First Amendment challenge in Michigan

2018Moreover, "[t]he overbreadth doctrine is not ... 'casually employed,' even in a case involving a First Amendment challenge." In re Chmura , 461 Mich. 517 , 531, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000) (citation omitted). "[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789 , 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).

2018Moreover, "[t]he overbreadth doctrine is not ... 'casually employed,' even in a case involving a First Amendment challenge." In re Chmura , 461 Mich. 517 , 531, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000) (citation omitted). "[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789 , 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).

2017Sweeney only cites United States v Amaya, 949 F Supp 2d 895 (ND Iowa, 2013), in support of his claim that OV 19 is subject to First Amendment analysis.

2017Sweeney only cites United States v Amaya, 949 F Supp 2d 895 (ND Iowa, 2013), in support of his claim that OV 19 is subject to First Amendment analysis.

2001The Court also touched on the First Amendment issue: “The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.” Id. at 138 .

1994After the cases were removed by defendants to federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the federal court granted the motion to dismiss on February 9, 1990, on the basis of First Amendment immunity under the Noerr-Pennington (Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 US 127 ; 81 S Ct 523 ; 5 L Ed 2d 464 [1961]; United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 US 657 ; 85 S Ct 1585 ; 14 L Ed 2d 626 [1965]) doctrine and, alternatively, on the ground that the Folino plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was barred by collateral estoppel because the "allegations

1985"The party alleging a First Amendment violation has the burden of proving that the regulation in question imposes a burden or restriction on the exercise of his or her religious beliefs.” Hough v North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich App 780, 783 ; 312 NW2d 158 (1981).

1985"The party alleging a First Amendment violation has the burden of proving that the regulation in question imposes a burden or restriction on the exercise of his or her religious beliefs.” Hough v North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich App 780, 783 ; 312 NW2d 158 (1981).

2026We engage in a de novo review of (1) the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition, Williamson, 513 Mich at 269, (2) issues of constitutional law, J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich 722, 729 ; 664 NW2d 728 (2003), and (3) whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Morden v Grand Traverse Co, 275 Mich App 325, 340 ; 738 NW2d 278 (2007).2 The First Amendment provides protection from government interference for many fundamental rights, including the right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” US Const, Am I.

2026We engage in a de novo review of (1) the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition, Williamson, 513 Mich at 269, (2) issues of constitutional law, J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich 722, 729 ; 664 NW2d 728 (2003), and (3) whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Morden v Grand Traverse Co, 275 Mich App 325, 340 ; 738 NW2d 278 (2007).2 The First Amendment provides protection from government interference for many fundamental rights, including the right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” US Const, Am I.

2026We engage in a de novo review of (1) the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition, Williamson, 513 Mich at 269, (2) issues of constitutional law, J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich 722, 729 ; 664 NW2d 728 (2003), and (3) whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Morden v Grand Traverse Co, 275 Mich App 325, 340 ; 738 NW2d 278 (2007).2 The First Amendment provides protection from government interference for many fundamental rights, including the right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” US Const, Am I.

2026We engage in a de novo review of (1) the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition, Williamson, 513 Mich at 269, (2) issues of constitutional law, J & J Constr Co v Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich 722, 729 ; 664 NW2d 728 (2003), and (3) whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Morden v Grand Traverse Co, 275 Mich App 325, 340 ; 738 NW2d 278 (2007).2 The First Amendment provides protection from government interference for many fundamental rights, including the right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” US Const, Am I.

2025Because a motion for a directed verdict involves review of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the essential elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Aldrich, 246 Mich App at 122 , defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict if the prosecutor’s evidence only consisted of posts that amounted to protected speech.

2025Because a motion for a directed verdict involves review of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the essential elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Aldrich, 246 Mich App at 122 , defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict if the prosecutor’s evidence only consisted of posts that amounted to protected speech.

2024As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703 ; 120 S Ct 2480 ; 147 L Ed 2d 597 (2000): None of our decisions has minimized the enduring importance of a right to be free from persistent importunity, following and dogging after an offer to communicate has been declined.

2024As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703 ; 120 S Ct 2480 ; 147 L Ed 2d 597 (2000): None of our decisions has minimized the enduring importance of a right to be free from persistent importunity, following and dogging after an offer to communicate has been declined.

2022The Nguyen Court rejected the First Amendment challenge, citing Black, 538 US at 360 , and concluding that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat.” However, the Nguyen Court never examined the additional aspect of Black that the statement communicate an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group.

2022The Nguyen Court rejected the First Amendment challenge, citing Black, 538 US at 360 , and concluding that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat.” However, the Nguyen Court never examined the additional aspect of Black that the statement communicate an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group.

2021Id. at 652 .

2021Id. at 652 .

2019While we are aware that this Court has addressed a First Amendment claim in the context of reviewing an unemployment benefits determination, Shirvell v Dep’t of Attorney General, 308 Mich App 702, 732-749 ; 866 NW2d 478 (2015), the present case is not one where the plaintiffs are merely disputing the determination of their individual employment benefits.

2019While we are aware that this Court has addressed a First Amendment claim in the context of reviewing an unemployment benefits determination, Shirvell v Dep’t of Attorney General, 308 Mich App 702, 732-749 ; 866 NW2d 478 (2015), the present case is not one where the plaintiffs are merely disputing the determination of their individual employment benefits.

2018Thus, because *579 defendant concedes that MCL 750.120a(1) is facially valid and a jury found that he willfully attempted to influence a juror's decision in Yoder's case, his as-applied constitutional challenge necessarily fails. 8 The foregoing is a more direct way of stating that when applying strict *280 scrutiny to the government's actions as defendant urges us to do (and argues the trial courts erred by failing to do), his First Amendment challenge fails because the state has a compelling interest in protecting the sanctity of the jury. 9 "The *580 First Amendment requires heightened scru

2018Thus, because *579 defendant concedes that MCL 750.120a(1) is facially valid and a jury found that he willfully attempted to influence a juror's decision in Yoder's case, his as-applied constitutional challenge necessarily fails. 8 The foregoing is a more direct way of stating that when applying strict *280 scrutiny to the government's actions as defendant urges us to do (and argues the trial courts erred by failing to do), his First Amendment challenge fails because the state has a compelling interest in protecting the sanctity of the jury. 9 "The *580 First Amendment requires heightened scru

2018The Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to a similar jury-tampering statute in Turney v. Pugh , 400 F.3d 1197 (C.A. 9, 2005).

2018The Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to a similar jury-tampering statute in Turney v. Pugh , 400 F.3d 1197 (C.A. 9, 2005).

2018There, the petitioner (who was also the petitioner in Turney , 936 P.2d 533 ) challenged the Alaska statute as overbroad, and as part of its decision, the court reasoned: [T]he First Amendment, while generally quite protective of speech concerning judicial proceedings, does not shield the narrow but significant category of communications to jurors made outside of the auspices of the official proceeding and aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of a particular case.

2018There, the petitioner (who was also the petitioner in Turney , 936 P.2d 533 ) challenged the Alaska statute as overbroad, and as part of its decision, the court reasoned: [T]he First Amendment, while generally quite protective of speech concerning judicial proceedings, does not shield the narrow but significant category of communications to jurors made outside of the auspices of the official proceeding and aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of a particular case.

2018Moreover, "[t]he overbreadth doctrine is not ... 'casually employed,' even in a case involving a First Amendment challenge." In re Chmura , 461 Mich. 517 , 531, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000) (citation omitted). "[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789 , 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).

2018Moreover, "[t]he overbreadth doctrine is not ... 'casually employed,' even in a case involving a First Amendment challenge." In re Chmura , 461 Mich. 517 , 531, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000) (citation omitted). "[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789 , 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).

2018"Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2218 , 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015).

2018"Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2218 , 2227, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015).

2015Former MCL 423.210(l)(c) was enacted by 1973 PA 25 and stated [t]hat nothing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative ... to require as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit pay to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative!.] This provision was upheld by the United States Supreme Court against a First Amendment challenge in Abood v Detroit Bd of Ed,

2015Former MCL 423.210(l)(c) was enacted by 1973 PA 25 and stated [t]hat nothing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative ... to require as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit pay to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative!.] This provision was upheld by the United States Supreme Court against a First Amendment challenge in Abood v Detroit Bd of Ed,

2015“The First Amendment protects the speech and association rights of an individual... no matter how different, unpopular or morally repugnant society may find his activities.” Melzer v Bd of Ed, 336 F3d 185 , 192 (CA 2, 2003).

2015However, the issues raised by the Department and the UIA are essentially identical and the circuit court addressed and decided the issues; therefore, we will consider them preserved for our review. 10 To the extent that the circuit court in Docket Nos. 314223 and 314227 held that Pickering did not apply in cases involving unemployment benefits, we hold that that conclusion constituted legal error. 11 “Though not binding on this Court, federal precedent is generally considered highly persuasive when it addresses analogous issues.” Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347 , 360 n 5

2015However, the issues raised by the Department and the UIA are essentially identical and the circuit court addressed and decided the issues; therefore, we will consider them preserved for our review. 10 To the extent that the circuit court in Docket Nos. 314223 and 314227 held that Pickering did not apply in cases involving unemployment benefits, we hold that that conclusion constituted legal error. 11 “Though not binding on this Court, federal precedent is generally considered highly persuasive when it addresses analogous issues.” Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347 , 360 n 5

2009This is because, at its core, the First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing speech, see Turner Broadcasting Sys, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 641-642 ; 114 S Ct 2445 ; 129 L Ed 2d 497 (1994); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 403 ; 109 S Ct 2533 ; 105 L Ed 2d 342 (1989), and once it is shown that the plaintiffs’ rights to engage in the protected speech are not infringed, there can be no First Amendment violation.

2009This is because, at its core, the First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing speech, see Turner Broadcasting Sys, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 641-642 ; 114 S Ct 2445 ; 129 L Ed 2d 497 (1994); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 403 ; 109 S Ct 2533 ; 105 L Ed 2d 342 (1989), and once it is shown that the plaintiffs’ rights to engage in the protected speech are not infringed, there can be no First Amendment violation.

2003The Court observed that “[e]ven in cases addressing regulations that strike closer to the core of First Amendment values, we have accepted a state or local government’s reasonable belief that the experience of other jurisdictions is relevant to the problem it is addressing.” Pap’s, supra at 297, citing Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377 , 393 n 6; 120 S Ct 897 ; 145 L Ed 2d 886 (2000) (applying “exacting scrutiny” and upholding Missouri’s campaign finance legislation against First Amendment challenge).

2003The Court observed that “[e]ven in cases addressing regulations that strike closer to the core of First Amendment values, we have accepted a state or local government’s reasonable belief that the experience of other jurisdictions is relevant to the problem it is addressing.” Pap’s, supra at 297, citing Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377 , 393 n 6; 120 S Ct 897 ; 145 L Ed 2d 886 (2000) (applying “exacting scrutiny” and upholding Missouri’s campaign finance legislation against First Amendment challenge).

2003And the Court noted that O’ Brien, supra, which applied intermediate scrutiny to federal legislation banning draft card burning, “required no evidentiary showing at all that the threatened harm was real.” Pap’s, supra at 299.

2003A case dealing with a First Amendment issue that is more analogous to the present case is Norris, supra .

2003In Norris, supra at 829 , the petitioner was charged as a criminal defendant for a sexual offense.

2003Jott, supra at 538 .

2003Jott, supra at 538 .

2000I also note that there is no general First Amendment "right to gather data." In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 , 85 S.Ct. 1271 , 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965), the United States Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment claim raised by a person denied a passport to Cuba.

2000I also note that there is no general First Amendment "right to gather data." In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 , 85 S.Ct. 1271 , 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965), the United States Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment claim raised by a person denied a passport to Cuba.