First Amendment claim in Connecticut

2023See Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 576 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991) (requiring trial court to determine attorney’s fees on remand); Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 782 , 264 A.3d 130 (remanding case to ‘‘[trial] court with instructions to determine, if possible, what portion of the fees and costs it awarded under [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42- 110a et seq.] were reasonably incurred to litigate that portion of the CUTPA claim that was not barred by the statute of limitations’’), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911 , 264 A.3d 94 (2021).

2023See Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 576 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991) (requiring trial court to determine attorney’s fees on remand); Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 782 , 264 A.3d 130 (remanding case to ‘‘[trial] court with instructions to determine, if possible, what portion of the fees and costs it awarded under [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42- 110a et seq. was] reasonably incurred to litigate that portion of the CUTPA claim that was not barred by the statute of limitations’’), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911 , 264 A.3d 94 (2021).

2020Id., 153–54.

2020Id., 153–54.

2001The reason for the first amendment exception to the general principle that one cannot challenge a statute that is not vague as applied to his or her conduct is the concern that "persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New York v. Ferber , 458 U.S. 747 , 768 (1982).

2000The reason for the first amendment exception to the general principle that a defendant cannot challenge a statute that is not vague as applied to his or her conduct is the concern that “persons whose expression is constitutionally pro tected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 , 102 S. Ct. 3348 , 73 L.

2000Similarly, the sole Supreme Court decision concerning the application of Sullivan to a former public official, Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 , 86 S. Ct. 669 , 15 L.

2000Similarly, the sole Supreme Court decision concerning the application of Sullivan to a former public official, Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 , 86 S. Ct. 669 , 15 L.

2025This court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and should have analyzed the issue of whether the defendant’s conduct was protected activity under the sham litigation exception, established by California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited ( 404 U.S. 508 ), to the doctrine of immunity for petitioning activity pursuant to Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ( 365 U.S. 127 ) and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington ( 381 U.S. 657 ), was unavailing, as the record showed that the defendant had an ob

2025Ed. 2d 626 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81 S. Ct. 523 , 5 L.

2025This court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and should have analyzed the issue of whether the defendant’s conduct was protected activity under the sham litigation exception, established by California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited ( 404 U.S. 508 ), to the doctrine of immunity for petitioning activity pursuant to Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ( 365 U.S. 127 ) and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington ( 381 U.S. 657 ), was unavailing, as the record showed that the defendant had an ob

2025As this court previously has explained, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine stems from a trio of federal antitrust cases: California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, supra, 404 U.S. 508 , United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, supra, 381 U.S. 657 , and Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., supra, 365 U.S. 127 ; see Zeller v. Consolini, 59 Conn. App. 545, 550 , 758 A.2d 376 (2000); in which the United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment ‘‘shields from the Sherman [Antitrust] Act [15 U.S.C § 1 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. A

2023In support of this contention, the defendant relies on State v. Whited, 506 S.W.3d 416 (Tenn. 2016), and asks us to review the content of the material at issue to determine whether it includes a lascivious exhibition of a child, to support his argument that, viewed objectively, the images of G are not sexual or lascivious and, therefore, are protected by the first amendment.

2019We find particularly illustrative the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60 , 647 F.3d 754 , 756-57 (8th Cir. 2011), which considered whether statements sent by a public school student to another student via instant message were true threats, rendering his suspension not a first amendment violation.

2019In D.J.M. , the court concluded that the following statements, when viewed in their entirety, were reasonably viewed as "serious expressions of intent to harm," rather than "in jest out of teenage frustration": [1] that the student admitted "he was depressed at being rejected by a romantic interest; [2] his 'access to weapons' which *12 made his threats 'believable'; [3] [the instant **577 message recipient's] report that [the student] said he intended to take a gun to school to shoot everyone he hates and then himself; [4] his expressed 'desire to kill at least five classmates'; [5] his telli

2018In affirming the judgment of the trial court, this court concluded that (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree; id., at 386-87 , 861 A.2d 537 ; and (2) the defendant's first amendment claim was "without merit [because] [t]he record reflect[ed] that the court's judgment was based on the defendant's conduct and not his speech." Id., at 389 , 861 A.2d 537 .

2018In affirming the judgment of the trial court, this court concluded that (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of breach of the peace in the second degree; id., at 386-87 , 861 A.2d 537 ; and (2) the defendant's first amendment claim was "without merit [because] [t]he record reflect[ed] that the court's judgment was based on the defendant's conduct and not his speech." Id., at 389 , 861 A.2d 537 .

2017State v. Buhl , supra, 321 Conn. at 728 -29 , 138 A.3d 868 ("[a]n appellant cannot, however, rely on the appellee to decipher the issues and explain them [on appeal]").

2017State v. Buhl , supra, 321 Conn. at 728 -29 , 138 A.3d 868 ("[a]n appellant cannot, however, rely on the appellee to decipher the issues and explain them [on appeal]").

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2016See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. at 418-21, 440 , 125 A.3d 920 ; Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525 , 535, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 , 115 S.Ct. 1098 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995) ; Knize v. Knize, 121 Conn.App. 787 , 790 n. 1, 998 A.2d 198 (2010). 7 Without adequate briefing, we cannot determine the applicable legal standard for the first amendment claim; therefore, we cannot determine what evidence would support a first amendment claim.

2015With respect to the defendants’ first amendment claim, the Appellate Court first determined that it was unpreserved, and considered it under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 213 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).10 Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 149 Conn. App. 289–90.

2015The defen- dants argue that the Appellate Court, which treated the first amendment issue as an unpreserved constitutional claim reviewable under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40,11 improperly deferred to the trial court’s findings of fact, even though the trial court did not address the constitutional issue.12 The defendants then contend that the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the first amendment did not bar the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is ‘‘directly at odds’’ with the United States Supreme Court’s deci- sion in Snyder v. Phelps, supra, 562

2015The defen- dants argue that the Appellate Court, which treated the first amendment issue as an unpreserved constitutional claim reviewable under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40,11 improperly deferred to the trial court’s findings of fact, even though the trial court did not address the constitutional issue.12 The defendants then contend that the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the first amendment did not bar the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is ‘‘directly at odds’’ with the United States Supreme Court’s deci- sion in Snyder v. Phelps, supra, 562