First Amendment challenge in Pennsylvania

2024A “single, isolated interference with [an inmate’s] personal mail [is] insufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation.” Rivera, 240 A.3d at 238 (quoting Nixon v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012)).

2024A “single, isolated interference with [an inmate’s] personal mail [is] insufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation.” Rivera, 240 A.3d at 238 (quoting Nixon v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012)).

2001First, if attempting to achieve closure under a first amendment analysis, “there must be a showing that the denial serves an important governmental interest and there is no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest.” Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 , 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2619-20 , 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982)).

1990First, if attempting to achieve closure under a first amendment analysis, “there must be a showing that the denial serves an important governmental interest and there is no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest.” Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 , 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2619-20 , 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982)).

2005See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1979).

2000See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1979).

2005See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1979).

2000See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1979).

2003The court did recognize, however, that a qualified First Amendment privilege, derived from Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), provided a limited degree of protection to the confidentiality of the reporters' notes.

2003The court did recognize, however, that a qualified First Amendment privilege, derived from Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), provided a limited degree of protection to the confidentiality of the reporters' notes.

2021See id.

2021See id.

2026See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353, 355 (1996); Hackett v. Horn, 751 A.2d 272, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); Petition for Review, ¶¶ 18, 21.

2026See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353, 355 (1996); Hackett v. Horn, 751 A.2d 272, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); Petition for Review, ¶¶ 18, 21.

2025The Chaplinsky list is not exhaustive and unprotected speech includes that which constitutes harassing conduct. “[O]ur Supreme Court has upheld a criminal statute prohibiting harassment by unwanted, repeated communications in the face of a First Amendment challenge, noting that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing harassment and that the offense was directed at the harassing conduct rather than the speech itself.” Collins, 286 A.3d at 776 (citing Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. 1999)).2 Section 2709 by its terms reaches only conduct that serves no legitimate pu

2025The Chaplinsky list is not exhaustive and unprotected speech includes that which constitutes harassing conduct. “[O]ur Supreme Court has upheld a criminal statute prohibiting harassment by unwanted, repeated communications in the face of a First Amendment challenge, noting that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing harassment and that the offense was directed at the harassing conduct rather than the speech itself.” Collins, 286 A.3d at 776 (citing Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. 1999)).2 Section 2709 by its terms reaches only conduct that serves no legitimate pu

2022The Schenck Court reasoned that “in assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court looks not only at the private claims asserted in the complaint, but also inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and order.” Schenck, 519 U.S. at 375 (citations omitted).

2022The Schenck Court reasoned that “in assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court looks not only at the private claims asserted in the complaint, but also inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and order.” Schenck, 519 U.S. at 375 (citations omitted).

2022Because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, the Lair Court held that the district court “abused its discretion when it entered a permanent injunction, and we remand for the district court to apply the correct standard.” Id. at 748 (footnote omitted); accord Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating preliminary injunction involving First Amendment issue and remanding to have district court apply the “rational basis level of scrutiny” because the district court “abused its discretion in applying an erroneous legal standard of review”).

2022Trial court’s amended October 11, 2019 order and September 12, 2019 order granting injunctive relief vacated and we remand for further proceedings.25 Jurisdiction relinquished. standard, the Lair Court held that the district court “abused its discretion when it entered a permanent injunction, and we remand for the district court to apply the correct standard.” Id. at 748 (footnote omitted); accord Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 , 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating preliminary injunction involving First Amendment issue and remanding to have district court apply the “rational basis level o

2022Similarly, in Virginia Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (Virginia Soc’y), overruled on other grounds by The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), the Circuit Court vacated the district court’s nationwide injunction regarding a First Amendment issue because it was too broad and remanded for the district court to amend it.

2022Similarly, in Virginia Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (Virginia Soc’y), overruled on other grounds by The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), the Circuit Court vacated the district court’s nationwide injunction regarding a First Amendment issue because it was too broad and remanded for the district court to amend it.

2022For example, in Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015), the district court “applied the wrong legal standard” in granting a permanent injunction resolving a First Amendment issue regarding campaign contributions.

2022Because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, the Lair Court held that the district court “abused its discretion when it entered a permanent injunction, and we remand for the district court to apply the correct standard.” Id. at 748 (footnote omitted); accord Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating preliminary injunction involving First Amendment issue and remanding to have district court apply the “rational basis level of scrutiny” because the district court “abused its discretion in applying an erroneous legal standard of review”).

2019In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)).

2019In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)).

2019In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)).

2019In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)).

2003Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that protecting minors from the trauma and embarrassment of testifying in public is, in and of itself, a compelling state interest under a First Amendment analysis. [4] See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 , 102 S.Ct. 2613 , 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); see also R.W., 626 A.2d at 1222 (recognizing "the salutary reasons of protecting the privacy interests of minors"); T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451 ("While the public's interest in access is important and deserving of protection, the state also has a compelling interest in the pr

2003Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that protecting minors from the trauma and embarrassment of testifying in public is, in and of itself, a compelling state interest under a First Amendment analysis. [4] See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 , 102 S.Ct. 2613 , 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); see also R.W., 626 A.2d at 1222 (recognizing "the salutary reasons of protecting the privacy interests of minors"); T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451 ("While the public's interest in access is important and deserving of protection, the state also has a compelling interest in the pr

2003Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that protecting minors from the trauma and embarrassment of testifying in public is, in and of itself, a compelling state interest under a First Amendment analysis. [4] See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 , 102 S.Ct. 2613 , 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); see also R.W., 626 A.2d at 1222 (recognizing "the salutary reasons of protecting the privacy interests of minors"); T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451 ("While the public's interest in access is important and deserving of protection, the state also has a compelling interest in the pr

2003Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that protecting minors from the trauma and embarrassment of testifying in public is, in and of itself, a compelling state interest under a First Amendment analysis. [4] See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 , 102 S.Ct. 2613 , 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); see also R.W., 626 A.2d at 1222 (recognizing "the salutary reasons of protecting the privacy interests of minors"); T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451 ("While the public's interest in access is important and deserving of protection, the state also has a compelling interest in the pr

2022For instance, in Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court rejected a First-Amendment challenge to the admission of rap lyrics.

2022For instance, in Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court rejected a First-Amendment challenge to the admission of rap lyrics.

2022This case is directly controlled by Shore v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 168 A.3d 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), wherein we rejected virtually 3 We have paraphrased the claims for the sake of concision and clarity. 3 identical First Amendment and due process claims.

2018See also Shore , 168 A.3d at 380 ("Pursuant to Brittain and Smith , DC-ADM 803 and 37 Pa. Code § 93.2 are facially constitutional for purposes of the First Amendment and, like the petitioners in those cases, Shore does not allege any specific facts that tend to undermine [DOC's] legitimate penological interests.").

2020Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).

2007Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

2019In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)).

2019In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)).

2016See also Hatchard, 532 A.2d at 349 (recognizing that the First Amendment does not bar a plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial processes of the media defendant responsible for publishing a defamatory statement because the plaintiff is entitled to discover information that permits a meaningful inquiry into whether the statement was made maliciously or recklessly).

2005Accordingly, public officials could not recover for defamation claims absent proof that the statement was made with “actual malice.” The Hatchard court also acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Constitution recognizes reputation as “one of the fundamental rights that cannot be abridged without compliance with state constitutional standards of due process and equal protection.” Hatchard, supra at 193 , 532 A.2d at 350 .

2005The Superior Court in Davis v. Glanton, supra, summarized the factors the court must consider in determining whether to sustain the invocation of the qualified privilege: “Inquirer also asserts that the trial court’s order is violative of the qualified First Amendment privilege protecting members of the news media from divulging their sources, including unpublished information.

2000See Davis v. Glanton, 705 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. 1997), where the court stated: “Inquirer also asserts that the trial court’s order is violative of the qualified First Amendment privilege protecting members of the news media from divulging their sources, including unpublished information.