transfer hearing in Illinois

2024The supreme court noted the juvenile court judge did not ask the probation officer any questions about either of his assertions. ¶ 123 In Clark, our supreme court then offered the following explanation and guidance: “Viewing the record of the transfer hearing in the instant case in its entirety in light of the language and purpose of the transfer provision and in light of People v. M.D. and People v. Taylor, supra, we conclude that defendant’s transfer hearing was inadequate.

2006In People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 303 (1979), we stated: “The transfer hearing not being adjudicatory, the procedural safeguards required at criminal trials and adjudications of delinquency are not mandated by due process.” As a consequence, reliable hearsay, including documentary or testimonial evidence, is admissible at such a proceeding.

2024Id. ¶ 120 In addition, the supreme court also held the Clark minor’s transfer hearing was inadequate for two other reasons.

2013People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1987) (our supreme court found that the transfer hearing was inadequate where the juvenile judge failed to consider all of the listed factors).

2025ANALYSIS ¶ 19 Smith contends he is entitled to a new transfer hearing because he was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court under provisions of the Act amended by Public Act 88-680, which has been found unconstitutional and void ab initio by our supreme court in People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999) and People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188 (2007).

2025Id. at 203 . ¶ 29 Ten years after Brown, in People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306 , our supreme court suggested that Brown’s remand for a new transfer hearing was improper, or, at the very least, would not have occurred if the State challenged the remand based on the defendant’s age.

2015Id.

2005PH., 145 Ill. 2d at 222 , 582 N.E.2d at 706 .

2007The same conclusion was reached by the appellate court and conceded by the State under similar circumstances in People v. Pena, 321 Ill.

2007The same conclusion was reached by the appellate court and conceded by the State under similar circumstances in People v. Pena, 321 Ill.

2007Invoking the principles that a claim that a judgment is void is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, either directly or collaterally, and that courts have an independent duty to vacate void orders and may vacate a void order sua sponte even if it is not challenged by the parties (see People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004)), the court concluded that it was obliged to vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new transfer hearing. 358 Ill.

2007Invoking the principles that a claim that a judgment is void is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, either directly or -3- collaterally, and that courts have an independent duty to vacate void orders and may vacate a void order sua sponte even if it is not challenged by the parties (see People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004)), the court concluded that it was obliged to vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new transfer hearing. 358 Ill.

2001In short, the transfer hearing is not an adversary proceeding.’ ” Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 302-03 , quoting State v. Piche, 74 Wash. 2d 9, 14 , 442 P.2d 632, 635-36 (1968).

2001In short, the transfer hearing is not an adversary proceeding.’ ” Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 302-03 , quoting State v. Piche, 74 Wash. 2d 9, 14 , 442 P.2d 632, 635-36 (1968).

2001See also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977) (changes in the state's death penalty procedures "simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed").

2001See also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977) (changes in the state's death penalty procedures "simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed").

1996Because the transfer hearing is a critical stage in the juvenile proceeding, "there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony — without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.” (Emphasis added.) Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 554 , 16 L.

1996Because the transfer hearing is a critical stage in the juvenile proceeding, "there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony — without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.” (Emphasis added.) Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 554 , 16 L.

1989In People v. M.D. (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 73, 85-86 , 461 N.E.2d 367, 373 , a case involving a 15-year-old defendant, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the underlying facts presented at the transfer hearing led to the conclusion that the defendant, despite his youth, was not a stranger to adult experiences, and that this factor, weighed with the other relevant factors, necessitated the transfer of the case to an adult forum.

1989In People v. M.D. (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 73, 85-86 , 461 N.E.2d 367, 373 , a case involving a 15-year-old defendant, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the underlying facts presented at the transfer hearing led to the conclusion that the defendant, despite his youth, was not a stranger to adult experiences, and that this factor, weighed with the other relevant factors, necessitated the transfer of the case to an adult forum.

2025See Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 35 (amendment altering the list of offenses qualifying for automatic transfer); People v. Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶ 22 (amendment raising the minimum age for automatic transfer). 17 No. 1-24-0121 ¶ 51 If, as the majority concludes, the juvenile court “no longer has authority” to conduct a transfer hearing (supra ¶ 38), there is no jurisdictional bar to having that hearing occur in criminal court.

2018We observed that transferring the defendant’s case to juvenile court for a transfer hearing “is something that is feasible.” Id. ¶ 25 Hunter argues that, like Howard, his case was also “pending” on the effective date of the amendment, albeit on direct review in the appellate court.

2025Id. at 847, 850 .

1996In a thoughtful opinion the court held "the finding of probable cause at the detention hearing does not bind the trial court as to probable cause at the transfer hearing and the minor is entitled to a de novo hearing.” In re R.L., 282 Ill.

2025See Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 35 (amendment altering the list of offenses qualifying for automatic transfer); People v. Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶ 22 (amendment raising the minimum age for automatic transfer). 17 No. 1-24-0121 ¶ 51 If, as the majority concludes, the juvenile court “no longer has authority” to conduct a transfer hearing (supra ¶ 38), there is no jurisdictional bar to having that hearing occur in criminal court.

2022To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must only demonstrate that there was a ‘reasonable probability of a different result,’ i.e., ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ [People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004).] Here, if [the defendant’s] counsel had moved for retroactive application of amended section 5-130, then, as a matter of law, that motion should have been granted. [The defendant] could still have been sentenced as an adult, but only at the trial court’s discretion.” Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶ 25 . ¶ 3

2024Advantages of Treatment in DOJJ ¶ 134 Defendant cited Moore for the proposition “[a] juvenile judge must evaluate information concerning the type of facilities available for the treatment or rehabilitation of the minor and must evaluate the likely effectiveness of those facilities in light of the history and present circumstances of the minor.” Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 20 (citing Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 428-29 ).

2022“In a transfer hearing under the Act, the State need only present evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause.” Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 426 . ¶ 33 At defendant’s transfer hearing, held on Monday, November 28, 2016, the trial court received exhibits and proffers from both sides and heard argument.

2024Advantages of Treatment in DOJJ ¶ 134 Defendant cited Moore for the proposition “[a] juvenile judge must evaluate information concerning the type of facilities available for the treatment or rehabilitation of the minor and must evaluate the likely effectiveness of those facilities in light of the history and present circumstances of the minor.” Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 20 (citing Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 428-29 ).

2021In Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 22 , “no evidence was presented at the transfer hearing regarding the availability and advantages of treatment services in the juvenile system.” ¶ 43 3.