contested hearing in Maine

2018Holding a party seeking de facto parenthood status to the burden of persuasion, regardless of the setting where the court determines standing, best achieves the desired balance between the "parents' fundamental rights [and] the legitimate interests of third parties ... asserting their status as de facto parents." Eaton , 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 590 . [¶ 24] Third and finally, there is no principled reason why a standing determination should be subject to one standard of proof if the court makes that determination based on the pleadings and affidavits, and a greater standard of proof if the e

2018Holding a party seeking de facto parenthood status to the burden of persuasion, regardless of the setting where the court determines standing, best achieves the desired balance between the "parents' fundamental rights [and] the legitimate interests of third parties ... asserting their status as de facto parents." Eaton , 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 590 . [¶ 24] Third and finally, there is no principled reason why a standing determination should be subject to one standard of proof if the court makes that determination based on the pleadings and affidavits, and a greater standard of proof if the e

2018See, e.g. , Curtis v. Medeiros , 2016 ME 180 , ¶ 18, 152 A.3d 605 ; Eaton v. Paradis , 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 590 ( quoting *844 Philbrook , 2008 ME 152 , 957 A.2d 74 ); Pitts , 2014 ME 59 , ¶ 35, 90 A.3d 1169 ; Philbrook , 2008 ME 152 , ¶¶ 17, 19-22, 957 A.2d 74 .

2018See, e.g. , Curtis v. Medeiros , 2016 ME 180 , ¶ 18, 152 A.3d 605 ; Eaton v. Paradis , 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 590 ( quoting *844 Philbrook , 2008 ME 152 , 957 A.2d 74 ); Pitts , 2014 ME 59 , ¶ 35, 90 A.3d 1169 ; Philbrook , 2008 ME 152 , ¶¶ 17, 19-22, 957 A.2d 74 .

2019See In re Child of Nicholas G. , 2019 ME 13 , ¶ 16, 200 A.3d 783 ("An indigent parent has a due process right ... to appointed counsel in a child protection proceeding."); In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 38, 126 A.3d 718 (setting out the process by which a parent may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights).

2019See In re Child of Nicholas G. , 2019 ME 13 , ¶ 16, 200 A.3d 783 ("An indigent parent has a due process right ... to appointed counsel in a child protection proceeding."); In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 38, 126 A.3d 718 (setting out the process by which a parent may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights).

2019See In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶ 7 , 772 A.2d 858 ; In re Morris D., 2000 ME 122, ¶ 6 , 754 A.2d 993 .

2019See In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶ 7 , 772 A.2d 858 ; In re Morris D., 2000 ME 122, ¶ 6 , 754 A.2d 993 .

2019See In re Paige L., 2017 ME 97, ¶ 30 , 162 A.3d 217 (“Title 22 allows a court to admit child hearsay evidence in a jeopardy hearing . . . .”); In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶¶ 7-8 , 772 A.2d 858 (“Section 4007 . . . abrogates the hearsay rule as it applies to out-of-court statements made by children . . . [and] provides for the admissibility of a child’s statement made outside of the court without the necessity of forcing the child to testify in the stressful environment of a contested hearing.”). [¶6] Contrary to the parents’ assertions, although we recognize their “fundamental liberty interest

2019See In re Paige L., 2017 ME 97, ¶ 30 , 162 A.3d 217 (“Title 22 allows a court to admit child hearsay evidence in a jeopardy hearing . . . .”); In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶¶ 7-8 , 772 A.2d 858 (“Section 4007 . . . abrogates the hearsay rule as it applies to out-of-court statements made by children . . . [and] provides for the admissibility of a child’s statement made outside of the court without the necessity of forcing the child to testify in the stressful environment of a contested hearing.”). [¶6] Contrary to the parents’ assertions, although we recognize their “fundamental liberty interest

2019See In re Paige L., 2017 ME 97, ¶ 30 , 162 A.3d 217 (“Title 22 allows a court to admit child hearsay evidence in a jeopardy hearing . . . .”); In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶¶ 7-8 , 772 A.2d 858 (“Section 4007 . . . abrogates the hearsay rule as it applies to out-of-court statements made by children . . . [and] provides for the admissibility of a child’s statement made outside of the court without the necessity of forcing the child to testify in the stressful environment of a contested hearing.”). [¶6] Contrary to the parents’ assertions, although we recognize their “fundamental liberty interest

2019See In re Paige L., 2017 ME 97, ¶ 30 , 162 A.3d 217 (“Title 22 allows a court to admit child hearsay evidence in a jeopardy hearing . . . .”); In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶¶ 7-8 , 772 A.2d 858 (“Section 4007 . . . abrogates the hearsay rule as it applies to out-of-court statements made by children . . . [and] provides for the admissibility of a child’s statement made outside of the court without the necessity of forcing the child to testify in the stressful environment of a contested hearing.”). [¶6] Contrary to the parents’ assertions, although we recognize their “fundamental liberty interest

2017We have also held that a Rule 59 motion in particular is to be considered only by the same judge, who.-issued the judgment, unless there are “extraordinary circumstances” such as-the original judge’s “death, resignation, sickness or other disability.” In re C.P., 2016 ME 18, ¶¶ 25-27 , 132 A.3d 174 . [¶ 14] Therefore, the way Kline framed his requests for relief demonstrates that the motion was directed to the magistrate.

2017We have also held that a Rule 59 motion in particular is to be considered only by the same judge, who.-issued the judgment, unless there are “extraordinary circumstances” such as-the original judge’s “death, resignation, sickness or other disability.” In re C.P., 2016 ME 18, ¶¶ 25-27 , 132 A.3d 174 . [¶ 14] Therefore, the way Kline framed his requests for relief demonstrates that the motion was directed to the magistrate.

2017Rather, clarification of factual findings can be properly, accomplished only by the judicial officer who issued the findings in the first place. 3 See, e.g., Childs v. Ballou, 2016 ME 142, ¶ 4 , 148 A.3d 291 (noting that the same judge who had presided over a contested hearing and issued the judgment acted on. a Rule 59(e) motion by making additional factual findings).

2017Rather, clarification of factual findings can be properly, accomplished only by the judicial officer who issued the findings in the first place. 3 See, e.g., Childs v. Ballou, 2016 ME 142, ¶ 4 , 148 A.3d 291 (noting that the same judge who had presided over a contested hearing and issued the judgment acted on. a Rule 59(e) motion by making additional factual findings).

2013P.A. v. Gorman, 2008 ME 36, ¶ 12 , 942 A.2d 707 . [¶ 18] The mother points to no evidence that her consent was fraudulently secured other than her solitary statement to the court concerning the “deal.” When the court asked about her motivation, however, the mother stated that she was consenting to the termination not only because of the “deal” but also because she did not believe she would prevail at the contested hearing in light of her “parenting issues” and her negative CANEP results.

2013P.A. v. Gorman, 2008 ME 36, ¶ 12 , 942 A.2d 707 . [¶ 18] The mother points to no evidence that her consent was fraudulently secured other than her solitary statement to the court concerning the “deal.” When the court asked about her motivation, however, the mother stated that she was consenting to the termination not only because of the “deal” but also because she did not believe she would prevail at the contested hearing in light of her “parenting issues” and her negative CANEP results.

1995In holding that it was within the trial court’s discretion to give an unrequested instruction on a factually available defense, we stated that the contested instruction was “not only proper, but necessary.” Giglio, 441 A.2d at 311 .

1995In holding that it was within the trial court's discretion to give an unrequested instruction on a factually available defense, we stated that the contested instruction was "not only proper, but necessary." Giglio, 441 A.2d at 311 .

1990Herrick v. Theberge, 474 A.2d 870 , 876 & n. 2 (Me.1984); Terry v. T.J.C.