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19 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rebecca Willis v. Town of Marshall, North Carolina, Rebecca Willis v. Town of Marshall, North Carolinagreen2 sentences2021See Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251 , 264 n.6 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In the context of a First Amendment claim, the phrase ‘public forum’ is a term of art, as are ‘limited public forum,’ designated ‘public forum,’ and ‘non-public forum.’ ” (citations omitted)); see also Perry Educ. 2021See Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251 , 264 n.6 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In the context of a First Amendment claim, the phrase ‘public forum’ is a term of art, as are ‘limited public forum,’ designated ‘public forum,’ and ‘non-public forum.’ ” (citations omitted)); see also Perry Educ. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Frinksgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Frinks, 284 N.C. 472, 485 , 201 S.E.2d 858, 866-67 (1974) (holding a defendant’s First Amendment and Article I, Section 12 challenges to his prosecution for violating a parade ordinance failed because the ordinance complied with the First Amendment). 2021See State v. Frinks, 284 N.C. 472, 485 , 201 S.E.2d 858, 866-67 (1974) (holding a defendant’s First Amendment and Article I, Section 12 challenges to his prosecution for violating a parade ordinance failed because the ordinance complied with the First Amendment). | 2 | 2 |
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'ngreen2 sentences2021Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 , 74 L. 2021Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 , 74 L. | 2 | 2 |
Butt v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Cf. Butt v. State, 2017 UT 33, ¶ 29 (“The First Amendment defense at issue involves a mixed determination of law and fact.”). 2021Cf. Butt v. State, 2017 UT 33, ¶ 29 (“The First Amendment defense at issue involves a mixed determination of law and fact.”). | 2 | 2 |
Connick Ex Rel. Parish of Orleans v. Myersgreen2 sentences2025That distinction matters because, if those racial slurs were speech on a matter of public concern, the applicable First Amendment test then requires the reviewing court to balance Dr. Mitchell’s interest in commenting on those matters with the state’s interest “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (cleaned up). 2025That distinction matters because, if those racial slurs were speech on a matter of public concern, the applicable First Amendment test then requires the reviewing court to balance Dr. Mitchell’s interest in commenting on those matters with the state’s interest “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2018Answering this question determines whether the First Amendment is implicated." State v. Bishop , 368 N.C. 869 , 872, 787 S.E.2d 814 , 817 (2016). 2 A. Is the First Amendment Implicated I first note that, though the State may have argued this "threshold" issue at trial, on appeal the State seems to concede that the statute does implicate the First Amendment, as it does not argue this issue in its brief-its arguments are limited to contentions that the statute survives First Amendment analysis pursuant to either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. 2018Answering this question determines whether the First Amendment is implicated." State v. Bishop , 368 N.C. 869 , 872, 787 S.E.2d 814 , 817 (2016). 2 A. Is the First Amendment Implicated I first note that, though the State may have argued this "threshold" issue at trial, on appeal the State seems to concede that the statute does implicate the First Amendment, as it does not argue this issue in its brief-its arguments are limited to contentions that the statute survives First Amendment analysis pursuant to either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 2144green2 sentences2015Namely, while the Supreme Court of the United States has often invalidated specific applications of statutes under as-applied challenges, see, e.g., McCullen, _ U.S. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2528, 2541 , that Court has also made clear that First Amendment doctrine specifically permits litigants to make facial challenges based on overbreadth, see, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 , 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (“In the First Amendment context, however, this Court recognizes a second type offacial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitut 2015Namely, while the Supreme Court of the United States has often invalidated specific applications of statutes under as-applied challenges, see, e.g., McCullen, _ U.S. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2528, 2541 , that Court has also made clear that First Amendment doctrine specifically permits litigants to make facial challenges based on overbreadth, see, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 , 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (“In the First Amendment context, however, this Court recognizes a second type offacial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitut | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2015Namely, while the Supreme Court of the United States has often invalidated specific applications of statutes under as-applied challenges, see, e.g., McCullen, _ U.S. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2528, 2541 , that Court has also made clear that First Amendment doctrine specifically permits litigants to make facial challenges based on overbreadth, see, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 , 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (“In the First Amendment context, however, this Court recognizes a second type offacial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitut 2015Namely, while the Supreme Court of the United States has often invalidated specific applications of statutes under as-applied challenges, see, e.g., McCullen, _ U.S. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2528, 2541 , that Court has also made clear that First Amendment doctrine specifically permits litigants to make facial challenges based on overbreadth, see, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 , 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (“In the First Amendment context, however, this Court recognizes a second type offacial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitut | 1 | 1 |
cluster 783713green2 sentences2014Analysis “The first inquiry a court must undertake when a First Amendment claim is asserted is whether the plaintiff has engaged in ‘protected speech’.” Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 2014Analysis “The first inquiry a court must undertake when a First Amendment claim is asserted is whether the plaintiff has engaged in ‘protected speech’.” Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. | 1 | 1 |
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.green2 sentences2014Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 , 87 L.Ed.2d 567, 576 (1985)). 2014Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 , 87 L.Ed.2d 567, 576 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Burton v. City of Durhamgreen2 sentences2005App. 676, 680 , 457 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1995) (plaintiffs conviction in district court is conclusive as evidence that plaintiff was not arrested for his verbal protests in a subsequent First Amendment claim); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc., 100 N.C. 2005App. 676, 680 , 457 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1995) (plaintiffs conviction in district court is conclusive as evidence that plaintiff was not arrested for his verbal protests in a subsequent First Amendment claim); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc., 100 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc.green2 sentences2005App. 676, 680 , 457 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1995) (plaintiffs conviction in district court is conclusive as evidence that plaintiff was not arrested for his verbal protests in a subsequent First Amendment claim); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc., 100 N.C. 2005App. 676, 680 , 457 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1995) (plaintiffs conviction in district court is conclusive as evidence that plaintiff was not arrested for his verbal protests in a subsequent First Amendment claim); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc., 100 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
California Democratic Party v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2002See id. 2002See id. | 1 | 1 |
El Vocero De Puerto Rico v. Puerto Ricogreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 973, 992 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean International News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 , 124 L. 1999Ed. 2d 973, 992 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean International News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 , 124 L. | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporationgreen2 sentences1999For example, one court has stated, “Where the First Amendment guarantees access, . . . access may be denied only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180 (applying First Amendment access standard for criminal trials from Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510 , 78 L. 1999For example, one court has stated, “Where the First Amendment guarantees access, . . . access may be denied only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180 (applying First Amendment access standard for criminal trials from Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510 , 78 L. | 1 | 1 |
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginiagreen2 sentences1999The United States Supreme Court has indicated that trial court proceedings in criminal *461 cases may not be summarily closed when the trial court is faced with a First Amendment claim to a right of access, “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 , 65 L. 1999The United States Supreme Court has indicated that trial court proceedings in criminal *461 cases may not be summarily closed when the trial court is faced with a First Amendment claim to a right of access, “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 , 65 L. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 412117green2 sentences1997See id. 1997See id. | 1 | 1 |
Jane Niehaus and Joyce Neumann v. Kansas Bar Association, John Gardner, and Marcia Poellgreen1 sentence1991Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass’n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1986) (state action required for claims under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home of Va., 709 F.2d 284 , 286-87 (4th Cir. 1983) (state action required for First Amendment claim). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Veilleux v. National Broadcasting Co.
green
2 sentences2021On questions of constitutional law, our review is “plenary.” Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 106 . 2021On questions of constitutional law, our review is “plenary.” Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 106 . | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Smith v. Privette
green
2 sentences2020Smith, 128 N.C. 2020Smith, 128 N.C. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Allied Veterans of the World, Inc. v. Seminole County
green
2 sentences2012Id.; see also Allied Veterans of the World, Inc.: Affiliate 67 v. Seminole County, Fla., 783 F.Supp.2d 1197 (M.D.Fla.2011) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a similar law prohibiting the use of "simulated gambling devices" in sweepstakes concluding the law regulated conduct not speech); Affiliate 67 v. Seminole County, Fla., 2011 WL 3958437 (M.D.Fla. 2012Id.; see also Allied Veterans of the World, Inc.: Affiliate 67 v. Seminole County, Fla., 783 F.Supp.2d 1197 (M.D.Fla.2011) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a similar law prohibiting the use of "simulated gambling devices" in sweepstakes concluding the law regulated conduct not speech); Affiliate 67 v. Seminole County, Fla., 2011 WL 3958437 (M.D.Fla. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Cassidy
green
2 sentences2019This is in sharp contrast to a telephone call, letter or e-mail specifically addressed to and directed at another person ...." See U.S. v. Cassidy , 814 F.Supp.2d 574 , 578 (D. 2019This is in sharp contrast to a telephone call, letter or e-mail specifically addressed to and directed at another person ...." See U.S. v. Cassidy , 814 F.Supp.2d 574 , 578 (D. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Brandenburg v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2018More importantly to this analysis, the trial court did not give any instructions defining what could constitute a "threat" or "intimidation." Specifically, the instruction given allowed the jury to convict Defendant without making any determination that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that anything Defendant, Dan, or Kathryn did constituted a "true threat," or that limited any conspiracy to one in which the alleged conspirators intended to communicate any "true threat." Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 , 448-49, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 1830-31, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 , 434 (1969) (as applied Firs 2018More importantly to this analysis, the trial court did not give any instructions defining what could constitute a "threat" or "intimidation." Specifically, the instruction given allowed the jury to convict Defendant without making any determination that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that anything Defendant, Dan, or Kathryn did constituted a "true threat," or that limited any conspiracy to one in which the alleged conspirators intended to communicate any "true threat." Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 , 448-49, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 1830-31, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 , 434 (1969) (as applied Firs | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey
green
1 sentence2017Klagsbrun , 53 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting General Council on Fin. & Admin. of United Methodist Church v. Cal. Superior Court , 439 U.S. 1369 , 1373, 58 L.Ed. 2d 77 , 82 (1978) ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
General Council on Finance & Administration, United Methodist Church v. California Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017Klagsbrun , 53 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting General Council on Fin. & Admin. of United Methodist Church v. Cal. Superior Court , 439 U.S. 1369 , 1373, 58 L.Ed. 2d 77 , 82 (1978) ). 2017Klagsbrun , 53 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting General Council on Fin. & Admin. of United Methodist Church v. Cal. Superior Court , 439 U.S. 1369 , 1373, 58 L.Ed. 2d 77 , 82 (1978) ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
green
2 sentences1999For example, one court has stated, “Where the First Amendment guarantees access, . . . access may be denied only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180 (applying First Amendment access standard for criminal trials from Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510 , 78 L. 1999For example, one court has stated, “Where the First Amendment guarantees access, . . . access may be denied only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180 (applying First Amendment access standard for criminal trials from Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510 , 78 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
cluster 419755
green
1 sentence1991Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass’n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1986) (state action required for claims under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home of Va., 709 F.2d 284 , 286-87 (4th Cir. 1983) (state action required for First Amendment claim). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.