24 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hodges v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See also Hodges, 912 So.2d at 760 ( Roper does not apply to the imposition of a death sentence where defendant was over eighteen, nor is the sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). ¶24. 1998See also Hodges, 912 So. 2d at 760 (Roper does not apply to the imposition of a death sentence where defendant was over eighteen, nor is the sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). ¶24. | 2 | 2 |
Bradshaw v. Stategreen2 sentences1970See Bullock v. State, 222 So.2d 692 (Miss.1969), Evans v. State, 204 So.2d 570 (Miss.1967), and Bradshaw v. State, 192 So.2d 387 (Miss.1966), in each of which we held that the larceny charge in the indictment was charged not as a substantive offense, but as demonstrative of burglarious intent, and therefore, the charge of grand larceny was not subject to separate sentence. 1969See Evans v. State, 204 So.2d 570 (Miss.1967) and Bradshaw v. State, 192 So.2d 387 (Miss.1966), in each of which we held that the larceny charged in the indictment was charged not as a substantive offense, but as demonstrative of burglarious intent, and therefore, the charge of grand larceny was not subject to separate sentence. | 2 | 2 |
Evans v. Stategreen2 sentences1970See Bullock v. State, 222 So.2d 692 (Miss.1969), Evans v. State, 204 So.2d 570 (Miss.1967), and Bradshaw v. State, 192 So.2d 387 (Miss.1966), in each of which we held that the larceny charge in the indictment was charged not as a substantive offense, but as demonstrative of burglarious intent, and therefore, the charge of grand larceny was not subject to separate sentence. 1969See Evans v. State, 204 So.2d 570 (Miss.1967) and Bradshaw v. State, 192 So.2d 387 (Miss.1966), in each of which we held that the larceny charged in the indictment was charged not as a substantive offense, but as demonstrative of burglarious intent, and therefore, the charge of grand larceny was not subject to separate sentence. | 2 | 2 |
Bullock v. Stategreen2 sentences1975Under the case of Bullock v. State, 222 So.2d 692 (Miss.1969), and the authorities therein cited, this sentence is error. 1970See Bullock v. State, 222 So.2d 692 (Miss.1969), Evans v. State, 204 So.2d 570 (Miss.1967), and Bradshaw v. State, 192 So.2d 387 (Miss.1966), in each of which we held that the larceny charge in the indictment was charged not as a substantive offense, but as demonstrative of burglarious intent, and therefore, the charge of grand larceny was not subject to separate sentence. | 1 | 2 |
Sweat v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The sentencing order was vacated only to allow the trial court to complete the ministerial duty of removing the enhancement and issuing an order without the illegal portion of the sentence. ¶ 35. "[W]here a convicted defendant receives an illegal sentence, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing because the defendant suffered prejudice." Sweat v. State , 912 So.2d 458 , 461 (Miss. 2005). 2018The sentencing order was vacated only to allow the trial court to complete the ministerial duty of removing the enhancement and issuing an order without the illegal portion of the sentence. ¶35. “[W]here a convicted defendant receives an illegal sentence, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing because the defendant suffered prejudice.” Sweat v. State, 912 So. 2d 458, 461 (Miss. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Babbitt v. Stategreen1 sentence2012An offender in the ISP is “under the full and complete jurisdiction of the [MDOC].” Miss.Code Ann. § 47-5-1008(3) (Rev.2011); See also Babbitt v. State, 755 So.2d 406, 409 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000) (holding a circuit court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate an offender’s sentence for a violation of the ISP that occurred while the offender was in the ISP). | 1 | 1 |
Edlin v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Williams cites Edlin v. State, 523 So.2d 42, 49 (Miss. 1988) and claims that based on this decision, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse his “single juror instruction.” The court in Edlin reversed because the jury was not instructed that their decision had to be unanimous, stating: In this contention the State is wrong and this case is distinguished from Mallette [v. State, 349 So.2d 546 (Miss. 1977)7, in that the Edlin jury was never instructed that their verdict must be unanimous. | 1 | 1 |
Luckett v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Luckett v. State, 582 So.2d 428, 429-30 (Miss.1991) (where a judge committed plain error and denied a defendant due process by issuing a sentence in violation of statute); Smith v. State, 477 So.2d 191 (Miss.1985) (where a defendant was sentenced under a harsher statute that was not the subject of the indictment). ¶ 7. | 1 | 1 |
Duckworth v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Duckworth v. State, 477 So.2d 935, 938 (Miss.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. State
green
2 sentences2006Robinson, 585 So.2d at 759 . 2003Robinson, 585 So.2d at 759 . | 6 | 1997–2006 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1998As the supreme court said in another capital rape conviction, defense counsel "would not appeal this case and assign as error [the sentencing issue] if he was aware that the case might be reversed and remanded for consideration of imposing the death penalty." Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100 , 105 n. 1 (Miss.1983). 1996As the supreme court said in another capital rape conviction, defense counsel "would not appeal this case and assign as error [the sentencing issue] if he was aware that the case might be reversed and remanded for consideration of imposing the death penalty." Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 100 , 105 n. 1 (Miss. 1983). | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Winston v. State
green
1 sentence2018Winston v. State , 754 So.2d 1154 , 1156-57 (Miss. 1999) (Court of Appeals erred by sua sponte vacating sentence when neither party assigned the sentence as error on appeal). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mallette v. State
green
1 sentence2008Williams cites Edlin v. State, 523 So.2d 42, 49 (Miss. 1988) and claims that based on this decision, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse his “single juror instruction.” The court in Edlin reversed because the jury was not instructed that their decision had to be unanimous, stating: In this contention the State is wrong and this case is distinguished from Mallette [v. State, 349 So.2d 546 (Miss. 1977)7, in that the Edlin jury was never instructed that their verdict must be unanimous. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence2006See Luckett v. State, 582 So.2d 428, 429-30 (Miss.1991) (where a judge committed plain error and denied a defendant due process by issuing a sentence in violation of statute); Smith v. State, 477 So.2d 191 (Miss.1985) (where a defendant was sentenced under a harsher statute that was not the subject of the indictment). ¶ 7. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Richardson v. State
green
1 sentence2001“If [Patrick] expected a more lenient sentence, he should have questioned the sentence at the hearing instead of two years later.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Stromas v. State
green
1 sentence2001Declaring a sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution carries a heavy burden and only in rare cases should this Court make such a finding." Stromas, 618 So.2d at 123 . ¶ 31. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Solem v. Helm
red
1 sentence2000Relying upon Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277 (1983), he insists that this sentence is a violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, which is guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ¶ 11. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gaskin v. State
green
1 sentence2000In Gaskin v. State , 618 So.2d 103 , 108 (Miss. 1993), the court held that the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the applicable minimum and maximum sentences was harmless error where it is shown that the defendant was correctly informed by another source. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Presley v. State
green
1 sentence1995In Presley v. State, 474 So.2d 612 (Miss. 1985), we upheld Presley's conviction for armed robbery, but remanded for a new sentence hearing. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Woodson v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences1976Remanding the case to be heard by a jury on the question of sentence only would meet the requirements of Woodson v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), where the Supreme Court denounced treating all persons convicted of a designated offense in the same manner as members of a "faceless undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." The procedure which I favor would not amount to this Court defining or prescribing the penalty for capital murder because the capital murder statute is a product of legislative action. 1976Remanding the case to be heard by a jury on the question of sentence only would meet the requirements of Woodson v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), where the Supreme Court denounced treating all persons convicted of a designated offense in the same manner as members of a "faceless undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." The procedure which I favor would not amount to this Court defining or prescribing the penalty for capital murder because the capital murder statute is a product of legislative action. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.