16 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.green2 sentences2020Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883 (quoted source omitted). ¶32 It is also striking that a portion of Carroll's Facebook activity was related to her main allegation against Miller at the contested hearing: domestic violence. 2020Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883 (quoted source omitted). ¶32 It is also striking that a portion of Carroll's Facebook activity was related to her main allegation against Miller at the contested hearing: domestic violence. | 2 | 2 |
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences1985We criticized the Two Rivers holding in Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 381 , 340 N.W.2d 722 (1983). 1985We criticized the Two Rivers holding in Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade v. DNR, 115 Wis. 2d 381 , 340 N.W.2d 722 (1983). | 1 | 3 |
In RE MARRIAGE OF RANDALL v. Randallgreen2 sentences2021Although we may search the record for reasons to 13 No. 2020AP332 sustain a circuit court’s discretionary decision, see Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7 , 235 Wis. 2d 1 , 612 N.W.2d 737 , in this case, there is nothing in the record to support the court’s application of a 22.5% tax discount to the parties’ retirement accounts. ¶31 In arguing to the contrary, Mark asserts that Shannen should be foreclosed from objecting to the 22.5% tax discount because the financial disclosure statement that she submitted at the contested hearing reflected the application of 20% tax discount to the parti 2021Although we may search the record for reasons to 13 No. 2020AP332 sustain a circuit court’s discretionary decision, see Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7 , 235 Wis. 2d 1 , 612 N.W.2d 737 , in this case, there is nothing in the record to support the court’s application of a 22.5% tax discount to the parties’ retirement accounts. ¶31 In arguing to the contrary, Mark asserts that Shannen should be foreclosed from objecting to the 22.5% tax discount because the financial disclosure statement that she submitted at the contested hearing reflected the application of 20% tax discount to the parti | 1 | 2 |
Meteor Timber, LLC v. Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appealsgreen1 sentence2023The ALJ defined secondary impacts as “[i]mpacts that are not the result of fill but result from how the land is used,” which closely matched testimony at the contested hearing that defined secondary impacts as “impacts which are closely linked or causally related to the activity but may occur over a longer period of time.” See also Meteor Timber, 400 Wis. 2d 451, ¶41 (secondary impacts identified in permit as those related to hydrology, presence of invasive species, and wildlife habitat); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“[T]echnical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pettitgreen1 sentence2023See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646 . 36 No. 2021AP1187 testified at the contested hearing that Kohler will use less than that amount based on “35 years of experience and talking to the superintendents of the Kohler golf courses.” According to Cohen, Kohler will apply “[l]ess than 3 pounds per 1,000 square feet over the managed turf.” ¶70 We disagree that the testimony of a witness—who does not work for Kohler—is an “express[] commit[ment]” on behalf of Kohler. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Countygreen1 sentence2023The ALJ defined secondary impacts as “[i]mpacts that are not the result of fill but result from how the land is used,” which closely matched testimony at the contested hearing that defined secondary impacts as “impacts which are closely linked or causally related to the activity but may occur over a longer period of time.” See also Meteor Timber, 400 Wis. 2d 451, ¶41 (secondary impacts identified in permit as those related to hydrology, presence of invasive species, and wildlife habitat); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“[T]echnical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical | 1 | 1 |
Bracegirdle v. State Department of Regulation & Licensing, Board of Nursing & Division of Enforcementgreen1 sentence2023See Bracegirdle v. DRL, 159 Wis. 2d 402, 411-12, 419-20 , 464 25 Kohler contends in its brief-in-chief that “[t]he ALJ expressly acknowledged that ‘[t]he permit could be amended’ … ‘either by stipulation or order.’” The ALJ’s statement, as cited by Kohler, is taken out of context. | 1 | 1 |
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2021We address and reject each of these arguments as follows. ¶24 Meteor Timber argues that the ALJ’s decision is entitled to “no deference.” However, consistent with the standard of review set forth above, our analysis does not rely on giving the ALJ’s decision deference, other than the deference we are bound to give his factual findings under the substantial evidence test. ¶25 Meteor Timber separately argues that the ALJ was obligated to give either of two levels of deference to the expertise and specialized knowledge of those Department witnesses who testified in support of the permit on which | 1 | 1 |
Omernick v. Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences1998See Omernick v. DNR, 100 Wis. 2d 234, 248 , 301 N.W.2d 437, 444 (1981) ("[P] arties to an administrative proceeding must raise known issues and objections and... all efforts should be directed toward developing a record that is as complete as possible in order to facilitate subsequent judicial review of the record under [ch. 227, Stats.]."). 1998See Omernick v. DNR, 100 Wis. 2d 234, 248 , 301 N.W.2d 437, 444 (1981) ("[P] arties to an administrative proceeding must raise known issues and objections and... all efforts should be directed toward developing a record that is as complete as possible in order to facilitate subsequent judicial review of the record under [ch. 227, Stats.]."). | 1 | 1 |
Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. State Department of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences1986See Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59 , 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63 , 375 N.W.2d 649 (1985). 1986See Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59 , 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63 , 375 N.W.2d 649 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Dremel v. State, Nursing Home Review Boardgreen2 sentences1984By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 We acknowledge that the last sentence of the passage cited from Dremel v. Nursing Home Review Board, 119 Wis. 2d 75, 82 , 349 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Ct. App. 1984), can be construed in a contrary manner. 1984By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 We acknowledge that the last sentence of the passage cited from Dremel v. Nursing Home Review Board, 119 Wis. 2d 75, 82 , 349 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Ct. App. 1984), can be construed in a contrary manner. | 1 | 1 |
Westring v. Jamesgreen2 sentences1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). 1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commissiongreen2 sentences1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). 1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
Daly v. Natural Resources Boardgreen2 sentences1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). 1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Teff v. Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp.
green
2 sentences2025Corp., 2003 WI App 115, ¶14 , 265 Wis. 2d 703 , 666 N.W.2d 38 (refusing to reverse a discretionary decision where “there [was] an implicit finding under the correct standard and … the facts provide[d] a reasonable basis for the court’s implicit determination”). ¶25 During her testimony at the contested hearing, the only reasons that Megan provided in support of her decision that Dawn’s visitation should occur in South Carolina, rather than Green Bay, were that Megan would not feel “comfortable” with the children being so far away from her and that she would like to be closer to the children in 2025Corp., 2003 WI App 115, ¶14 , 265 Wis. 2d 703 , 666 N.W.2d 38 (refusing to reverse a discretionary decision where “there [was] an implicit finding under the correct standard and … the facts provide[d] a reasonable basis for the court’s implicit determination”). ¶25 During her testimony at the contested hearing, the only reasons that Megan provided in support of her decision that Dawn’s visitation should occur in South Carolina, rather than Green Bay, were that Megan would not feel “comfortable” with the children being so far away from her and that she would like to be closer to the children in | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Michels v. Lyons (In Re Visitation of A. A. L.)
green
1 sentence2025Michels, 387 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37 . ¶22 Megan argues that the circuit court failed to apply the presumption that her visitation decision was in the children’s best interests and instead “applied its own assessment of what was in the best interests of the children.” She asserts that the court “made no findings or comment regarding” her “very clearly stated position” that Dawn’s visitation with the children should take place “where [the 9 No. 2024AP753 children] currently lived.” She further asserts that there was “no evidence” presented at the contested hearing that “conducting the visitation where t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lessor v. Wangelin
green
2 sentences2023Although Steven’s expert witness opined that Amity had the ability to earn between $27,040 and $35,360 per year, assuming a forty-hour work week, the circuit court found that witness’s testimony to be “incredibly biased and really not helpful.” “When the [circuit] court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony.” Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665 , 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1998). ¶11 Amity testified that at the time of the contested hearing, she was working part-time at Premium Retai 2023Although Steven’s expert witness opined that Amity had the ability to earn between $27,040 and $35,360 per year, assuming a forty-hour work week, the circuit court found that witness’s testimony to be “incredibly biased and really not helpful.” “When the [circuit] court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony.” Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665 , 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1998). ¶11 Amity testified that at the time of the contested hearing, she was working part-time at Premium Retai | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jamerson v. Department of Children & Families
green
1 sentence2013Jamerson, 345 Wis. 2d 205, ¶ 77 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Interest of Md (S)
green
2 sentences1998Later, Victoria, now represented by counsel, also filed a motion entitled "Notice of Motion and Motion to Deny Placement and Grant Name Change." The record also reflects that, apparently in anticipation of a contested hearing pursuant to §§ 767.325 and 767.24, Stats., on April 17, 1996, the trial court appointed counsel for the respondent, citing A.S. v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995 , 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992), as authority. 5 On June 7, 1996, following a multi-day *110 hearing, the trial court gave an oral decision from the bench, later reduced to writing, in which it denied Mark any periods of physical 1998Later, Victoria, now represented by counsel, also filed a motion entitled "Notice of Motion and Motion to Deny Placement and Grant Name Change." The record also reflects that, apparently in anticipation of a contested hearing pursuant to §§ 767.325 and 767.24, Stats., on April 17, 1996, the trial court appointed counsel for the respondent, citing A.S. v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995 , 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992), as authority. 5 On June 7, 1996, following a multi-day *110 hearing, the trial court gave an oral decision from the bench, later reduced to writing, in which it denied Mark any periods of physical | 1 | 1998–1998 |
First National Bank of Columbus v. Hansen
green
2 sentences1995Hansen, 84 Wis. 2d at 427-28 , 267 N.W.2d at 370 . 1995Hansen, 84 Wis. 2d at 427-28 , 267 N.W.2d at 370 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
green
2 sentences1986See Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59 , 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63 , 375 N.W.2d 649 (1985). 1986See Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59 , 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986); Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63 , 375 N.W.2d 649 (1985). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
green
2 sentences1985Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 122 Wis. 2d 330 , 362 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1984). 1985Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. DNR, 122 Wis. 2d 330 , 362 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1984). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Town of Two Rivers v. State
green
2 sentences1984When the DNR denied the District’s request for a contested hearing, it relied on this court’s interpretation of sec. 227.064(1), Stats., in Town of Two Rivers v. DNR, 105 Wis. 2d 721, 729 , 315 N.W.2d 377 , 381 (Ct. App. 1981). 1984When the DNR denied the District’s request for a contested hearing, it relied on this court’s interpretation of sec. 227.064(1), Stats., in Town of Two Rivers v. DNR, 105 Wis. 2d 721, 729 , 315 N.W.2d 377 , 381 (Ct. App. 1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Pollard v. United States
green
1 sentence1981Our understanding of this statute is buttressed by the holdings of the supreme court in three cases: Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 472-73 , 238 N.W.2d 695, 700-01 (1976); Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216-17 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843-44 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974), and Town of Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 127 , 115 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1962). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.