contested hearing in Washington

2009In Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wash.App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶ 34 Reading RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) together, there is no statutory authority for the trial court's decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶ 35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW

2009In Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wn.

2007Shepard, 95 Wash.App. at 242 , 974 P.2d 1275 . ¶ 19 The defendants provided no competent evidence of a prima facie defense to damages.

2007Shepard, 95 Wn.

2025In Brush, the contested instruction was “‘the term ‘prolonged period of time’ means more than a few weeks.’” 183 Wn.2d at 557 .

2025App. 145, 152 , 936 P.2d 1141 (1997) (holding that, to prevent “an inequitable result,” the contested claim was “constructively accepted” when the claimant attempted to file it by presenting it to a city clerk, despite his failure to use the city’s preprinted form).

2024Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 313 , 440 P.3d 978 (2019) (dismissing a personal restraint petition for lack of error and prejudice for a juvenile who was sentenced at the top end of the standard range at a contested hearing). 3 With these considerations in mind, we turn to the issue before us. 3 We also rejected the argument that trial courts must presume exceptional sentences below the standard range are required for juvenile defendants unless the State proves otherwise.

2024Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 313 , 440 P.3d 978 (2019) (dismissing a personal restraint petition for lack of error and prejudice for a juvenile who was sentenced at the top end of the standard range at a contested hearing). 3 With these considerations in mind, we turn to the issue before us. 3 We also rejected the argument that trial courts must presume exceptional sentences below the standard range are required for juvenile defendants unless the State proves otherwise.

2024Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328 , 332, 336, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (holding young adult defendant could argue mitigating evidence of youth under the SRA after receiving the State-requested maximum standard range sentence); In re Pers.

2024State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 482-83 , 474 P.3d 539 (2020). 11 No. 102311-1 1.

2024State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 482-83 , 474 P.3d 539 (2020). 11 No. 102311-1 1.

2024Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 260-62 , 474 P.3d 524 (2020) (same); In re Pers.

2024Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 260-62 , 474 P.3d 524 (2020) (same); In re Pers.

2021In arguing that a contested hearing is required before appointing a GAL, Mr. Critchlow’s motions relied on In re Marriage of Blakely, 111 Wn.

2018Ortiz- Abreqo, 187 Wn.2d at 407 .

2016For its analysis of causation, the city relies on Estate of Bordon v. Department of Corrections, 122 Wn.

2015Because Allstate fails in its burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the amount of fees and costs that it did, we affirm. 1 Chuong Van Pham v. Seattle City Light, 159 Wn.2d 527, 538 , 151 P.3d 976 (2007). 2 Clerk's Papers at 1940.

2015Because Allstate fails in its burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the amount of fees and costs that it did, we affirm. 1 Chuong Van Pham v. Seattle City Light, 159 Wn.2d 527, 538 , 151 P.3d 976 (2007). 2 Clerk's Papers at 1940.

2011App. 255 , 128 P.3d 1241 (2006), a case from Division One of this court, instructive.

2011If the animal’s owner challenges the DAD, PCC 6.07.015(E)(3) requires that the auditor review the case to determine if there is “sufficient evidence to support the declaration.” PCC 6.07.015(E)(3) does not expressly require the auditor to determine de novo whether the County has met any specific standard of proof at the contested hearing. 16 Similarly, the hearing examiner review under PCC 1.22.090(G) requires only that the hearing examiner evaluate the auditor’s determination to determine if it was “clearly erroneous”; it does not state what standard of proof the auditor was required to apply

2009In Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wash.App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶ 34 Reading RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) together, there is no statutory authority for the trial court's decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶ 35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW

2008This is not a legally cognizable argument and the damages match the severity of Rosander's loss. ¶ 34 In Little, our Supreme Court held that a trial court abuses its discretion if it sets aside a default judgment solely because the "defendant is surprised by the amount or ... the damages might have been less in a contested hearing." 160 Wash.2d at 704, 161 P.3d 345 .

2008Rather, "[w]here a party fails to provide evidence of a prima facie defense and fails to show that its failure to appear was occasioned by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, there is no equitable basis for vacating judgment." Little, 160 Wash.2d at 706 , 161 P.3d 345 .

1998Id. at 618 .

1994"It is a general rule that, where only moot questions or abstract propositions are involved, or where the substantial questions involved in the trial court no longer exist, the appeal, or writ of error, should be dismissed.” Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558 , 496 P.2d 512 (1972).

1994"It is a general rule that, where only moot questions or abstract propositions are involved, or where the substantial questions involved in the trial court no longer exist, the appeal, or writ of error, should be dismissed.” Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558 , 496 P.2d 512 (1972).

1976“This inference of intent is, of course, rebuttable; but, more important, it is not conclusive even if no attempt is made to rebut it.” State v. Odom, supra at 545 , quoting State v. Thomas, 58 Wn.2d 746, 748 , 364 P.2d 930 (1961). “[T]he fact that he was armed with a pistol and had no license to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence of his intention to commit said crime of violence.” (Italics ours.) State v. Rogers, supra at 555 , quoting the contested instruction.

1976“This inference of intent is, of course, rebuttable; but, more important, it is not conclusive even if no attempt is made to rebut it.” State v. Odom, supra at 545 , quoting State v. Thomas, 58 Wn.2d 746, 748 , 364 P.2d 930 (1961). “[T]he fact that he was armed with a pistol and had no license to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence of his intention to commit said crime of violence.” (Italics ours.) State v. Rogers, supra at 555 , quoting the contested instruction.

1975Ed. 2d 751 , 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975), the court again struck down a summary garnishment procedure which afforded neither a prior contested hearing nor an independent ex parte determination by a judge of a need for immediate attachment.

1975But then in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 , 42 L.Ed.2d 751 , 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975), the court again struck down a summary garnishment procedure which afforded neither a prior contested hearing nor an independent ex parte determination by a judge of a need for immediate attachment.

1973As such, he contends, the instruction contains essentially the same inappropriate language which the court found objectionable in State v. Ring, 52 Wn.2d 423, 325 P.2d 730 (1958). 2 While the contested instruction could have been more aptly worded, we do not find in it the objectionable implication that the juror may consent to a verdict by “surrendering his verdict to the majority.” State v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 666 , 335 P.2d 809 (1959).

1973As such, he contends, the instruction contains essentially the same inappropriate language which the court found objectionable in State v. Ring, 52 Wn.2d 423, 325 P.2d 730 (1958). 2 While the contested instruction could have been more aptly worded, we do not find in it the objectionable implication that the juror may consent to a verdict by “surrendering his verdict to the majority.” State v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 666 , 335 P.2d 809 (1959).

1973As such, he contends, the instruction contains essentially the same inappropriate language which the court found objectionable in State v. Ring, 52 Wn.2d 423, 325 P.2d 730 (1958). 2 While the contested instruction could have been more aptly worded, we do not find in it the objectionable implication that the juror may consent to a verdict by “surrendering his verdict to the majority.” State v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 666 , 335 P.2d 809 (1959).

1973As such, he contends, the instruction contains essentially the same inappropriate language which the court found objectionable in State v. Ring, 52 Wn.2d 423, 325 P.2d 730 (1958). 2 While the contested instruction could have been more aptly worded, we do not find in it the objectionable implication that the juror may consent to a verdict by “surrendering his verdict to the majority.” State v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 666 , 335 P.2d 809 (1959).