contested hearing in California

2024(See In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124 [offer of proof may not merely identify issue to be addressed] (Tamika T.).) When asked for further clarification as to the offer of proof and what mother anticipated providing to the court, mother’s counsel stated mother had “further information about visits outside of the [Review of Permanent Plan] report filed in August [2022]” and other visits that happened since August 2022 “the court is not aware of.” Mother’s offer of proof did not identify, with any precision, the specific evidence she would present at a contested hearing.

2023Due process is ‘a flexible concept dependent on the circumstance.’ (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 .) Since due process does not authorize a parent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.’ (Ibid.) ‘The trial court can therefore exercise its power to request an offer of proof to clearly identify the contested issue(s) so it can determine whether a parent’s representation is sufficient to warrant a hearing involvin

2023The relevant case law Mother relies on Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 605 and A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 973 as support for her position the 34 juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her a contested hearing on the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights.

2021(In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 .) The juvenile court may require a parent to make an offer of proof as to what evidence would be adduced at a contested hearing and why that evidence is “relevant . . . on the issue [the parent] seeks to contest.” (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 ; In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050 ,1052–1053; In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 612 .) A contested hearing is not necessary if the proffered evidence will have no effect on that issue.

2023(Id. at p. 1121; see In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 .) The parent’s offer of proof “must be adequate in scope and must be specific.” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973 , 982 (A.G.).) A legally sufficient offer of proof must set forth “‘the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.’” (Ibid.) Due process “does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant 31 evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.” (In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053 .) A juvenile

2023Due process is ‘a flexible concept dependent on the circumstance.’ (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 .) Since due process does not authorize a parent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.’ (Ibid.) ‘The trial court can therefore exercise its power to request an offer of proof to clearly identify the contested issue(s) so it can determine whether a parent’s representation is sufficient to warrant a hearing involvin

2023(Id. at p. 1121; see In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 .) The parent’s offer of proof “must be adequate in scope and must be specific.” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973 , 982 (A.G.).) A legally sufficient offer of proof must set forth “‘the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.’” (Ibid.) Due process “does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant 31 evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.” (In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053 .) A juvenile

2021(In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 .) The juvenile court may require a parent to make an offer of proof as to what evidence would be adduced at a contested hearing and why that evidence is “relevant . . . on the issue [the parent] seeks to contest.” (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 ; In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050 ,1052–1053; In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 612 .) A contested hearing is not necessary if the proffered evidence will have no effect on that issue.

2022(See, e.g., In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116 [failure to give proper notice to a parent facing termination of her parental rights]; Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 558 [failure to timely serve report recommending termination of reunification services in advance of a dependency hearing]; In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403 , 417–418 [improper denial of a parent’s request for a contested hearing in a dependency proceeding]; In re Kelly D. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 433, 440 [failure to provide notice and a contested hearing on the issue of 10 In re CHR

2014(Kelly D., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 435 ; J.F., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 .) In both cases, the court recognized that long-term foster care “is not necessarily a stable placement.” (J.F., at p. 334; see Kelly D., at p. 438.) In both cases, the statute in issue expressly invites the parent to participate in the review process and seek to demonstrate if possible that additional efforts at reunification will promote the minor’s best interests. (§ 366.3, subd. (f).) In these circumstances, a review hearing under section *1439 366.3 bears many similarities to a review hearing during the r

2021(In re Vincent S. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1093 ; see Andrea L. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1387 [refusal to reverse for a contested hearing because it was an idle act and no prejudice arose from error].) DISPOSITION The orders terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights are affirmed.

2015(In re Clifton V., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406; see Andrea L. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1387 [“remand for a contested hearing would constitute an idle act and the juvenile court’s error must be seen as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”].) The court stated it could only be swayed by evidence directly attacking the drug patch test itself, not mother’s self-serving statements about her conduct.

2022Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. visitation frequency “resulted in a miscarriage of justice” requiring reversal of the order, with no discussion of prejudice]; In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 268 [conditioning a contested hearing on an offer of proof was a “miscarriage of justice”].) Moreover, we took care to note that there was no indication the father in James F. was “ ‘stripped . . . of his right to participate’ ”: “Nothing suggests that [the father] was unable to express his wishes to the court, either directly or through his appointed guardian, that he lacked actual notice of the

2020In general, a “juvenile court cannot require a party to a review hearing to tender an offer of proof as a condition to obtaining a contested hearing.” (In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 266 [emphasis added].) However, “the juvenile court may make evidentiary requests of a party on any of a number of issues during the contested hearing itself.” (Ibid.) Here, the court did not require an offer of proof as a condition to obtaining a contested hearing.

2026Proc., § 373.) “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. [Citations.] The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case. [Citations.] The effect of the guardian ad litem’s appointment is to transfer direction and control of the litigation from the parent to the guardian ad litem, who may waive the parent’s right to a contested hearing.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910 .) “[W]hen the trial court already has k

2025Proc., § 372; [citation].) The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case. [Citations.] The effect of the guardian ad litem’s appointment is to transfer direction and control of the litigation from the parent to the guardian ad litem, who may waive the parent’s right to a contested hearing.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910 (James F.).) Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency case, the juvenile court must hold a hearing at which the court or counsel “shou

2018In Dolly D. , the court concluded that it was a violation of due process rights and California Rules of Court, rule 1449(b) and 1450 to deny a parent the opportunity to cross-examine the social worker who prepared the jurisdictional report. ( In re Dolly D. , supra , 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-445, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) In Ingrid E. , the court noted that due process in dependency proceedings is a flexible concept, the application of which depends on the circumstances and the balancing of various factors. ( Ingrid E. , at p. 757, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 .) There, the court denied the parent's reques

2018In Dolly D. , the court concluded that it was a violation of due process rights and California Rules of Court, rule 1449(b) and 1450 to deny a parent the opportunity to cross-examine the social worker who prepared the jurisdictional report. ( In re Dolly D. , supra , 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-445, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) In Ingrid E. , the court noted that due process in dependency proceedings is a flexible concept, the application of which depends on the circumstances and the balancing of various factors. ( Ingrid E. , at p. 757, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 .) There, the court denied the parent's reques

2022As explained by one court, a “factor bearing on the right to a contested hearing is the stage of the dependency proceeding, which is closely tied to the issue of which party has the burden of proof. ‘Different levels of due process protection apply at different stages of dependency proceedings. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In the initial phases of a dependency proceeding, family preservation is the primary focus and the ‘ “parent’s interest in reunification is given precedence over the child’s need for stability and permanency.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘However, “[o]nce reunification services ar

2015(See David B., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 780 [“A contested hearing is the minimal procedural safeguard available, one which is not onerous or unwarranted”]; see also In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 733 [a parent has an unfettered due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at contested hearings held before the permanent planning stage].) But father’s argument that he was deprived of this opportunity or that he was not given adequate notice is unpersuasive because the record does not support it.

2025Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 253-254 [exercising jurisdiction over an appeal taken from an order entered after a contested hearing on custody]; see also Critzer v. 6 DISCUSSION A.S. raises two principal arguments on appeal.

2024(Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1377–1378, discussing Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249 , 253–254 and LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1072 .) Similarly, a move-away order cannot be issued on a temporary basis or in the absence of a contested hearing (Andrew V. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 103, 107 ), and may be considered by direct appeal (see In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1466 (Edlund & Hales) [appeal from order granting move-away request]; see also F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, 14 [appeal from order denying move-away request

2022(In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 733 .) And, she had the right to make an offer of proof and request a contested hearing on the issues whether P.K.’s relationship with her called for application of the parent-child exception to termination of parental rights, but she did not do so.

2015(See David B., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 780 [“A contested hearing is the minimal procedural safeguard available, one which is not onerous or unwarranted”]; see also In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 733 [a parent has an unfettered due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at contested hearings held before the permanent planning stage].) But father’s argument that he was deprived of this opportunity or that he was not given adequate notice is unpersuasive because the record does not support it.

2013(In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276, 283-284 (Usef S.); In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (Luis B.).) However, the juvenile court is not required to conduct a suitability hearing if the prosecutor determines the minor is eligible for DEJ, and the minor receives the requisite notice of his or her eligibility, but he or she nevertheless denies the allegations of the petition and requests a contested hearing.

2013(In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 976-980 (Kenneth J.); Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 281-283.) In such circumstances, the minor’s denial of the allegations and insistence on a contested hearing 17. are “tantamount to a rejection of DEJ.” (Kenneth J., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 ; Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 286, fn. 3 .) B.

2024(People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1171 (Lavi).) Subdivision (a)(2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule: (1) the all-purpose assignment rule; (2) the 10-day/5-day rule; and (3) the master calendar rule.

2024(People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1171 (Lavi).) Subdivision (a)(2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule: (1) the all-purpose assignment rule; (2) the 10-day/5-day rule; and (3) the master calendar rule.

2022(Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 23, fn. 17 ; In re Brian P., supra, at p. 623.) Parents therefore are not precluded from raising for the first time on appeal their challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding the Children are adoptable. “[W]hile a parent may waive the objection that an adoption assessment does not comply with the requirements provided in section 366.21, subdivision (i), a claim that there was insufficient evidence of the child ’s adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in the ju

2021Nevertheless, “while a parent may waive the objection that an adoption assessment does not comply with the requirements provided in section 366.21, subdivision (i), a claim that there was insufficient evidence of the child’s adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in the juvenile court.” (In re Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 623 ; accord In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 395 , 399- 400.) Mother claims the juvenile court’s adoptability finding was not supported by substantial evidence because the evidence demonstrated otherwise.

2024In Howitt v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1575 (Howitt) our court addressed “the foundational question . . . whether a county counsel’s office ‘is ever permitted to place [it]self in [the] position’ of acting as an advocate for one party in a contested hearing while at the same time serving as the legal adviser for the decision maker.” (Id. at p. 1579.) In Howitt, the decision maker was a quasi-independent commission established to resolve county employment disputes.

2024(Ibid.) The court concluded that county counsel could not 7 undertake this dual representation, in which the office was both advocate and adviser to the decision maker in a contested hearing, unless “there are assurances that the advisor for the decision maker is screened from any inappropriate contact with the advocate.” (Id. at p. 1586; see id. at pp. 1579, 1587.) The Howitt court stated that the party asserting proper screening had the burden “to demonstrate its existence and effectiveness.” (Howitt, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587 .) In a footnote, the Howitt court remarked on screening: “

2023(In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077 , citing Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1379–1380; In re Marriage of Birnbaum (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1508, 1513 .) The court is guided by the “best interests” of the child in making such orders. “‘In an initial custody determination, the trial court has “the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.” [Citation.] It must look to all the circumstances bearing on the best interest of the minor child. [Citation.]’” (In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1087

2022(See e.g., Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374 [parties had attended 17 private mediation sessions and five mediation sessions with Family Court Services]; Birnbaum, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1511 [parties attended coparenting counselling which resulted in an evaluation and recommendation by a psychologist they had selected].) Whether the changed circumstances rule applies is an issue that arises when the trial court considers the sufficiency of evidence at a contested hearing.

2025(See M.T. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1177 [“[f]ailure to make a futile . . . argument” does not forfeit the argument on appeal]; see, e.g., ibid. [petitioner did not forfeit his argument he was entitled to a contested hearing where making that request in the trial court would have been futile under existing precedent]; see also Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, L.P. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 332 , 342 [appellant did not forfeit the argument the trial court erred in refusing to give a 3 Carmody could have filed a separate action in the trial court, argued his claim was timely unde

2025(See M.T. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1177 [“[f]ailure to make a futile . . . argument” does not forfeit the argument on appeal]; see, e.g., ibid. [petitioner did not forfeit his argument he was entitled to a contested hearing where making that request in the trial court would have been futile under existing precedent]; see also Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, L.P. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 332 , 342 [appellant did not forfeit the argument the trial court erred in refusing to give a 3 Carmody could have filed a separate action in the trial court, argued his claim was timely unde

2024(In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 976-980 .) Here the juvenile court was not required to hold a DEJ suitability hearing because J.R. denied the allegations of the petition and requested a contested hearing.

2013(In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 976-980 (Kenneth J.); Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 281-283.) In such circumstances, the minor’s denial of the allegations and insistence on a contested hearing 17. are “tantamount to a rejection of DEJ.” (Kenneth J., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 ; Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 286, fn. 3 .) B.

2025At the contested hearing, the court-appointed expert testified that this case involved “a very close call.” She opined that the fifth LaMusga factor—the parents’ “ability to communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to put the interests of the children above their individual interests” (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101 )—was dispositive and that she concluded that factor weighed in favor of D.S.

2024(Enrique M., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1377–1378, discussing Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249 , 253–254 and LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1072 .) Similarly, a move-away order cannot be issued on a temporary basis or in the absence of a contested hearing (Andrew V. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 103, 107 ), and may be considered by direct appeal (see In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1466 (Edlund & Hales) [appeal from order granting move-away request]; see also F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, 14 [appeal from order denying move-away request

2018In Dolly D. , the court concluded that it was a violation of due process rights and California Rules of Court, rule 1449(b) and 1450 to deny a parent the opportunity to cross-examine the social worker who prepared the jurisdictional report. ( In re Dolly D. , supra , 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-445, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) In Ingrid E. , the court noted that due process in dependency proceedings is a flexible concept, the application of which depends on the circumstances and the balancing of various factors. ( Ingrid E. , at p. 757, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 .) There, the court denied the parent's reques

2003In support of his contention, appellant cites cases involving the denial of a contested hearing to the mother (In re Stacy T (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1415 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 319 ]; In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 873 ]) or to a father whose paternity was not disputed (In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; In re Nemis M. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1344 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ]; In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 534 ]).

2022(See, e.g., In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116 [failure to give proper notice to a parent facing termination of her parental rights]; Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 558 [failure to timely serve report recommending termination of reunification services in advance of a dependency hearing]; In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403 , 417–418 [improper denial of a parent’s request for a contested hearing in a dependency proceeding]; In re Kelly D. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 433, 440 [failure to provide notice and a contested hearing on the issue of 10 In re CHR

2014Analysis “If the parent or guardian denies the allegations of the petition, the court must hold a contested hearing and determine whether the allegations in the petition are true.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.684(a).) “[T]he right to a contested hearing contemplates that a parent ‘has the right to testify and otherwise submit evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and argue his [or her] case.’ [Citation.]” (In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 417 .) The hearing here was contested.

2020(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(b).) California Rules of Court, rule 5.565 provides that at a hearing on a supplemental petition, the juvenile court must make two findings: “(A) The factual allegations are or are not true; and [¶] (B) The allegation that the previous disposition has not been effective is or is not true.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.565(e)(1).) As our sister court explained: “[I]f the relevant ‘parent, guardian, relative or friend’ denies the allegations of the supplemental petition, the court must conduct a contested hearing to resolve factual disputes and determine whether

2019(Rule 5.684(c)(1) ["A social study, with hearsay evidence contained in it, is admissible as provided in section 355"]; In re Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685 , 692, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 601 ["At the contested hearing on a supplemental petition, a report filed by the responsible social worker is admissible if the author is made available for cross-examination on the contents of the report"].) *993 In any event, mother's own testimony corroborated the incident as described in the text message. ( In re B.D. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 975 , 984, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 810 ["In this context corroborating evidenc

2021Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to Conduct a Contested Hearing In requesting a contested hearing, father’s counsel made an offer of proof relating to the second element of the parental- 12 benefit exception—whether daughter had “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to [father]—the kind of attachment implying that [daughter] would benefit from continuing the relationship.”3 (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see also In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 .) This element is influenced by numerous factors: “The age of the child, the portion of the ch

2020(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 .) The trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, reasonably concluded that mother’s offer of proof, which required a two-prong showing, was insufficient to warrant a contested hearing.

2023Due process is ‘a flexible concept dependent on the circumstance.’ (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 .) Since due process does not authorize a parent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.’ (Ibid.) ‘The trial court can therefore exercise its power to request an offer of proof to clearly identify the contested issue(s) so it can determine whether a parent’s representation is sufficient to warrant a hearing involvin

2011(Ibid.; accord, Josiah S., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 416-417.) A parent’s right to participate “has little meaning or content if it does not include the right to challenge or contest a proposed order.” (Kelly D., supra, at p. 439; see Josiah S., supra, at p. 417.) “[T]he right to a contested hearing contemplates that a parent ‘has the right to testify and otherwise submit evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and argue his [or her] case.’ ” (Josiah S., supra, at p. 417, quoting Kelly D., supra, at p. 440; see rule 5.534(k).) 3 We are not persuaded by the Agency’s reliance on Maricela

2024In In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 , the high court held that the juvenile court’s alleged violation of the “solely statutory” right to the “appoint[ment of] separate counsel” for a minor warranted reversal only if it was “reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.” (See Celine R., at pp. 51–52, 59–60, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) failing to request a contested hearing and object to the exit orders recommended by the agency.

2013(Id., at p. 60.) “ ‘ “[T]he standard of review where a parent is deprived of a due process right is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” ’ ” (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1556 .) Under the harmless error test, a court may not set aside a judgment unless the error has resulted in a “ ‘miscarriage of justice.’ ” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60 .) Accordingly, reversal is permitted “only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error. [Citation.]” (Ibi