contested hearing in Oregon

2025In 2018, petitioner filed a resident insurance license renewal application with the state and represented that he had not “been named or involved as a party in an adminis- trative proceeding, including FINRA sanction.” DCBS sub- sequently alleged that petitioner “act[ed] as a state invest- ment adviser in Oregon without a state investment license,” provided “misleading information” on his insurance license applications by not disclosing the FINRA investigation, and that he engaged in “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest prac- tices.” At the contested hearing, the daughter of petitioner’s former

2025In 2018, petitioner filed a resident insurance license renewal application with the state and represented that he had not “been named or involved as a party in an adminis- trative proceeding, including FINRA sanction.” DCBS sub- sequently alleged that petitioner “act[ed] as a state invest- ment adviser in Oregon without a state investment license,” provided “misleading information” on his insurance license applications by not disclosing the FINRA investigation, and that he engaged in “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest prac- tices.” At the contested hearing, the daughter of petitioner’s former

2025After wife and a police officer had testified at the contested hearing, husband stated that he was requesting a continuance because he “really didn’t have enough of the evidence” and because he “was going to make some photo- copies of some things.” Having considered “the particular circumstances of the case” and the reasons that husband “presented to the court at the time the request [was] denied,” Hickey, 79 Or App at 203 , we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

2025After wife and a police officer had testified at the contested hearing, husband stated that he was requesting a continuance because he “really didn’t have enough of the evidence” and because he “was going to make some photo- copies of some things.” Having considered “the particular circumstances of the case” and the reasons that husband “presented to the court at the time the request [was] denied,” Hickey, 79 Or App at 203 , we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

2024At that hearing, appellant asked whether he could “request for counsel.” The trial court explained that appellant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel: Cite as 333 Or App 13 (2024) 17 “I don’t think you’re entitled to a court appointed attor- ney.

2024At that hearing, appellant asked whether he could “request for counsel.” The trial court explained that appellant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel: Cite as 333 Or App 13 (2024) 17 “I don’t think you’re entitled to a court appointed attor- ney.

2023The legislature did so by adding a new FAPA provision that allows the trial court to continue the restraining order issued at an ex parte hearing, after a contested hearing, if the court finds that: “(A) Abuse has occurred within the period specified in ORS 107.710 (1) [which is currently within 180 days preced- ing the filing of the petition]; Cite as 327 Or App 39 (2023) 45 “(B) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s physical safety; and “(C) The respondent represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner or the petitioner’s child.” Or Laws 2019, ch 144, §

2023The legislature did so by adding a new FAPA provision that allows the trial court to continue the restraining order issued at an ex parte hearing, after a contested hearing, if the court finds that: “(A) Abuse has occurred within the period specified in ORS 107.710 (1) [which is currently within 180 days preced- ing the filing of the petition]; Cite as 327 Or App 39 (2023) 45 “(B) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s physical safety; and “(C) The respondent represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner or the petitioner’s child.” Or Laws 2019, ch 144, §

2016A. C.: “The proper procedure in those cases is for the court to receive one parent’s admissions and delay making a jurisdictional determination until after the contested hearing [sought by the other parent].” Id. at 394-95 .

2014We noted that it was error for the court to assert jurisdiction before adjudicating the allegations against the father because “if a child has a parent who appears in the proceeding and is capable of caring for the child safely, juvenile court jurisdiction is not warranted and that, unless and until DHS proved that neither parent who appeared could safely parent the child, the court could not enter a jurisdictional judgment.” Id. at 394 .

2026During the contested hearing, the trial court specifically asked the state to address defendant’s argument that the evidence should be admitted to show that Flores-Ramos “[i] s attracted to children,” to which the state responded that the evidence was “just distracting [to] everybody” and that it was inadmissible propensity evidence offered against “some- body who is not on trial.” Moreover, in its ruling, the trial court expressly stated that Flores-Ramos “absolutely has the propensity to touch a child,” and the court considered the evidence under the LeMay factors, explaining “that’s the Cit

2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 900 (2026) 901 PER CURIAM Appellant appeals from a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) restraining order that was continued after a contested hearing.

2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 900 (2026) 901 PER CURIAM Appellant appeals from a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) restraining order that was continued after a contested hearing.

2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 349 Or App 814 (2026) 815 PER CURIAM In this criminal case, defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon and second-degree criminal mis- chief, and the trial court imposed restitution, among other terms of his sentence, after a contested hearing.

2024C. v. Bowman, 249 Or App 590, 593-94 , 277 P3d 634 , rev den, 352 Or 377 (2012). 2 At the contested hearing, petitioner introduced into evidence Facebook messages from respondent.

2024C. v. Bowman, 249 Or App 590, 593-94 , 277 P3d 634 , rev den, 352 Or 377 (2012). 2 At the contested hearing, petitioner introduced into evidence Facebook messages from respondent.

2023Respondent testified that, even though he had moved out in June 2022 and the landlord had changed the locks, he entered his former home 3 The evidence in the record does not explain the relationship between respondent and the woman involved in the incident. 4 ORS 419B.010 provides, in part, that “[a]ny public or private official having reasonable cause to believe that any child with whom the official comes in contact has suffered abuse or that any person with whom the official comes in contact has abused a child shall immediately report or cause a report to be made[.]” ORS 419B.005(6) lists th

2022Here, after the contested hearing on the restraining order, the trial court determined that petitioner had suffered 1 In this opinion, we refer to the parties by their designations in the trial court; thus, appellant is referred to as “respondent,” and respondent on appeal is referred to as “petitioner.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 323 Or App 477 (2022) 479 from two incidents of abuse committed by respondent within 180 days of filing, that respondent was a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety, and that respondent posed an imminent danger of further abuse to petitioner.2 On appeal, resp

2020Linn County Circuit Court 18PO05322; A168659 473 P3d 103 Under the Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), petitioner obtained a restraining order against respondent, her soon-to-be-ex-husband, and the trial court continued that restraining order after a contested hearing.

2019Linn County Circuit Court 18PO05430; A168943 452 P3d 1059 Respondent appeals from an order that continued an ex parte restraining order following a contested hearing.

2019Cite as 299 Or App 820 (2019) 825 question of imminent danger of further abuse.4 The court’s task was to determine whether respondent continued to be a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety and whether she was in imminent danger of further abuse from respon- dent.

2013That distinction is recognized not only in Oregon, see Wilson, 199 Or App at 250 , but in other states as well.

1995On the child’s appeal of that denial, we explained that the rationale for our holding in Gillman was that “early dismissal of the petition deprived the state of its opportunity to investigate the case and present its evidence.” 80 Or App at 507 .

1978An employee is not bound by the terms of a vacation policy or plan when the existence and the contents of that policy or plan are not made known to that employee.” In Sabin v. Willamette Western Corp., 276 Or 1083 , 557 P2d 1344 (1976), as here, an employee accepted employment without any agreement as to vacation pay.

1978An employee is not bound by the terms of a vacation policy or plan when the existence and the contents of that policy or plan are not made known to that employee.” In Sabin v. Willamette Western Corp., 276 Or 1083 , 557 P2d 1344 (1976), as here, an employee accepted employment without any agreement as to vacation pay.

1945Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Or. 10 , 93 P. 696 , 15 L.

1945Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Or. 10 , 93 P. 696 , 15 L.

1933From Clark v. Guard, 73 Ala. 456 , we quote: “When, on final or partial settlement of an insolvent estate, litigation is still pending, and remains undecided, over a contested claim against the estate, distribution or disbursement should not be made of the entire assets, until the contention over such claim is finally settled.