transfer hearing in Alabama

2005Ex parte W.T.K., 586 So.2d 850, 853 (Ala.1991) ("It is particularly important to protect a juvenile's constitutional rights at a transfer hearing.

2005Ex parte W.T.K., 586 So.2d 850, 853 (Ala.1991) (“It is particularly important to protect a juvenile’s constitutional rights at a transfer hearing.

2004In Ake , the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of fundamental fairness required that an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding be provided the means to build an effective defense, 470 U.S. at 76-77 , 105 S.Ct. at 1092-93 , but this case involved a transfer hearing and this Court has specifically stated that ‘a transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the child accused of a crime but is, instead, a probable cause hearing to determine whether the child should be transferred out of the juvenile court for criminal prosecution as an a

1994However, the Alabama Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is well recognized that a transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the child accused of a crime but is, instead, a probable cause hearing to determine whether the child should be transferred out of the juvenile court for criminal prosecution as an adult.” Brown v. State, 353 So.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Ala.1977) (citation omitted).

2004See Gulledge v. State, 419 So.2d 219, 220 (Ala.1982) (holding that the strict rules of evidence do not apply to a transfer hearing because it is a probable cause hearing rather than a criminal prosecution); Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala. Cr.App.1986) (holding that a transfer hearing is not a ‘criminal prosecution’ within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of the right to a speedy trial).

2003In addition, in Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), this Court held that “[s]ince a transfer hearing is not a ‘criminal prosecution’ within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that right does not apply to transfer hearings.” Therefore, the month between the filing of the delinquency petitions and the transfer of the case to circuit court and the approximately four months from the appellant’s filing of his application for treatment as a youthful offender and the trial court’s denial of that application should not be weig

1998Furthermore, the applicable standard for a transfer hearing is “whether a reasonable man would believe the crime occurred and that the defendant committed it.” M.S.B. v. State, 651 So.2d 69, 71 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

1998Furthermore, the applicable standard for a transfer hearing is “whether a reasonable man would believe the crime occurred and that the defendant committed it.” M.S.B. v. State, 651 So.2d 69, 71 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

2004See Gulledge v. State, 419 So.2d 219, 220 (Ala.1982) (holding that the strict rules of evidence do not apply to a transfer hearing because it is a probable cause hearing rather than a criminal prosecution); Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala. Cr.App.1986) (holding that a transfer hearing is not a ‘criminal prosecution’ within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of the right to a speedy trial).

1993See, Gulledge v. State, 419 So.2d 219, 220 (Ala.1982) (holding that the strict rules of evidence do not apply to a transfer hearing because it is a probable cause hearing rather than a criminal prosecution); Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (holding that a transfer hearing is not a “criminal prosecution” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of the right to a speedy trial).

2022App. 1995) (" 'The Alabama Supreme Court has made it clear that evidence which could not be constitutionally admitted at a criminal trial should be excluded from a transfer hearing.' " (quoting O.M., 595 So .2d at 517 (citing Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Ala. 1985))).

1998The Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Jackson made clear that the exclusionary rule is equally applicable whether the state seeks to admit a juvenile's custodial statement at a transfer hearing in the juvenile court, see Ex parte Whisenant, supra, 466 So.2d 1006 , or at a criminal prosecution of the juvenile in the circuit court.

1994See also Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930, 932 (Ala.1981).

1994See also Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930, 932 (Ala.1981).

1991Before 1985, the Alabama Supreme Court held that “constitutional questions concerning the admissibility of evidence ... may be relevant at a later proceeding [but] they are not appropriate in a transfer hearing.” Snow v. State, 423 So.2d 220, 222 (Ala.1982).

1991Before 1985, the Alabama Supreme Court held that "constitutional questions concerning the admissibility of evidence ... may be relevant at a later proceeding [but] they are not appropriate in a transfer hearing." Snow v. State, 423 So.2d 220, 222 (Ala.1982).

1994"It is not necessary, at the transfer hearing, that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to kill the police officers. `[A] transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the accused, but instead is a probable cause hearing, to determine whether the juvenile should be transferred out of juvenile court for prosecution as an adult.' W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)." R.L.S. v. State, 619 So.2d 940, 941 (Ala.Cr.

1994“It is not necessary, at the transfer hearing, that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to kill the police officers. ‘[A] transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the accused, but instead is a probable cause hearing, to determine whether the juvenile should be transferred out of juvenile court for prosecution as an adult.’ W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).” RL.S. v. State, 619 So.2d 940, 941 (Ala.Cr.App.1993).

1999A statement that would not be admissible in a criminal adjudication of guilt is not admissible at a transfer hearing." O.M., 595 So.2d at 518 (citations omitted).

1999A statement that would not be admissible in a criminal adjudication of guilt is not admissible at a transfer hearing.” O.M., 595 So.2d at 518 (citations omitted).

1986Furthermore, "a transfer hearing is not for the determination of the guilt or innocence of the [appellant], but is in the nature of a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause `for believing that the allegations are true and correct.'" Winstead v. State, 371 So.2d 418, 420 (Ala.1979).

1985The Alabama Supreme Court has held that a transfer hearing is "in the nature of a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause `for believing that the allegations are true and correct.'" Winstead v. State, 371 So.2d 418, 420 (Ala.1979).

1994See also Ex parte W.T.K., 586 So.2d 850, 851 (Ala.1991); Smith v. State, 475 So.2d 633, 635 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).

1992Ex parte W.T.K., supra; Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930 (Ala.1981); Smith v. State, 475 So.2d 633 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).

1985In this regard Justice Beatty stated in Gallagher v. State, 425 So.2d 1079, 1080 (Ala. 1983): "The purpose of a transfer hearing has been stated by this court as being to establish whether there is probable cause for a child to be transferred from juvenile court for criminal prosecution as an adult....

1984"The purpose of a transfer hearing . . . (is) to establish whether there is probable cause for a child to be transferred from juvenile court for criminal prosecution as an adult." Gallagher v. State , 425 So.2d 1079 , 1080 (Ala. 1983); Brown v. State , 353 So.2d 1384 , 1387 (Ala. 1977).

2005It was in this factual context that the Supreme Court held that a transfer hearing at which the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction over a juvenile is a “ ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile.” 383 U.S. at 556 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 .

2005It was in this factual context that the Supreme Court held that a transfer hearing at which the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction over a juvenile is a “ ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile.” 383 U.S. at 556 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 .

2022App. 2021). 2 CR-21-0024 juvenile court was required to determine "whether there is probable cause to believe that [A.P.S.] committed the alleged crime," and (2) a dispositional phase, during which the juvenile court was required to determine "whether it is in the best interest of [A.P.S.] or the public to transfer [A.P.S.] to the circuit court to stand trial as an adult." J.S.A. v. State, 615 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Ala. Crim.

1997The transfer of a juvenile for prosecution in the circuit court is governed by Ala.Code 1975, S. 12-15-34, which states, in pertinent part: “(d) Evidence of the following and other relevant factors shall be considered in determining whether the motion [to transfer] shall be granted: “(1) The nature of the present alleged offense; “(2) The extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency record; “(3) The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child’s response to such efforts; “(4) Demeanor; “(5) The extent and nature of the child’s physical and mental maturity; and “(6) The in

1991This Court stated: "Transfer hearings are `probable cause' hearings, and the transferring court should not be reversed unless its ruling is clearly erroneous." 416 So.2d at 716 , citing Duncan v. State, supra. We applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review to both the probable cause and the dispositional phases of the transfer hearing.

1991This Court stated: “Transfer hearings are ‘probable cause’ hearings, and the transferring court should not be reversed unless its ruling is clearly erroneous.” 416 So.2d at 716 , citing Duncan v. State, supra. We applied the “clearly erroneous” standard of review to both the probable cause and the dispositional phases of the transfer hearing.

1994"It is not necessary, at the transfer hearing, that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to kill the police officers. `[A] transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the accused, but instead is a probable cause hearing, to determine whether the juvenile should be transferred out of juvenile court for prosecution as an adult.' W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Ala.Cr.App.1992)." R.L.S. v. State, 619 So.2d 940, 941 (Ala.Cr.

1994“It is not necessary, at the transfer hearing, that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to kill the police officers. ‘[A] transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the accused, but instead is a probable cause hearing, to determine whether the juvenile should be transferred out of juvenile court for prosecution as an adult.’ W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).” RL.S. v. State, 619 So.2d 940, 941 (Ala.Cr.App.1993).

1995“The Alabama Supreme Court has made it clear that evidence which could not be constitutionally admitted at a criminal trial should be excluded from a transfer hearing.” O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 517 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), cert. quashed, 595 So.2d 528 (Ala.1992) (citing Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Ala.1985)) (emphasis added).

1995"The Alabama Supreme Court has made it clear that evidence which could not be constitutionally admitted at a criminal trial should be excluded from a transfer hearing." O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 517 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), cert. quashed, 595 So.2d 528 (Ala.1992) (citing Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Ala.1985)) (emphasis added).

1998In another case, the United States Supreme Court, applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, said a transfer under that doctrine is proper when: "`an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would "establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience," or when the "chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems.'" " Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235 , 241 , 102 S.Ct. 252 , 258 , 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), quotin

1998In another case, the United States Supreme Court, applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, said a transfer under that doctrine is proper when: "`an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would "establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience," or when the "chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems.'" " Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235 , 241 , 102 S.Ct. 252 , 258 , 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), quotin

1985Winstead, supra; Vincent v. State, 349 So.2d 1145 (Ala. 1977); Gulledge v. State, 419 So.2d 219 (Ala.1982).

1984See Vincent v. State , 349 So.2d 1145 (Ala. 1977), wherein our Supreme Court determined that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was sufficient basis for finding probable cause.