First Amendment challenge in Ohio

2026See Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, 2016-Ohio-8014, ¶ 18 (recognizing that “Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is a content-based regulation of political speech and therefore must withstand strict scrutiny”); Republican Party of 44 January Term, 2026 Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (applying strict scrutiny to a provision in a state’s judicial code of conduct that prohibited a judicial candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues); Williams- Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“A State may restrict the speech of a judicial candi

2026See Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, 2016-Ohio-8014, ¶ 18 (recognizing that “Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is a content-based regulation of political speech and therefore must withstand strict scrutiny”); Republican Party of 44 January Term, 2026 Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (applying strict scrutiny to a provision in a state’s judicial code of conduct that prohibited a judicial candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues); Williams- Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“A State may restrict the speech of a judicial candi

2026In rejecting a First Amendment challenge to Arizona’s judicial 47 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO anti-endorsement rule, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Wolfson that “[a] rule requiring judges to recuse themselves from every case where they endorsed or campaigned for one of the parties could ‘disable many jurisdictions’ and cripple the judiciary.” Id., quoting Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 454-455 .

2026In rejecting a First Amendment challenge to Arizona’s judicial 47 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO anti-endorsement rule, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Wolfson that “[a] rule requiring judges to recuse themselves from every case where they endorsed or campaigned for one of the parties could ‘disable many jurisdictions’ and cripple the judiciary.” Id., quoting Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 454-455 .

2021See Packingham at 1735-1737 (invalidating a North Carolina statute that prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing commercial social-networking websites); see also Toledo Blade Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2010-Ohio-1533 , 926 N.E.2d 634, at ¶ 25 , quoting Citizens United v. Fed.

2021See Packingham at 1735-1737 (invalidating a North Carolina statute that prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing commercial social-networking websites); see also Toledo Blade Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 149 , 2010-Ohio-1533 , 926 N.E.2d 634, at ¶ 25 , quoting Citizens United v. Fed.

2020In that case, the court said: In Bench Billboard Co. v. Covington, 465 Fed.Appx. 395, 406 (6th Cir.2012), the Sixth Circuit rejected a First Amendment claim brought by BBC against the city of Covington, which was similar to the First Amendment claim BBC asserts in this case.

2020In that case, the court said: In Bench Billboard Co. v. Covington, 465 Fed.Appx. 395, 406 (6th Cir.2012), the Sixth Circuit rejected a First Amendment claim brought by BBC against the city of Covington, which was similar to the First Amendment claim BBC asserts in this case.

1984See State v. Daniels (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 220 [ 15 O.O.3d 232 ], where an over-breadth challenge was limited to the situation of the one making the challenge, absent a First Amendment exception not applicable here.

1984See State v. Daniels (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 220 [ 15 O.O.3d 232 ], where an over-breadth challenge was limited to the situation of the one making the challenge, absent a First Amendment exception not applicable here.

2017Newlin v. Downing, 43 Ohio St.3d 109, 115 , 539 N.E.2d 140 (1989), quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 505 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). {¶18} Pollock was convicted of pandering obscenity under R.C. 2907.32(A)(2), which provides as follows: No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or performance involved, shall * * * [p]romote or advertise for sale, delivery, or dissemination; sell, deliver, publicly disseminate, publicly display, exhibit, present, rent, or provide; or offer or agree to sell, deliver, publicly disseminate, publicly display, exhibi

2017Newlin v. Downing, 43 Ohio St.3d 109, 115 , 539 N.E.2d 140 (1989), quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 505 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). {¶18} Pollock was convicted of pandering obscenity under R.C. 2907.32(A)(2), which provides as follows: No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or performance involved, shall * * * [p]romote or advertise for sale, delivery, or dissemination; sell, deliver, publicly disseminate, publicly display, exhibit, present, rent, or provide; or offer or agree to sell, deliver, publicly disseminate, publicly display, exhibi

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Maxcy, 2018-Ohio-4035, at ¶ 28 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (recognizing the failure of the majority to order supplemental briefing before deciding a constitutional issue sua sponte).

2026The majority, quoting an opinion concurring in judgment only, asserts that sua sponte raising the waived and unbriefed First Amendment issue is appropriate because we “‘are obligated in the first instance to ensure that the rule[s] comport[] with constitutional guarantees.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Id. at ¶ 39, quoting In re Application of Jones, 2018-Ohio-4182, ¶ 34 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only). {¶ 101} Notwithstanding that a separate opinion is not binding authority, the separate opinion in In re Application of Jones does not stand for the proposition that this court may,

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Platt v. Bd. of Commrs. on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (Ohio); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (Arizona); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 691-692 (6th Cir. 2016) (Kentucky); Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1028 (8th Cir. 2012) (Minnesota). {¶ 88} Even if this court had before it a First Amendment challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 4.1(A)(3), I would hold that respondent John William Rudduck’s First Amendment rights are not a defense to the disciplinary action at issue here.

2026See Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, 2016-Ohio-8014, ¶ 18 (recognizing that “Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is a content-based regulation of political speech and therefore must withstand strict scrutiny”); Republican Party of 44 January Term, 2026 Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (applying strict scrutiny to a provision in a state’s judicial code of conduct that prohibited a judicial candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues); Williams- Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“A State may restrict the speech of a judicial candi

2026See Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, 2016-Ohio-8014, ¶ 18 (recognizing that “Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is a content-based regulation of political speech and therefore must withstand strict scrutiny”); Republican Party of 44 January Term, 2026 Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (applying strict scrutiny to a provision in a state’s judicial code of conduct that prohibited a judicial candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues); Williams- Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“A State may restrict the speech of a judicial candi

2025Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). -8- Case No. 16-25-01 {¶22} This Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a civil stalking protection order in Bey v. Rasawehr, 2019-Ohio-57 (3d Dist.) (judgment rev’d in part by Bey v. Rasawehr, 2020-Ohio-3301 ).

2025Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). -8- Case No. 16-25-01 {¶22} This Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a civil stalking protection order in Bey v. Rasawehr, 2019-Ohio-57 (3d Dist.) (judgment rev’d in part by Bey v. Rasawehr, 2020-Ohio-3301 ).

2025See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64-67 (1964) (holding that the actual-malice standard from 10 January Term, 2025 New York Times v. Sullivan applied to attorney speech critical of the judiciary); see also Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 557-558 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to speech restrictions on elected judges).

2025See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64-67 (1964) (holding that the actual-malice standard from 10 January Term, 2025 New York Times v. Sullivan applied to attorney speech critical of the judiciary); see also Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 557-558 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to speech restrictions on elected judges).

2025See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64-67 (1964) (holding that the actual-malice standard from 10 January Term, 2025 New York Times v. Sullivan applied to attorney speech critical of the judiciary); see also Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 557-558 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to speech restrictions on elected judges).

2025See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64-67 (1964) (holding that the actual-malice standard from 10 January Term, 2025 New York Times v. Sullivan applied to attorney speech critical of the judiciary); see also Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 557-558 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to speech restrictions on elected judges).