17 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Broadrick v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2020See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); Dougherty v. Town ofN. 2020See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); Dougherty v. Town ofN. | 3 | 3 |
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd.green2 sentences2024See Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465 . 2024See Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465 . | 1 | 1 |
Godman v. City of Fort Wrightgreen2 sentences2020“A party opposing a motion for -11- summary judgment cannot rely merely on the unsupported allegations of his pleadings, but is required to present some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Ky. App. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2020“A party opposing a motion for -11- summary judgment cannot rely merely on the unsupported allegations of his pleadings, but is required to present some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Ky. App. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1887-88 (2018) (noting types of expressive apparel as including t-shirts, buttons and armbands); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (First Amendment protection extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 , 695 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“[V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). 2019See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1887-88 (2018) (noting types of expressive apparel as including t-shirts, buttons and armbands); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (First Amendment protection extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 , 695 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“[V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). | 1 | 1 |
Bery v. City Of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2019See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1887-88 (2018) (noting types of expressive apparel as including t-shirts, buttons and armbands); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (First Amendment protection extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 , 695 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“[V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). 2019See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1887-88 (2018) (noting types of expressive apparel as including t-shirts, buttons and armbands); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (First Amendment protection extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 , 695 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“[V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). | 1 | 1 |
Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Manskygreen2 sentences2019See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1887-88 (2018) (noting types of expressive apparel as including t-shirts, buttons and armbands); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (First Amendment protection extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 , 695 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“[V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). 2019See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1887-88 (2018) (noting types of expressive apparel as including t-shirts, buttons and armbands); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (First Amendment protection extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 , 695 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“[V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). | 1 | 1 |
Courier-Journal, Inc. v. McDonald-Burkmangreen2 sentences2014The Court agreed with this statement in Noriega, wrapping up its First Amendment analysis in McDonald-Burkman by stating “we do not believe that there is a constitutional right of access to discovery material, and the Courier-Journal’s position in this regard must fail.” McDonald-Burkman, 298 S.W.3d at 849 (emphasis added). 2014However, the Court made that statement in the context of a First Amendment analysis, which "asks (1) whether the document is one which has been historically open to inspection by the press and public, and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id. at 848 (citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Chestnut v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2011Since Crutchfield is otherwise dis-positive, for Cook to prevail on her First Amendment claim, as a preliminary matter, it would be necessary for us to overrule Crutchfield’s holding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy. 12 And while we recognize that “the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents,” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), we must nevertheless bear in mind that its purpose is to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intel | 1 | 1 |
Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somersetgreen2 sentences2010And in Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a ban on the sale of alcohol in an adult-oriented business, the court recognized that “[prohibiting alcohol on the premises of adult entertainment establishments will unquestionably reduce the enhanced secondary effects resulting from the explosive combination of alcohol consumption and nude or semi-nude dancing.” 316 F.3d 702, 727-28 (7th Cir.2003). 2010And in Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a ban on the sale of alcohol in an adult-oriented business, the court recognized that “[prohibiting alcohol on the premises of adult entertainment establishments will unquestionably reduce the enhanced secondary effects resulting from the explosive combination of alcohol consumption and nude or semi-nude dancing.” 316 F.3d 702, 727-28 (7th Cir.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PACgreen2 sentences2003Any First Amendment analysis of Kentucky's Campaign Finance Regulation Act, KRS chapter 121, and Public Financing Campaign Act, KRS chapter 121A, necessarily begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court's seminal opinion construing similar provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), [6] as amended in 1974. [7] See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382 , 120 S.Ct. 897, 901 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ("We hold Buckley to be authority for comparable state regulation, which need 2003Any First Amendment analysis of Kentucky's Campaign Finance Regulation Act, KRS chapter 121, and Public Financing Campaign Act, KRS chapter 121A, necessarily begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court's seminal opinion construing similar provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), [6] as amended in 1974. [7] See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382 , 120 S.Ct. 897, 901 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ("We hold Buckley to be authority for comparable state regulation, which need | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky Right To Life, Inc. v. Joseph Terrygreen2 sentences2003That statute was upheld against a First Amendment challenge in Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, supra, at 648. [12] The definition fashioned in Christian Coalition was intended only to apply to what was termed an "expressive coordinated expenditure," 52 F.Supp.2d at 92 , which the Federal Election Commission apparently regards as an expenditure for "a general public communication," e.g., an advertisement. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 . 2003That statute was upheld against a First Amendment challenge in Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, supra, at 648. [12] The definition fashioned in Christian Coalition was intended only to apply to what was termed an "expressive coordinated expenditure," 52 F.Supp.2d at 92 , which the Federal Election Commission apparently regards as an expenditure for "a general public communication," e.g., an advertisement. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015), the United States Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to Florida Canon of Judicial Conduct 7C(1), which is substantially similar to SCR 4.1(A)(8). 29 The Court concluded that the canon served a compelling state interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary and was not overly restrictive because it restricts a narrow slice of speech . . . 2024Moreover, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015), the United States Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to Florida Canon of Judicial Conduct 7C(1), which is substantially similar to SCR 4.1(A)(8). 29 The Court concluded that the canon served a compelling state interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary and was not overly restrictive because it restricts a narrow slice of speech . . . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rucho v. Common Cause
green
2 sentences2023Ultimately, “the First Amendment analysis . . . offers no ‘clear’ and ‘manageable’ way of distinguishing permissible from impermissible partisan motivation.” Id. at 2505 . 2023Ultimately, “the First Amendment analysis . . . offers no ‘clear’ and ‘manageable’ way of distinguishing permissible from impermissible partisan motivation.” Id. at 2505 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Harmelin v. Michigan
green
2 sentences2011Since Crutchfield is otherwise dis-positive, for Cook to prevail on her First Amendment claim, as a preliminary matter, it would be necessary for us to overrule Crutchfield’s holding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy. 12 And while we recognize that “the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents,” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), we must nevertheless bear in mind that its purpose is to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intel 2011Since Crutchfield is otherwise dis-positive, for Cook to prevail on her First Amendment claim, as a preliminary matter, it would be necessary for us to overrule Crutchfield’s holding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy. 12 And while we recognize that “the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents,” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), we must nevertheless bear in mind that its purpose is to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intel | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Vasquez v. Hillery
green
2 sentences2011Since Crutchfield is otherwise dis-positive, for Cook to prevail on her First Amendment claim, as a preliminary matter, it would be necessary for us to overrule Crutchfield’s holding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy. 12 And while we recognize that “the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents,” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), we must nevertheless bear in mind that its purpose is to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intel 2011Since Crutchfield is otherwise dis-positive, for Cook to prevail on her First Amendment claim, as a preliminary matter, it would be necessary for us to overrule Crutchfield’s holding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy. 12 And while we recognize that “the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional precedents,” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), we must nevertheless bear in mind that its purpose is to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intel | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Williams
green
1 sentence2009“There is no First Amendment exception from the general principle of criminal law that a person attempting to commit a crime need not be exonerated because he has a mistaken view of the facts.” Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1845 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Federal Election Commission v. Christian Coalition
green
2 sentences2003That statute was upheld against a First Amendment challenge in Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, supra, at 648. [12] The definition fashioned in Christian Coalition was intended only to apply to what was termed an "expressive coordinated expenditure," 52 F.Supp.2d at 92 , which the Federal Election Commission apparently regards as an expenditure for "a general public communication," e.g., an advertisement. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 . 2003That statute was upheld against a First Amendment challenge in Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, supra, at 648. [12] The definition fashioned in Christian Coalition was intended only to apply to what was termed an "expressive coordinated expenditure," 52 F.Supp.2d at 92 , which the Federal Election Commission apparently regards as an expenditure for "a general public communication," e.g., an advertisement. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Robin Clifton and Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission
green
2 sentences2003However, KRS 121.150(1)(c) (as dissected) prohibited the communication, itself, an even worse First Amendment violation than the "no contact" rule in 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (c)(5) that was struck down in Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309 (1st Cir. 1997). "[W]e think it is beyond reasonable belief that, to prevent corruption or illicit coordination, the government could prohibit voluntary discussions between citizens and their legislators and candidates on public issues." Id. at 1314 . 2003However, KRS 121.150(1)(c) (as dissected) prohibited the communication, itself, an even worse First Amendment violation than the "no contact" rule in 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (c)(5) that was struck down in Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309 (1st Cir. 1997). "[W]e think it is beyond reasonable belief that, to prevent corruption or illicit coordination, the government could prohibit voluntary discussions between citizens and their legislators and candidates on public issues." Id. at 1314 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Buckley v. Valeo
green
2 sentences2003Any First Amendment analysis of Kentucky's Campaign Finance Regulation Act, KRS chapter 121, and Public Financing Campaign Act, KRS chapter 121A, necessarily begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court's seminal opinion construing similar provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), [6] as amended in 1974. [7] See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382 , 120 S.Ct. 897, 901 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ("We hold Buckley to be authority for comparable state regulation, which need 2003Any First Amendment analysis of Kentucky's Campaign Finance Regulation Act, KRS chapter 121, and Public Financing Campaign Act, KRS chapter 121A, necessarily begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court's seminal opinion construing similar provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), [6] as amended in 1974. [7] See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382 , 120 S.Ct. 897, 901 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ("We hold Buckley to be authority for comparable state regulation, which need | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Howard Meadows v. Hal R. Hopkins, Warden, F.C.I.
green
1 sentence1998These policies were even less restrictive than those approved in Meadows v. Hopkins, supra. No First Amendment violation occurred as a result of the opening and inspection of Appellant’s correspondence with Bush. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
cluster 493381
green
1 sentence1997Lee v. Weisman, supra. In Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.1987), plaintiffs objected to the school’s use of certain home economics, history and social studies textbooks on grounds that they advanced certain religious beliefs and, thus, violated the Establishment Clause. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Chapman v. Gorman
green
2 sentences1993Chapman v. Gorman, supra; and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). 1993Chapman v. Gorman, supra; and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Anderson v. Celebrezze
green
2 sentences1993Chapman v. Gorman, supra; and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). 1993Chapman v. Gorman, supra; and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Letcher v. Commonwealth Ex Rel. Matthews
green
2 sentences1992See Hall v. Boyd County Board of Education, supra ; Letcher v. Commonwealth, supra, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 402 . 1992See Hall v. Boyd County Board of Education, supra; Letcher v. Commonwealth, supra, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 402 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.