7 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hart by and through Hart v. State ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Divisiongreen1 sentence2023Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2018 WY 105 , ¶ 18, 442 P.3d 653, 659 (Wyo. 2018) (“Because the administrative body ‘is the trier of fact and has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses,’ we will defer to the Medical Commission’s findings of fact unless they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record.” (citation omitted)). [¶21] Dr. Martinson was deposed prior to the contested hearing and opined that even considering the physical therapy Mr. Bressler received after the Division entered its denials of benefits, physical therapy had | 1 | 1 |
Sparks v. McCluskeygreen2 sentences1988See Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283 , 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449 , 534 P.2d 854 (1975); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 (1984); and Ernest W. 1988See Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283 , 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449 , 534 P.2d 854 (1975); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 (1984); and Ernest W. | 1 | 1 |
McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualificationsgreen2 sentences1977No fundamental unfairness or constitutional infirmity is inherent in such a combination of investigative and adjudicative functions." McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal.3d 512 , 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 267 , 526 P.2d 268, 275, n. 7 (1974). 1977No fundamental unfairness or constitutional infirmity is inherent in such a combination of investigative and adjudicative functions." McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal.3d 512 , 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 267 , 526 P.2d 268, 275, n. 7 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Pickens
green
2 sentences2010Pickens, ¶¶ 13-14, 134 P.3d at 1236 . 2010Pickens, ¶¶ 13-14, 134 P.3d at 1236 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Bowles v. Sunrise Home Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Bowles, 847 P.2d at 1004 . 1995Bowles, 847 P.2d at 1004 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Smith v. Fmc Corporation
green
2 sentences1989The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d 873 (10th Cir.1985) considered a safety device to protect a crane from "two-blocking." Reversal of a defendant's verdict came by decision of the appellate court on the improper inclusion of an assumption of risk instruction and in regard to a contested instruction on defective product liability where the appellate court directed that "the district court may wish to review this instruction upon remand, inasmuch as a manufacturer has a responsibility to warn of a defective product at any time after it is manufactured and sold if 1989The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d 873 (10th Cir.1985) considered a safety device to protect a crane from "two-blocking." Reversal of a defendant's verdict came by decision of the appellate court on the improper inclusion of an assumption of risk instruction and in regard to a contested instruction on defective product liability where the appellate court directed that "the district court may wish to review this instruction upon remand, inasmuch as a manufacturer has a responsibility to warn of a defective product at any time after it is manufactured and sold if | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Larson v. State
green
2 sentences1988See Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283 , 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449 , 534 P.2d 854 (1975); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 (1984); and Ernest W. 1988See Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283 , 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449 , 534 P.2d 854 (1975); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 (1984); and Ernest W. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County
green
2 sentences1988See Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283 , 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449 , 534 P.2d 854 (1975); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 (1984); and Ernest W. 1988See Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283 , 327 P.2d 295 (1958); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449 , 534 P.2d 854 (1975); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 (1984); and Ernest W. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Hudson
green
2 sentences1988Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. v. Hudson, supra, 370 P.2d 364 , and Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming Tax Commission, Chapter XXII, § 4(a) (1986). 1988Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. v. Hudson, supra, 370 P.2d 364 , and Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming Tax Commission, Chapter XXII, § 4(a) (1986). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Teton Valley Ranch v. State Board of Equalization
green
1 sentence1988However, that requirement would not impose on the system an unmanageable burden as would result from the application of the differentiated market factor for which appellant contends." Teton Valley Ranch v. State Board of Equalization, supra, 735 P.2d at 115-116 , Urbigkit, J., concurring. [13] Except for residential properties, which continue to utilize a 1967 fair-market-value attribution with a 25 percent assessment ratio valuation, the present process as defined by the contested rule requires a fair-market value as defined by precedents of this court as a current market value in J. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Grinnell Corp.
green
2 sentences1977More recently and in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 , 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710 , 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966), it was said: “The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. * * * ” Withrow concluded on this point: “We are of the view, therefore, that the District Court was in error when it entered the restraining order against the Board’s contested hearing and when it granted the preliminary injunction based on the untenabl 1977More recently and in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 , 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710 , 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966), it was said: “The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. * * * ” Withrow concluded on this point: “We are of the view, therefore, that the District Court was in error when it entered the restraining order against the Board’s contested hearing and when it granted the preliminary injunction based on the untenabl | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Withrow v. Larkin
green
2 sentences1977More recently and in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 , 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710 , 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966), it was said: “The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. * * * ” Withrow concluded on this point: “We are of the view, therefore, that the District Court was in error when it entered the restraining order against the Board’s contested hearing and when it granted the preliminary injunction based on the untenabl 1977More recently and in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 , 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710 , 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966), it was said: “The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. * * * ” Withrow concluded on this point: “We are of the view, therefore, that the District Court was in error when it entered the restraining order against the Board’s contested hearing and when it granted the preliminary injunction based on the untenabl | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.