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7 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wood v. Woodgreen2 sentences2019See Wood v. Wood, 96 Idaho 100, 101 , 524 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1974) (“The function of [a temporary restraining] order is to preserve the status quo during the interim and until a hearing can be held after notice to the adverse party on the application for a preliminary injunction.”). 1. 2019See Wood v. Wood, 96 Idaho 100, 101 , 524 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1974) (“The function of [a temporary restraining] order is to preserve the status quo during the interim and until a hearing can be held after notice to the adverse party on the application for a preliminary injunction.”). 1. | 2 | 2 |
Stempel v. Department of Water Resourcesgreen2 sentences1981In the only other case to address the exact question before this Court, Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 109 , 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973), the court held: "The appellant-department contends that SEPA [State Environmental Policy Act] and WRA [Water Resources Act] may not be applied in this case because the application for the water use permit, its issuance, the contested hearing, and the superior court review all occurred prior to August 9, 1971, the effective date of the acts. 1981In the only other case to address the exact question before this Court, Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 109 , 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973), the court held: "The appellant-department contends that SEPA [State Environmental Policy Act] and WRA [Water Resources Act] may not be applied in this case because the application for the water use permit, its issuance, the contested hearing, and the superior court review all occurred prior to August 9, 1971, the effective date of the acts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Harris
green
1 sentence2023Pendleton responded that “the court should not create a rigid set of 5 requirements to evaluate a K9,” but that case law indicated certain records could be relevant in challenging a drug dog’s reliability, including field records, the handler’s log, training records, score sheets, certification records, and training standards and manuals pertaining to the dog in accordance with Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 , 244–47 (2013), and United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Jonathan Thomas
green
1 sentence2023Pendleton responded that “the court should not create a rigid set of 5 requirements to evaluate a K9,” but that case law indicated certain records could be relevant in challenging a drug dog’s reliability, including field records, the handler’s log, training records, score sheets, certification records, and training standards and manuals pertaining to the dog in accordance with Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 , 244–47 (2013), and United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Second, Izaguirre cites to Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715 , 992 P.2d 164 (1999), asserting that the holding therein does not prohibit a claimant from seeking protection of certain elements of a third-party recovery from a subrogation claim by a surety when the allocation is determined at a contested hearing. 2013Second, Izaguirre cites to Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715 , 992 P.2d 164 (1999), asserting that the holding therein does not prohibit a claimant from seeking protection of certain elements of a third-party recovery from a subrogation claim by a surety when the allocation is determined at a contested hearing. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Edmonson
green
2 sentences1994Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence. [5] The contested instruction states that: When as in this case, it is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about a certain date," if the jury finds that the crime was committed, it is not necessary that the proof show that it was committed on that certain date; it is sufficient if the proof shows that the crime was committed on or about that date 1994Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence. [5] The contested instruction states that: When as in this case, it is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about a certain date," if the jury finds that the crime was committed, it is not necessary that the proof show that it was committed on that certain date; it is sufficient if the proof shows that the crime was committed on or about that date | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Odziemek v. Wesely
green
2 sentences1982It is reasonably clear that appellant made no item objection as contemplated by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6), and that the argument made before the trial court was either a "prevailing party" argument, Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582 , 634 P.2d 623 (1981), or an objection as to timeliness. 1982It is reasonably clear that appellant made no item objection as contemplated by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6), and that the argument made before the trial court was either a "prevailing party" argument, Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582 , 634 P.2d 623 (1981), or an objection as to timeliness. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.