92 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mossgreen2 sentences2021A defendant’s sentence is in violation of the proportionate penalties clause where the penalty imposed is “ ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487 (quoting People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003)). 2020A defendant’s sentence is in violation of the proportionate penalties clause where the penalty imposed is “ ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487 (quoting People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003)). | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Walter Moray Williamsgreen2 sentences2015To hold otherwise would be " 'to hold that the enhancement of an adult criminal sentence requires a higher level of due process protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence.' " Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1199 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989)). 2015To hold otherwise would be " 'to hold that the enhancement of an adult criminal sentence requires a higher level of due process protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence.' " Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1199 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989)). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Shannon Wayne Tighegreen2 sentences2015To hold otherwise would be " 'to hold that the enhancement of an adult criminal sentence requires a higher level of due process protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence.' " Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1199 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989)). 2015To hold otherwise would be " 'to hold that the enhancement of an adult criminal sentence requires a higher level of due process protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence.' " Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1199 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989)). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Steffensgreen2 sentences2011He cites People v. Steffens, 131 Ill. 2010He cites People v. Steffens, 131 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2025See People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 374 (1988) (“[B]y its explicit terms, Rule 604(d) states that issues not preserved in a motion to vacate a guilty plea are waived. 2023Under Rule 604(d), defendant had 30 days from the imposition of the sentence to challenge the plea by filing a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment, and “any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to *** withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived.” See People v. Stewart 123 Ill. 2d 368, 374 (1988) (applying the forfeiture rule to postconviction proceedings as well as to appeals). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Van Schoyckgreen2 sentences2016Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is a C 2015Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the -7- statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Whitegreen2 sentences2016Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is a C 2015Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the -7- statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2016Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is a C 2015Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the -7- statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2016Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is a C 2015Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the -7- statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences2016Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is a C 2015Nor does making the sentence for a violation of the -7- statute a Class 4 felony or a Class 2 felony transform the offense of AUUW into a different “form.” See People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (2009) (“Under the plain language of the statute, there is only one offense of driving under the influence. *** The enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not create a new offense, but rather serve only to enhance the punishment.”); People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 112 (2008) (involuntary manslaughter statute, providing that if the victim was a family or household member then the offense is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sonntaggreen2 sentences2005App. 3d at 857 , 605 N.E.2d at 1066 ("[w]e are satisfied that the sentences imposed were not so interrelated as to require a new sentence hearing"). 2005App. 3d at 857 , 605 N.E.2d at 1066 (“[w]e are satisfied that the sentences imposed were not so interrelated as to require a new sentence hearing”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lindsaygreen2 sentences2005People v. Lindsay , 263 Ill. 2005People v. Lindsay, 263 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Staceygreen2 sentences2003People v. Stacey , 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 , 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). 2003People v. Stacey , 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 , 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Arnared2 sentences2001People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). 2001People v. Arna , 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Baileygreen2 sentences2001See Bailey, 311 Ill.App.3d at 270 , 244 Ill.Dec. 144 , 724 N.E.2d 1032 (holding that defendant waived any objection to his sentence by failing to file a postsentencing motion and that there was no other basis on which to review the sentence such as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 2001See Bailey, 311 Ill.App.3d at 270 , 244 Ill.Dec. 144 , 724 N.E.2d 1032 (holding that defendant waived any objection to his sentence by failing to file a postsentencing motion and that there was no other basis on which to review the sentence such as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). | 2 | 2 |
Cabana v. Bullockgreen2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 704, 716-17 , 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 (1986), for the proposition that a finding of culpability need not be made at any particular stage of the sentence hearing. 1999Ed. 2d 704, 716-17 , 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 (1986), for the proposition that a finding of culpability need not be made at any particular stage of the sentence hearing. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Beangreen2 sentences1998Once the State has met this burden of proving an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence hearing moves to a second stage in which “a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the State and defendant is to occur, and the State has no burden of proving that the weight of these factors is such that a death penalty should be imposed.” People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 138 (1990). 1998Once the State has met this burden of proving an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence hearing moves to a second stage in which "a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the State and defendant is to occur, and the State has no burden of proving that the weight of these factors is such that a death penalty should be imposed." People v. Bean, 137 Ill.2d 65, 138 , 147 Ill.Dec. 891 , 560 N.E.2d 258 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences2023People v. Flores, 404 Ill. 2023People v. Flores, 404 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Easleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Birgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Haspreygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sharpe
green
2 sentences2021A defendant’s sentence is in violation of the proportionate penalties clause where the penalty imposed is “ ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487 (quoting People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003)). 2020A defendant’s sentence is in violation of the proportionate penalties clause where the penalty imposed is “ ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487 (quoting People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003)). | 4 | 2018–2021 |
People v. Perruquet
green
2 sentences2007The reason we review the sentence under this standard is because after seeing the evidence and viewing the defendant, the trial judge is "in a better position to determine the punishment to be imposed." Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154 . 2007The reason we review the sentence under this standard is because after seeing the evidence and viewing the defendant, the trial judge is “in a better position to determine the punishment to be imposed.” Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154 . | 4 | 1979–2007 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2023ORDER ¶1 Held: Petitioner failed to make a substantial showing that the sentencing court imposed a sentence in violation of the eighth amendment under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and failed to allege facts showing her delay in raising her proportionate penalties claim was not due to culpable negligence. 2021Such a sentence would be in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 and, as such, was involuntary.” -8- In the very next sentence, defendant states “Brown acknowledges that he did not raise the issue in his postconviction petition. | 3 | 2021–2023 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2001We are asked to examine the statutory sentencing scheme employed in this case, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. 2001We are asked to examine the statutory sentencing scheme employed in this case, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. | 3 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2017People v. Ernest Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19 (2004). 2017Ernest Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2008Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156 . 2008Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156 , 189 Ill.Dec. 49 , 619 N.E.2d 750 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Tek Ngo
green
2 sentences2008Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence was in violation of the sixth amendment as it was “based upon impermissible fact[-]finding.” Ngo, 406 F.3d at 844 . 2008Accordingly, the defendant's sentence was in violation of the sixth amendment as it was "based upon impermissible fact[-]finding." Ngo, 406 F.3d at 844 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Foster
green
2 sentences2006In People v. Foster, 171 Ill.2d 469 , 216 Ill.Dec. 565 , 665 N.E.2d 823 (1996), the defendant failed to file a motion for reconsideration of a sentence in violation of Rule 604(d). 2006In People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996), the defendant failed to file a motion for reconsideration of a sentence in violation of Rule 604(d). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. McClanahan
green
2 sentences2005That sentence, which refers to stipulations to lab reports, reads as follows: “Unlike section 115—15, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.” McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137-38 . 2005That sentence, which refers to stipulations to lab reports, reads as follows: “Unlike section 115–15, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.” McClanahan , 191 Ill. 2d at 137-38 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Lee
green
2 sentences2003Lee , 318 Ill. 2003Lee, 318 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2000In an attempt to preclude the application of the rationale of Evans to the instant matter, defendant attempts to draw an analogy between the cause at bar and our prior decisions in People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998), wherein we held that defendants are not required to withdraw their guilty pleas prior to a sentence challenge if the sentence is “void” because it “does not conform with the statute.” Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333 ; Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 413 . 2000In an attempt to preclude the application of the rationale of Evans to the instant matter, defendant attempts to draw an analogy between the cause at bar and our prior decisions in People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998), wherein we held that defendants are not required to withdraw their guilty pleas prior to a sentence challenge if the sentence is “void” because it “does not conform with the statute.” Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333 ; Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 413 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2000In an attempt to preclude the application of the rationale of Evans to the instant matter, defendant attempts to draw an analogy between the cause at bar and our prior decisions in People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998), wherein we held that defendants are not required to withdraw their guilty pleas prior to a sentence challenge if the sentence is “void” because it “does not conform with the statute.” Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333 ; Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 413 . 2000In an attempt to preclude the application of the rationale of Evans to the instant matter, defendant attempts to draw an analogy between the cause at bar and our prior decisions in People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998), wherein we held that defendants are not required to withdraw their guilty pleas prior to a sentence challenge if the sentence is “void” because it “does not conform with the statute.” Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 333 ; Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d at 413 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Dorsey green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Bonds green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Palmer-Smith green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Villalobos green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Dickey green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Hillier green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Whitfield green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Bui green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Buffer green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Parker green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Daniel J. Balint and James A. Ketchum green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Hough green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Banks green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Conley green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Schutz green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Taylor green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Young green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Osborn green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Savage neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Rickman green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Taylor neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Cox green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Dukett green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Vallero green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.