First Amendment claim in District of Columbia

2014Even if we were to review appellant's First Amendment claim, it fails under the test for plain error review as appellant provides no evidence that the error "seriously affectfed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

2014Even if we were to review appellant's First Amendment claim, it fails under the test for plain error review as appellant provides no evidence that the error "seriously affectfed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

2019Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court , 464 U.S. 501 , 504-10, 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 , (1984) (considering the issue under the First Amendment); Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209 , 213, 130 S.Ct. 721 , 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) ("[T]here is no legitimate reason, at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the accused has [under the Sixth Amendment].").

2019Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court , 464 U.S. 501 , 504-10, 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 , (1984) (considering the issue under the First Amendment); Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209 , 213, 130 S.Ct. 721 , 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) ("[T]here is no legitimate reason, at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the accused has [under the Sixth Amendment].").

2019As this court has observed, "it is only under the most exceptional circumstances that limited portions of a criminal trial may be closed even partially to the public." Kleinbart v. United States , 388 A.2d 878 , 883 (D.C. 1978).

2019As this court has observed, "it is only under the most exceptional circumstances that limited portions of a criminal trial may be closed even partially to the public." Kleinbart v. United States , 388 A.2d 878 , 883 (D.C. 1978).

1998See Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 , 815 n. 32, 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see also Pearson, 581 A.2d at 354 .

1991Pearson v. United States, 581 A.2d 347, 349, 351-52 (D.C.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 51 , 116 L.Ed.2d 28 (1991).

1981See also In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorney-client privilege claim); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 591 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (claim of governmental privilege) (discussing cases); North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers v. North Carolina Board of Law Examiners, 538 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1976) (burdensomeness of discovery order; Covey Oil distinguished); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL— CIO-CLC, 423 U.S. 1033 , 96 S.Ct. 566 ,

1980See also In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorney-client privilege claim); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 591 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (claim of governmental privilege) (discussing cases); North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers v. North Carolina Board of Law Examiners, 538 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1976) (burdensomeness of discovery order; Covey Oil distinguished); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, 423 U.S. 1033

1996White, 571 A.2d at 792 (appellate jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal where trial court denied church’s motion to dismiss on grounds of First Amendment immunity).

1996See White, 571 A.2d at 793 (implicitly adopting de novo standard of review to consider denial of church’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion asserting First Amendment immunity); see also Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 297 U.S.App.D.C. 406, 411 , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (1992); Windfield v. Groen Div., Dover Corp., 890 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir.1989). 5 Because Bible Way Church is a religious institution, we agree with the church that, in filing the complaint against the church and its leaders, the plaintiffs immediately confronted a potential First Amendment bar to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdic

2025See Carson, 419 A.2d at 998 (explaining that the statute is “saved” because, “under the statute as construed in Leiss, individual citizens may not be ejected from public property on the order of the person lawfully in charge absent some additional, specific factor establishing their lack of a legal right to be there”). 20 fences and barricades regulating the public’s use of government property, or other reasonable restrictions.” Id.

2025See Carson, 419 A.2d at 998 (explaining that the statute is “saved” because, “under the statute as construed in Leiss, individual citizens may not be ejected from public property on the order of the person lawfully in charge absent some additional, specific factor establishing their lack of a legal right to be there”). 20 fences and barricades regulating the public’s use of government property, or other reasonable restrictions.” Id.

2025Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB for it to “invoke any specific, 106 Id. at 1556-59 . 107 418 U.S. 241, 254, 258 (1971). 108 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 168 (1979). 93 alternate remedies” for the discriminatorily canceled reporter that would be consistent with First Amendment principles. 109 Thus, in evaluating the Post’s First Amendment challenge to Sonmez’s complaint, we agree with this statement by the Supreme Court of California (in another case on which the Post has relied): Not every staffing decision a news organization makes— even with respect to those who write, edit, or othe

2025Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB for it to “invoke any specific, 106 Id. at 1556-59 . 107 418 U.S. 241, 254, 258 (1971). 108 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 168 (1979). 93 alternate remedies” for the discriminatorily canceled reporter that would be consistent with First Amendment principles. 109 Thus, in evaluating the Post’s First Amendment challenge to Sonmez’s complaint, we agree with this statement by the Supreme Court of California (in another case on which the Post has relied): Not every staffing decision a news organization makes— even with respect to those who write, edit, or othe

2024Standard of Review Mr. Keerikkattil did not raise this First Amendment challenge with the trial court, and it is thus unpreserved. 2 Unpreserved arguments are forfeited because the that his words would be perceived as a threat.”); see also Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 69 (2023) (requiring a mens rea of at least recklessness before a defendant may be convicted for speech constituting a true threat of violence).

2024Standard of Review Mr. Keerikkattil did not raise this First Amendment challenge with the trial court, and it is thus unpreserved. 2 Unpreserved arguments are forfeited because the that his words would be perceived as a threat.”); see also Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 69 (2023) (requiring a mens rea of at least recklessness before a defendant may be convicted for speech constituting a true threat of violence).

2023We also held, inter alia, that the First Amendment did not bar the trial court from making its determinations regarding the Church’s Bylaws, the validity of the Board elections, and the standing of the persons who filed this lawsuit, since deciding those questions “required application of no more than neutral principles of corporation law.” Id. at 6 (citing, inter alia, Jackson v. George, 146 A.3d 405, 417 (D.C. 2016), and Family Fed’n for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 250 (D.C. 2015)). 18 determination of that issue.” 15 Moreover, we said, a remand was necessary because the tria

2023We also held, inter alia, that the First Amendment did not bar the trial court from making its determinations regarding the Church’s Bylaws, the validity of the Board elections, and the standing of the persons who filed this lawsuit, since deciding those questions “required application of no more than neutral principles of corporation law.” Id. at 6 (citing, inter alia, Jackson v. George, 146 A.3d 405, 417 (D.C. 2016), and Family Fed’n for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 250 (D.C. 2015)). 18 determination of that issue.” 15 Moreover, we said, a remand was necessary because the tria

2023A party such as Meta claiming a First Amendment privilege bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that enforcement of the discovery requests will result in . . . consequences which objectively suggest an impact on, or ‘chilling’ of, the members’ associational rights.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

2023A party such as Meta claiming a First Amendment privilege bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that enforcement of the discovery requests will result in . . . consequences which objectively suggest an impact on, or ‘chilling’ of, the members’ associational rights.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

2023Thus, a court may decide that although the First Amendment does not bar liability, the protection of speech is nonetheless a weighty enough concern in a given context that liability for intentionally inflicted emotional harm should not be imposed.”). 94 Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158, 163-64 (D.C. 2013). 95 Id. (citation omitted). 50 liable for discussing the sexual harassment that led to employment retaliation against her clients, including sharing the full name of the employee who was harassed on a public blog and the video depicting the incident on YouTube and local television s

2023Thus, a court may decide that although the First Amendment does not bar liability, the protection of speech is nonetheless a weighty enough concern in a given context that liability for intentionally inflicted emotional harm should not be imposed.”). 94 Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158, 163-64 (D.C. 2013). 95 Id. (citation omitted). 50 liable for discussing the sexual harassment that led to employment retaliation against her clients, including sharing the full name of the employee who was harassed on a public blog and the video depicting the incident on YouTube and local television s

2022See Smith-Caronia, 714 A.2d at 766 (noting the “limited utility” of engaging in forum analysis when the “nature and extent of government regulation at issue would withstand First Amendment analysis” regardless).

2022See Lex Tex, 579 A.2d at 249 n.13; see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770 , 780 n.12 (1984) (“[W]e reject categorically the suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 , 790–91 (1984). 14 legislature intended the exception to apply to § (a)(4), questions about the scope and applicability of any exception to § (a)(4) are better left for the legislature.

2022See Lex Tex, 579 A.2d at 249 n.13; see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770 , 780 n.12 (1984) (“[W]e reject categorically the suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 , 790–91 (1984). 14 legislature intended the exception to apply to § (a)(4), questions about the scope and applicability of any exception to § (a)(4) are better left for the legislature.

2022See Lex Tex, 579 A.2d at 249 n.13; see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770 , 780 n.12 (1984) (“[W]e reject categorically the suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 , 790–91 (1984). 14 legislature intended the exception to apply to § (a)(4), questions about the scope and applicability of any exception to § (a)(4) are better left for the legislature.

2022See Lex Tex, 579 A.2d at 249 n.13; see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770 , 780 n.12 (1984) (“[W]e reject categorically the suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 , 790–91 (1984). 14 legislature intended the exception to apply to § (a)(4), questions about the scope and applicability of any exception to § (a)(4) are better left for the legislature.

2016As Mr. Givens’s challenge is directed only to the portion of the statute under which he was convicted, we do not address its other provisions. 29 .The District argues that Mr. Givens lacks standing to raise an overbreadth challenge because the statute does not implicate the First Amendment and our exception to prudential third-party standing rules only applies "in limited circumstances.” Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 166 (D.C. 2011).