First Amendment challenge in Maine

2019Dismjss 1-3.) "Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concem , . , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege' -that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity." Lester v. Powers, 596 A .2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (citing New York Times v. Sultiva.n., 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2019See Roche v, Egan, 433 A .2d 757 ,·762 (Me. 1981). 11 Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concern .. , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege'-that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity.'' Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (cit!ng New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2019Dismjss 1-3.) "Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concem , . , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege' -that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity." Lester v. Powers, 596 A .2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (citing New York Times v. Sultiva.n., 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2019See Lester v. Powers, 596 A .2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (an opinion which does not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts cannot support a claim for defamation). 5 recognized that statements made about or against public officials , even ones which are "objectively false", inflammatory, or outrageous, are protected by a limited First Amendment privilege.

2018See City of Bangor v. Diva's, Inc. , 2003 ME 51 , ¶ 10, 830 A.2d 898 .

2018See City of Bangor v. Diva's, Inc. , 2003 ME 51 , ¶ 10, 830 A.2d 898 .

2020We did consider a First Amendment challenge in an appeal from a Superior Court judgment 10 entered in an appeal from the Secretary of State’s decision in Hart v. Sec’y of State, 1998 ME 189, ¶¶ 1, 3-4 , 715 A.2d 165 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999).

2020We did consider a First Amendment challenge in an appeal from a Superior Court judgment 10 entered in an appeal from the Secretary of State’s decision in Hart v. Sec’y of State, 1998 ME 189, ¶¶ 1, 3-4 , 715 A.2d 165 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999).

2026See Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 2016 ME 143, ¶¶ 16-17 , 148 A.3d 707 ; Fair Elections Portland, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2021 ME 32 , ¶ 21 n.7, 252 A.3d 504 ; Cape Shore House Owners Ass’n v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2019 ME 86, ¶¶ 7-9 , 209 A.3d 102 . 7We also note an additional ground for the denial of the Residents’ First Amendment claim.

2026See Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 2016 ME 143, ¶¶ 16-17 , 148 A.3d 707 ; Fair Elections Portland, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2021 ME 32 , ¶ 21 n.7, 252 A.3d 504 ; Cape Shore House Owners Ass’n v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2019 ME 86, ¶¶ 7-9 , 209 A.3d 102 . 7We also note an additional ground for the denial of the Residents’ First Amendment claim.

2024See Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 974 (Me. 1994); see also State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 898 (Me. 1974).

2024See Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 974 (Me. 1994); see also State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 898 (Me. 1974).

2024State v. Anderson, 409 A.2d 1290, 1304 (Me. 1979); see State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 468-69 (Me. 1981).

2024Amicus Br. (“[T]his Court should clarify . . . the test elucidated . . . in 25 Counterman.”); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he refusal to consider arguments not raised is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or constitutional mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the contrary.”). [¶42] Because Labbe failed to preserve his First Amendment challenge, however, we apply the obvious-error standard in reviewing the merits of his appeal.

2024State v. Anderson, 409 A.2d 1290, 1304 (Me. 1979); see State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 468-69 (Me. 1981).

2024See Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 974 (Me. 1994); see also State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 898 (Me. 1974).

2024See Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 974 (Me. 1994); see also State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 898 (Me. 1974).

2020Cf. Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing a summary judgment entered in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LEXIS through Pub.

2020Cf. Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing a summary judgment entered in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LEXIS through Pub.

2019See Plante v. long, 2017 ME 189 , ~ 10, 170 A.3d 24 .

2019See Roche v, Egan, 433 A .2d 757 ,·762 (Me. 1981). 11 Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concern .. , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege'-that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity.'' Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (cit!ng New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2016State v. Mott, 166 Vt. 188 , 692 A.2d 360, 362, 365 (1997). 7 [¶22] To disallow the imposition of an order 'restraining contact when abuse and harassment have already occurred, and a person has a demonstrable need for protection from further abusive and harassing conduct, “would establish a precedent that would leave persons powerless to protect themselves against unwanted, annoying, or harassing intrusions on their privacy.” People in Interest of C.S.M., 570 P.2d at *298 230-31 (holding that a no-contact order did not violate the right to freedom of association).

2016State v. Mott, 166 Vt. 188 , 692 A.2d 360, 362, 365 (1997). 7 [¶22] To disallow the imposition of an order 'restraining contact when abuse and harassment have already occurred, and a person has a demonstrable need for protection from further abusive and harassing conduct, “would establish a precedent that would leave persons powerless to protect themselves against unwanted, annoying, or harassing intrusions on their privacy.” People in Interest of C.S.M., 570 P.2d at *298 230-31 (holding that a no-contact order did not violate the right to freedom of association).

2016Specifically, in cases involving restraining orders, courts have held that the First Amendment’s protections do not apply to prevent a court from restraining “threatening or abusive communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for protection from an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse.” Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla.Crim.App. 1988). [¶21] For example, the Court of Appeal of California rejected a First Amendment challenge to a protection from abuse order when a man had conveyed embarrassing information about his girlfriend to others, including her employer, an

2016Specifically, in cases involving restraining orders, courts have held that the First Amendment’s protections do not apply to prevent a court from restraining “threatening or abusive communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for protection from an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse.” Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla.Crim.App. 1988). [¶21] For example, the Court of Appeal of California rejected a First Amendment challenge to a protection from abuse order when a man had conveyed embarrassing information about his girlfriend to others, including her employer, an

2012First, the target of the disclosure must make a prima facie showing, typically that "enforcement of the disclosure requirement will result in harassment of current members, a decline in new members, or other chilling of associational rights." Unites States v. Comley, 890 F.2d 539, 544 (1st Cir. 1989).

2012First, the target of the disclosure must make a prima facie showing, typically that "enforcement of the disclosure requirement will result in harassment of current members, a decline in new members, or other chilling of associational rights." Unites States v. Comley, 890 F.2d 539,544 (1st Cir. 1989).

2005Smith, 494 U.S. at 907, 909 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 (Blackmun, J„ dissenting).

2005Smith, 494 U.S. at 907, 909 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 (Blackmun, J„ dissenting).

2005See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 565 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the free exercise of religion is violated only when a law or regulation “placets] a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).

2005See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 565 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the free exercise of religion is violated only when a law or regulation “placets] a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).

2005See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 365 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent imposing liability on a Catholic church for negligently supervising a priest "who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parishioner”); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 , 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-96 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (holding that negligent supervision claims survived a motion to dismiss because the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of liability on a church for a priest’s sexual abuse of a minor); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 75 (

2005See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 365 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent imposing liability on a Catholic church for negligently supervising a priest "who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parishioner”); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 , 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-96 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (holding that negligent supervision claims survived a motion to dismiss because the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of liability on a church for a priest’s sexual abuse of a minor); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 75 (

2005See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 365 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent imposing liability on a Catholic church for negligently supervising a priest "who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parishioner"); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 , 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-96 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (holding that negligent supervision claims survived a motion to dismiss because the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of liability on a church for a priest's sexual abuse of a minor); Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 75 (

2005See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 365 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent imposing liability on a Catholic church for negligently supervising a priest "who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parishioner”); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 , 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-96 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (holding that negligent supervision claims survived a motion to dismiss because the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of liability on a church for a priest’s sexual abuse of a minor); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 75 (

2005See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 365 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent imposing liability on a Catholic church for negligently supervising a priest "who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parishioner"); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 , 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-96 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (holding that negligent supervision claims survived a motion to dismiss because the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of liability on a church for a priest's sexual abuse of a minor); Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 75 (

2005See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 365 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the First Amendment does not prevent imposing liability on a Catholic church for negligently supervising a priest "who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parishioner”); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159 , 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-96 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (holding that negligent supervision claims survived a motion to dismiss because the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of liability on a church for a priest’s sexual abuse of a minor); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 75 (

2005See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 . [¶ 18] Because we remand for further analysis, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether, independent of First Amendment considerations, the record supports the decision not to modify the 1997 order.

2005See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 . [¶ 18] Because we remand for further analysis, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether, independent of First Amendment considerations, the record supports the decision not to modify the 1997 order.