8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. McMinn Countygreen2 sentences2014It is well-settled that the use of the word “may” in a statute generally connotes “discretion or permission and will not be treated as a word of command.” Steppach v. Thomas, 346 S.W.3d 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Williams v. McMinn County, 209 Tenn. 236 , 352 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tenn. 1961)); see also Bd. of County Commr’s of Shelby County v. Taylor, No. 93-1490-I, 1994 WL 420922 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1994) (holding that “a provision couched in permissive terms is generally regarded as directory or discretionary” and “[t]his is true of the word ‘may’”). 2014It is well-settled that the use of the word “may” in a statute generally connotes “discretion or permission and will not be treated as a word of command.” Steppach v. Thomas, 346 S.W.3d 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Williams v. McMinn County, 209 Tenn. 236 , 352 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tenn. 1961)); see also Bd. of County Commr’s of Shelby County v. Taylor, No. 93-1490-I, 1994 WL 420922 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1994) (holding that “a provision couched in permissive terms is generally regarded as directory or discretionary” and “[t]his is true of the word ‘may’”). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Sizemoregreen1 sentence2011See Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“Unless the person challenging a board member for bias comes forward with evidence of bias of this sort, the courts will presume that the challenged board member, like other public officials, will perform his or her duty in good faith and in the manner prescribed by law.”); cf. Ogrodowczyk v. Tennessee Bd. for Licensing Health Care Facilities, 886 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (Cantrell, J., concurring) (finding the fact that the Board relied on expert witnesses who were competitors of the sanctioned individual was not s | 1 | 1 |
Ogrodowczyk v. Tennessee Board for Licensing Health Care Facilitiesgreen1 sentence2011See Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“Unless the person challenging a board member for bias comes forward with evidence of bias of this sort, the courts will presume that the challenged board member, like other public officials, will perform his or her duty in good faith and in the manner prescribed by law.”); cf. Ogrodowczyk v. Tennessee Bd. for Licensing Health Care Facilities, 886 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (Cantrell, J., concurring) (finding the fact that the Board relied on expert witnesses who were competitors of the sanctioned individual was not s | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Raygreen1 sentence2010Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (citing Stubblefield, 106 S.W.2d at 560 )(requiring a “clear preponderance of convincing proof”); see also In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d at 548 (requiring a clear showing); Hall v. Bookout, 87 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. -4- 2002); In re J.C.S., No. M2007-02049-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2924982 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); and In Re R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352 at *6. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Bookoutgreen1 sentence2010Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (citing Stubblefield, 106 S.W.2d at 560 )(requiring a “clear preponderance of convincing proof”); see also In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d at 548 (requiring a clear showing); Hall v. Bookout, 87 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. -4- 2002); In re J.C.S., No. M2007-02049-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2924982 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); and In Re R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352 at *6. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of Female Childgreen1 sentence2010Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (citing Stubblefield, 106 S.W.2d at 560 )(requiring a “clear preponderance of convincing proof”); see also In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d at 548 (requiring a clear showing); Hall v. Bookout, 87 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. -4- 2002); In re J.C.S., No. M2007-02049-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2924982 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); and In Re R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352 at *6. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Banks
green
1 sentence2021Simply put, there is nothing inflammatory or disquieting about the not contested these factors and has instead focused his argument on the balance between probative value and the danger of unfair prejudice. 26 Unfair prejudice has been defined as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d 179 , 188 (Tenn. 2019) (citing State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947 , 950–51 (Tenn. 1978)). - 31 - photographs. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wayne County v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board
green
1 sentence2020As noted above, in reviewing an administrative decision, this Court does “not review the fact issues de novo and, therefore, do[es] not substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence, even when the evidence could support a different result.” Wayne County, 756 S.W.2d at 279 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Patterson v. Hunt
green
1 sentence2014Patterson, 682 S.W.2d at 516–17.7 Consent Order The Real Estate Commission next argues that the Chancery Court erred in finding that the Real Estate Commission acted improperly, and with evident partiality, in considering a consent order that Ms. Bobo refused to agree to prior to the contested hearing. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Steppach v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2014It is well-settled that the use of the word “may” in a statute generally connotes “discretion or permission and will not be treated as a word of command.” Steppach v. Thomas, 346 S.W.3d 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Williams v. McMinn County, 209 Tenn. 236 , 352 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tenn. 1961)); see also Bd. of County Commr’s of Shelby County v. Taylor, No. 93-1490-I, 1994 WL 420922 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1994) (holding that “a provision couched in permissive terms is generally regarded as directory or discretionary” and “[t]his is true of the word ‘may’”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Henry v. Goins
green
2 sentences2011Where the party’s failure to act results in a summary entry of judgment or a summary dismissal without a contested hearing on the merits, it is appropriate to analyze the party’s motion to set aside the judgment under the standard of cases that deal with whether to set aside a default judgment.2 Id. at 481 . 2011Id. at 481 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bennett v. Stutts
green
1 sentence2010To reiterate, it is the “settled law in this state that private citizens, as such, cannot maintain an action complaining of the wrongful acts of public officials unless such private citizens aver special interest or a special injury not common to the public generally.” Bennett, 521 S.W.2d at 576 (citing Patton v. City of Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414 (Tenn. 1901); Skelton v. Barnett, 227 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1950); Badgett v. Broome, 409 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1966)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Skelton v. Barnett
green
1 sentence2010To reiterate, it is the “settled law in this state that private citizens, as such, cannot maintain an action complaining of the wrongful acts of public officials unless such private citizens aver special interest or a special injury not common to the public generally.” Bennett, 521 S.W.2d at 576 (citing Patton v. City of Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414 (Tenn. 1901); Skelton v. Barnett, 227 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1950); Badgett v. Broome, 409 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1966)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Badgett v. Broome
green
1 sentence2010To reiterate, it is the “settled law in this state that private citizens, as such, cannot maintain an action complaining of the wrongful acts of public officials unless such private citizens aver special interest or a special injury not common to the public generally.” Bennett, 521 S.W.2d at 576 (citing Patton v. City of Chattanooga, 65 S.W. 414 (Tenn. 1901); Skelton v. Barnett, 227 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1950); Badgett v. Broome, 409 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1966)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Stubblefield v. State Ex Rel. Fjelstad
green
1 sentence2010Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (citing Stubblefield, 106 S.W.2d at 560 )(requiring a “clear preponderance of convincing proof”); see also In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d at 548 (requiring a clear showing); Hall v. Bookout, 87 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. -4- 2002); In re J.C.S., No. M2007-02049-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2924982 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); and In Re R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352 at *6. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Withrow v. Larkin
green
2 sentences2001Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 39-41 , 95 S.Ct. at 1460-61 . 4 . 2001Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 39-41 , 95 S.Ct. at 1460-61 . 4 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.