (citing Matthews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 358, 359 , 218 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1975); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 80 , 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966)).

2000A court order, to which the defendant does not object within 21 days of its entry, is presumed to be the “final pronouncement on the subject,” and an appellate court may presume that the order, rather than a transcript, “accurately reflects what transpired.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 861 , 434 S.E.2d 319, 325 (1993).

2000A court order, to which the defendant does not object within 21 days of its entry, is presumed to be the “final pronouncement on the subject,” and an appellate court may presume that the order, rather than a transcript, “accurately reflects what transpired.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 861 , 434 S.E.2d 319, 325 (1993).

2008See Jamborsky, 247 Va. at 511 , 442 S.E.2d at 639 (“Any determination whether a defendant has suffered prejudice constituting a denial of due process must be made on a case-by-case basis.”); Butler, 264 Va. at 620 , 570 S.E.2d at 816-17 ; Williams v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 1, 7 , 595 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2004).

2008See Jamborsky, 247 Va. at 511 , 442 S.E.2d at 639 (“Any determination whether a defendant has suffered prejudice constituting a denial of due process must be made on a case-by-case basis.”); Butler, 264 Va. at 620 , 570 S.E.2d at 816-17 ; Williams v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 1, 7 , 595 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2004).

2001Nelson alleges in his habeas petition that his father was not notified of the initiation of the proceedings in juvenile court or of the transfer hearing. 2 Nelson alleges that the juvenile court’s failure to notify his father of the proceedings rendered his convictions in the circuit court unlawful and void. 3 Nelson not only invokes our decision in Baker II but also our decision in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431 , 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000).

2001Nelson alleges in his habeas petition that his father was not notified of the initiation of the proceedings in juvenile court or of the transfer hearing. 2 Nelson alleges that the juvenile court’s failure to notify his father of the proceedings rendered his convictions in the circuit court unlawful and void. 3 Nelson not only invokes our decision in Baker II but also our decision in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431 , 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000).

2010Id. at 283, 552 S.E.2d at 77.

2010Id. at 283, 552 S.E.2d at 77.

2008See also Winters v. George Mason Bank, 94 F.3d 130, 136 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to address “whether it will follow those circuits who find the automatic stay renders actions void, or those circuits who find the automatic stay renders an action merely voidable”).

2008Despite the lack of a proper record to fully address this question, we recognize that at present, “Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has squarely addressed whether a transfer in violation of the stay is void or voidable.” Cooper v. GGGR Invs., LLC, 334 B.R. 179, 193 (2005).

2008See Jamborsky, 247 Va. at 511 , 442 S.E.2d at 639 (“Any determination whether a defendant has suffered prejudice constituting a denial of due process must be made on a case-by-case basis.”); Butler, 264 Va. at 620 , 570 S.E.2d at 816-17 ; Williams v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 1, 7 , 595 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2004).

2008See Jamborsky, 247 Va. at 511 , 442 S.E.2d at 639 (“Any determination whether a defendant has suffered prejudice constituting a denial of due process must be made on a case-by-case basis.”); Butler, 264 Va. at 620 , 570 S.E.2d at 816-17 ; Williams v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 1, 7 , 595 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2004).

2004See infra. Joyner v. Graybeal, 204 Va. 543 , 132 S.E.2d 467 (1963) (merger deemed to have occurred where creditor demonstrated a clear intention to extinguish his lien at the time title was transferred to him by directing that the word “None” be written in the transfer clause on the back of the title certificate where outstanding liens were to be noted.) In addition, a subsequent contract which does not by express terms abrogate an earlier contract will nevertheless operate as a discharge thereof it if is inconsistent with such earlier contract.

2004See infra. Joyner v. Graybeal, 204 Va. 543 , 132 S.E.2d 467 (1963) (merger deemed to have occurred where creditor demonstrated a clear intention to extinguish his lien at the time title was transferred to him by directing that the word “None” be written in the transfer clause on the back of the title certificate where outstanding liens were to be noted.) In addition, a subsequent contract which does not by express terms abrogate an earlier contract will nevertheless operate as a discharge thereof it if is inconsistent with such earlier contract.

2003The cases he cites provide, at most, that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, “ ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ ” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 226, 229 , 421 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 ); see Cheeks v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 578, 583-86 , 459 S.E.2d 107, 109-11 (1995) (holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former Code § 16.1-269(E) was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review t

2003The cases he cites provide, at most, that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, “ ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ ” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 226, 229 , 421 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 ); see Cheeks v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 578, 583-86 , 459 S.E.2d 107, 109-11 (1995) (holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former Code § 16.1-269(E) was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review t

2003Id.; see also Deiter v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 771, 775 , 139 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1965) (noting that dicta is language that is “not responsive to the question presented and ... not necessary to a disposition of the case”).

2003Id.; see also Deiter v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 771, 775 , 139 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1965) (noting that dicta is language that is “not responsive to the question presented and ... not necessary to a disposition of the case”).

2003The cases he cites provide, at most, that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, “ ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ ” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 226, 229 , 421 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 ); see Cheeks v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 578, 583-86 , 459 S.E.2d 107, 109-11 (1995) (holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former Code § 16.1-269(E) was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review t

2003The cases he cites provide, at most, that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, “ ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ ” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 226, 229 , 421 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 ); see Cheeks v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 578, 583-86 , 459 S.E.2d 107, 109-11 (1995) (holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former Code § 16.1-269(E) was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review t

2003The cases he cites provide, at most, that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, “ ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ ” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 226, 229 , 421 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1992) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562 , 86 S.Ct. at 1058 ); see Cheeks v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 578, 583-86 , 459 S.E.2d 107, 109-11 (1995) (holding that procedure for juvenile transfer appeal review in circuit court under former Code § 16.1-269(E) was jurisdictional and that failure to provide juvenile with statutory review t

2000ANALYSIS Finney argues that the Henry County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the instant offenses because the juvenile court did not comply with the mandatory notice requirements of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 by failing to provide notice to his - 2 - father of the transfer hearing of the Martinsville juvenile proceedings in 1997. 1 Code § 16.1-271 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he trial or treatment of a juvenile as an adult pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall preclude the juvenile court from taking jurisdiction of such juvenile for subsequent offenses committed b

2000ANALYSIS Finney argues that the Henry County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the instant offenses because the juvenile court did not comply with the mandatory notice requirements of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 by failing to provide notice to his - 2 - father of the transfer hearing of the Martinsville juvenile proceedings in 1997. 1 Code § 16.1-271 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he trial or treatment of a juvenile as an adult pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall preclude the juvenile court from taking jurisdiction of such juvenile for subsequent offenses committed b

1999Appellant furnished no transcript or statement of facts detailing the evidence introduced at the original transfer hearing, and the district court’s order indicates it found only “that the evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the alleged offense(s).” See, e.g., McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 30, 35 , 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997) (holding that “[a] court speaks through its orders and those orders are presumed to accurately reflect what transpired”); see also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81 , 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979) (notin

1999Appellant furnished no transcript or statement of facts detailing the evidence introduced at the original transfer hearing, and the district court’s order indicates it found only “that the evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the alleged offense(s).” See, e.g., McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 30, 35 , 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997) (holding that “[a] court speaks through its orders and those orders are presumed to accurately reflect what transpired”); see also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81 , 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979) (notin