First Amendment challenge in Washington

2019In Kirby, the court found that the necessary elements of a First Amendment claim could not be fairly inferred from pleadings that did not contain the terms “First Amendment” or “free speech.” 124 Wn App. at 470-471 (citing Dewey, 95 Wn.

2019In Kirby, the court found that the necessary elements of a First Amendment claim could not be fairly inferred from pleadings that did not contain the terms “First Amendment” or “free speech.” 124 Wn App. at 470-471 (citing Dewey, 95 Wn.

2005App. 18 , 974 P.2d 847 (1999) (the court found the plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead a First Amendment violation because it did not allege all elements necessary to establish a prima facie free speech claim).

2005App. 18 , 974 P.2d 847 (1999) (the court found the plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead a First Amendment violation because it did not allege all elements necessary to establish a prima facie free speech claim).

2019In fact, the court ultimately chose to "decline to reach the federal constitutional issues," given the complex interaction between First Amendment doctrine and state law, and saw "no need to discuss the existence or content of a First Amendment right not to perform an artistic endeavor." Redgrave , 855 F.2d at 911 .

2017In fact, the court ultimately chose to “decline to reach the federal constitutional issues,’’ given the complex interaction between First Amendment doctrine and state law, and saw “no need to discuss the existence or content of a First Amendment right not to perform an artistic endeavor.’’Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 911 .

2019Regarding the First Amendment claim, the First Covenant II court held that the challenged statute fell within both of the exceptions to rational basis review recognized in Smith : it created a system of "individualized assessments" and it raised "hybrid" constitutional concerns (by restricting speech as well as religious free exercise). 120 Wash.2d at 214 -17 , 840 P.2d 174 .

2019Regarding the First Amendment claim, the First Covenant II court held that the challenged statute fell within both of the exceptions to rational basis review recognized in Smith : it created a system of "individualized assessments" and it raised "hybrid" constitutional concerns (by restricting speech as well as religious free exercise). 120 Wash.2d at 214 -17 , 840 P.2d 174 .

2016Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 .

2016Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 .

2016Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 , 117 S. Ct. 2329 , 138 L.

2016Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 , 117 S. Ct. 2329 , 138 L.

2016Mighty Movers, 152 Wn.2d at 349-351 .

2016Mighty Movers, 152 Wn.2d at 349-351 .

2016Majority at 13. 12               State v. K.H.-H., No. 91934-8 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) The majority relies primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990) for this deferential, "related to the underlying crime" test.

2016Majority at 13. 12               State v. K.H.-H., No. 91934-8 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) The majority relies primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990) for this deferential, "related to the underlying crime" test.

2016Under the Supreme Court's test in Martinez, the government cannot restrict the content of a prison inmate's speech in this context unless the restriction "further[ s] an important or substantial governmental interest" and is narrowly tailored so that it infringes on "no greater [speech] than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." 416 U.S. at 413 .

2016Under the Supreme Court’s test in Martinez , the government cannot restrict the content of a prison inmate’s speech in this context unless the restriction “further [s] an important or substantial governmental interest” and is narrowly tailored so that it infringes on “no greater [speech] than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” 416 U.S. at 413 .

2015Our treatment of the obstruction statute is in line with federal First Amendment analysis. 11               No. 88694-6 Madsen, C.J., concurring "[C]onduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 , 85 S. Ct. 476 , 13 L.

2015Our treatment of the obstruction statute is in line with federal First Amendment analysis. 11               No. 88694-6 Madsen, C.J., concurring "[C]onduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 , 85 S. Ct. 476 , 13 L.

2015But it agreed with the defense that "words alone do not constitute sufficient provocation" and "the giving of an 13 No. 3 1694-7-II1 State v. Bertram aggressor instruction where words alone are the asserted provocation would be error completely aside from any First Amendment issue." Id. at 911 .

2000Riley, 137 Wash.2d at 911 , 976 P.2d 624 .

2014The showing that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected free speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, “until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 , 123 S. Ct. 2191 , 156 L.

2011Instead, it noted that “[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges.” Id.

1988As an illustration, the federal statute that prohibits threatening death or bodily harm upon the President of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 871 (a), has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States against a first amendment challenge that it prohibits "pure speech." Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969).

1988As an illustration, the federal statute that prohibits threatening death or bodily harm upon the President of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 871 (a), has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States against a first amendment challenge that it prohibits "pure speech." Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969).

1997Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132 , 57 S.Ct. at 655-56 .

1997Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132 , 57 S.Ct. at 655-56 .

2026“A condition of community custody is unconstitutionally vague if it either fails to give fair warning of what is forbidden or fails to give ascertainable standards that will prevent arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 747 , 487 P.3d 893 (2021). “‘If persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 754 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 1.

2026“A condition of community custody is unconstitutionally vague if it either fails to give fair warning of what is forbidden or fails to give ascertainable standards that will prevent arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 747 , 487 P.3d 893 (2021). “‘If persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 754 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 1.

2026“A condition of community custody is unconstitutionally vague if it either fails to give fair warning of what is forbidden or fails to give ascertainable standards that will prevent arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 747 , 487 P.3d 893 (2021). “‘If persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 754 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 1.

2026“A condition of community custody is unconstitutionally vague if it either fails to give fair warning of what is forbidden or fails to give ascertainable standards that will prevent arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 747 , 487 P.3d 893 (2021). “‘If persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 754 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 1.

2013To avoid a First Amendment violation, a conviction for felony harassment must be based on a "true threat." State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 43, 46 , 84 P.3d 1215 (2004); State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274, 282 , 236 P.3d 858 (2010).

2013To avoid a First Amendment violation, a conviction for felony harassment must be based on a "true threat." State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 43, 46 , 84 P.3d 1215 (2004); State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274, 282 , 236 P.3d 858 (2010).

2021The court concluded that the United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) did not hold that an “‘intent to intimidate’” requirement must be imposed in all cases to avoid a First Amendment violation.

2021The court concluded that the United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) did not hold that an “‘intent to intimidate’” requirement must be imposed in all cases to avoid a First Amendment violation.

2019In Kirby, the plaintiff raised a new First Amendment claim in opposition to summary judgment. 124 Wn.

2019In Kirby, the plaintiff raised a new First Amendment claim in opposition to summary judgment. 124 Wn.