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26 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1900–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. WAYNE W.green2 sentences1998See id. at 224 (upholding the constitutionality of the lesser burden, which also placed on the juvenile the burden of producing evidence that he is not a danger to the public and is amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system). 2 The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1993At the probable cause portion of a transfer hearing, “a determination of probable cause means a determination that there exists sufficient credible evidence to warrant a conclusion by a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.” Commonwealth v. Wayne W., supra 223. “[A] grand jury indictment depends only on the existence of evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of ‘probable cause to arrest [the defendant],’ ” Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 198 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. O’Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984). 8 The juvenile also maintains that the amendment | 3 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Watsongreen2 sentences1998See Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 540 (1983) (the test for admissibility is fundamental fairness “and not the application of rules of evidence concerning the admission of hearsay”). 1997See Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 540 (1983), citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Nannygreen2 sentences2021The probable cause portion of the transfer hearing in the Juvenile Court "serves the same function as a bind-over probable cause hearing in the District Court." Ulla U. v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass. 219 , 228 (2020), citing Nanny, 462 Mass. at 805 . 2020At the very least, because such an inquiry would occur as part of the transfer hearing, the juvenile would have the opportunity to "present a defense and cross-examine witnesses." Nanny, 462 Mass. at 805 . | 2 | 3 |
Bell v. Treasurer of Cambridgegreen2 sentences2003Compare Bell v. Treasurer of Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484, 488-489 (1941) (by conferring temporary mayoral duties and salary on president of city council pursuant to statute, in order to replace mayor who had been convicted of bribery and stipulated in court he would not exercise his duties pending appeal but nonetheless brought litigation to recover his salary as an incident of his office, '“the Legislature could hardly have intended to saddle a double liability upon the city”); Commonwealth v. Williams, 427 Mass. 59, 61-63 (1998) (juvenile transfer hearing legislation cannot, consistently with c 1998If the language of the statute is “ ‘fairly susceptible [of] a construction that would lead to a logical and sensible result’ . . . we will construe [it] so ‘as to make [it an] . . . effectual piece[] of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.’ ” Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 254 (1983), quoting Bell v. Treasurer of Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484, 489 (1941), and Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492 (1932), We therefore hold that a transfer hearing conducted under former G. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018We reasoned that even though the lesser included offense was not specifically charged, the "legislative **290 intent that such lesser included offenses are part and parcel of the transfer hearing process may fairly be presumed." Id. at 62 , 691 N.E.2d 553 . 2018We reasoned that even though the lesser included offense was not specifically charged, the "legislative **290 intent that such lesser included offenses are part and parcel of the transfer hearing process may fairly be presumed." Id. at 62 , 691 N.E.2d 553 . | 1 | 2 |
J.H. v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2026A "thoughtful presentation by defense counsel directed 11Nothing in § 72A precludes a judge from holding a single transfer hearing on both determinations or requires bifurcation of the issues. 14 at both [probable cause and whether, in view of the defendant's maturity and rehabilitation, transfer is apt] is thus critical." Id., quoting J.H. v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 285, 290 (2018). 2026A "thoughtful presentation by defense counsel directed 11Nothing in § 72A precludes a judge from holding a single transfer hearing on both determinations or requires bifurcation of the issues. 14 at both [probable cause and whether, in view of the defendant's maturity and rehabilitation, transfer is apt] is thus critical." Id., quoting J.H. v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 285, 290 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1)green1 sentence2026See A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552, 562-563 (1980) (directing indictments to remain in place provisionally while Superior Court remits to Juvenile Court for prompt findings on appropriateness of transfer to adult court pursuant to G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kolenovicgreen1 sentence2026As her request for a continuance highlighted and her posthearing affidavit acknowledged, transfer counsel's unpreparedness rendered her unable to present evidence on factors critical to the transfer judge's decision.13 The record reflects that transfer counsel's lack of preparation was not based on any strategic decision or "informed exercise of [transfer counsel's] prerogative to decide on the defense strategy," Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 675 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017), but on her mistaken belief that the transfer hearing would be bifurcated. 13In support of his motion | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Azargreen1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Azargreen1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ortizgreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 393 Mass. 523, 533 (1984) ("adult and juvenile probable cause hearings serve identical purposes"). | 1 | 1 |
Acting Superintendent of Bournewood Hospital v. Bakergreen1 sentence2020See Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Humberto H.green1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562 , 575–576 (2013). 4 G. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020See Johnson, 409 Mass. at 716 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mogelinskigreen1 sentence2018See Mogelinski I , supra at 632 n.4, 1 N.E.3d 237 (noting that as a result of the 2013 amendments, "the Commonwealth may seek a transfer hearing if an individual is apprehended after the age of nineteen, for conduct allegedly committed prior to his or her eighteenth birthday"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mogelinkskigreen1 sentence2018See also Commonwealth v. Mogelinski , 473 Mass. 164 , 167-170, 40 N.E.3d 544 (2015) ( Mogelinski II ). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. a Juvenilegreen1 sentence2015The Juvenile Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, which “has no . . . authority in the absence of a specific statutory authorization.” Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 406 Mass. 31, 34 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Hopkins v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence2003Co., 434 Mass. 556, 561-563 (2001) (defendant’s proposed interpretation of G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'Briengreen1 sentence2001“A transfer hearing is held to determine whether the child presents a danger to the public, and whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system.” Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 423 Mass. 841, 845 (1996) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Berrygreen1 sentence2001“General Laws c. 119, § 61, sets forth the requirements governing a transfer hearing.” 3 Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 99 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clifford C.green1 sentence2000See Commonwealth v. Clifford C., 415 Mass. 38, 41-42 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. DiBenedettogreen1 sentence1999In the probable cause portion of the transfer hearing, commonly known as a “Part A hearing,” the judge then had to find that there was probable cause to “believe that the child ha[d] committed the offense or violation charged.” Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 47 (1992), quoting G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. a Juvenilegreen1 sentence1998If the language of the statute is “ ‘fairly susceptible [of] a construction that would lead to a logical and sensible result’ . . . we will construe [it] so ‘as to make [it an] . . . effectual piece[] of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.’ ” Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 254 (1983), quoting Bell v. Treasurer of Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484, 489 (1941), and Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492 (1932), We therefore hold that a transfer hearing conducted under former G. | 1 | 1 |
McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniagreen1 sentence1997See Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 540 (1983), citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheneygreen1 sentence1994Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, supra at 617. | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. O'DELLgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Myers v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mathews v. Eldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Matthewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Maggiogreen1 sentence1993At the probable cause portion of a transfer hearing, “a determination of probable cause means a determination that there exists sufficient credible evidence to warrant a conclusion by a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.” Commonwealth v. Wayne W., supra 223. “[A] grand jury indictment depends only on the existence of evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of ‘probable cause to arrest [the defendant],’ ” Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 198 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. O’Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984). 8 The juvenile also maintains that the amendment | 1 | 1 |
A Juvenile v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1993See also A Juvenile *224 v. Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 104, 107 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| James J. Stokes v. Michael E. Fairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kent v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. a Juvenilegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Worcester County National Bank v. Commissioner of Banksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Breed v. Jones
green
2 sentences1976The Supreme Court in Breed declined to express any opinion as to whether an evidentiary hearing with respect to the commission of the offense was a necessary component of a transfer hearing. 8 It indicated that *279 “the Court has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court.” 421 U.S. at 537 . 1976L. c. 119, § 83 (but see Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 363 Mass. 640, 643 [1973]), and that such post-trial consideration does not appear to conflict with the doctrine enunciated in Breed v. Jones, supra. 8 We note that under the California law that was before the Court in Breed , a Juvenile Court judge was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the complaint before transferring the juvenile to adult court. 421 U.S. at 536 n.16. 9 Although we hold that an evidentiary hearing is not constitutionally mandated, we believe that the preferable approach, in light of the importance of a deci | 3 | 1975–1980 |
Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth
green
1 sentence1998If the language of the statute is “ ‘fairly susceptible [of] a construction that would lead to a logical and sensible result’ . . . we will construe [it] so ‘as to make [it an] . . . effectual piece[] of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.’ ” Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 254 (1983), quoting Bell v. Treasurer of Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484, 489 (1941), and Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492 (1932), We therefore hold that a transfer hearing conducted under former G. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
D'URBANO v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1998D’Urbano v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 466 (1963), also does not apply to the facts here. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Harker v. City of Holyoke green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| A Juvenile v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Stokes v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Erwin v. United States green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.